On Tue, Nov 05, 2002 at 05:15:25PM -0800, bear wrote:
| I remember having exactly your reaction (plus issues about patenting
| math and the USPTO being subject to coercion/collusion from the NSA
| and influence-peddling and so on...) when the RSA patent issued - but
| RSA is free now, and RSA secur
Hello Jason:
>"Page 193 and 210 do talk about having an identifying
>value encoded in the credentials which the holder can
>prove is or isn't the same as in other credentials. However,
>the discussion on page 193 is with respect to building
>digital pseudonyms"
No, not at all. The paragraph o
bear wrote:
>
> It's not terribly helpful for someone to lock up an idea for twenty
> years, but honestly it may be at least that long before the legal and
> cultural infrastructure is ready to fully take advantage of it anyway.
Absolutely. Which is precisely why we need an extension to patent
l
At 5:15 PM -0800 11/5/02, bear wrote:
>It's not terribly helpful for someone to lock up an idea for twenty
>years, but honestly it may be at least that long before the legal and
>cultural infrastructure is ready to fully take advantage of it anyway.
The classic example is Arthur C. Clarke's invent
(Re: my paper at http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/151/ )
Stefan Brands wrote:
> - The system is subject to a simple attack. The problem lies with the
> multiplication of the hashes. Let's take the Chaum blinding as an
[...]
(For our readers at home, that was the vulnerability I mentioned in
On Tue, 5 Nov 2002, Nomen Nescio wrote:
>That's just one possibility. The point is, your ideas are going nowhere
>using your present strategy. Either this technology won't be used at
>all, or inferior but unrestricted implementations will be explored,
>as in the recent work. If you want thing
Stefan Brands writes regarding http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/151/:
> The paper shows some promise but, apart from being insecure, has other
> drawbacks that should be addressed:
>
> ... My work... introduced by myself... my MIT press book...
>
> In addition to various other drawbacks pointed out by
The paper shows some promise but, apart from being insecure, has other
drawbacks that should be addressed:
- The system is subject to a simple attack. The problem lies with the
multiplication of the hashes. Let's take the Chaum blinding as an
example, something similar work for the "Laurie" prot
(Re: my paper at http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/151/ )
Let me first point out that Dr. Stefan Brands noted an insecurity in
my system which would allow malicious users to obtain issuer signatures on
arbitrary documents.
This is due to the fact that users aren't prevented from using
Some comments on this paper comparing efficiency, and functionality
with Camenisch, Chaum, Brands.
On Tue, Oct 29, 2002 at 11:49:21PM +, Jason Holt wrote:
> http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/151/
>
> It mentions how to use the blinding technique Ben Laurie describes
> in his Lucre paper, which I do
--- begin forwarded text
Status: RO
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2002 23:49:21 + (UTC)
From: Jason Holt <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Old-Subject: patent free(?) anonymous credential system pre-print
Subject: patent free(?) anonymous credential system pre-print
Sender: [EMAIL PRO
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