Is there a way to answer this question as a query against PyPI metadata? It
seems like the information ought to be there, in some form...
-g
> On Apr 14, 2015, at 11:22, Alex Gaynor wrote:
>
> Have we confirmed that all important downstreams (pyOpenSSL, Twisted,
> eventually Fabric/Paramiko,
Thank you very much to Jean-Paul and Hynek for getting out this most recent
release! (And thanks to Hynek for my opportunity to contribute my first patch
to pyOpenSSL ;-)).
-glyph
> On Apr 15, 2015, at 14:10, Alex Gaynor wrote:
>
> Thank you for your years of maintenance of
h cryptography, and speed up `pip install
twisted[tls]´ on OS X. Thanks for making this happen, Paul!
-glyph
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> On Jun 27, 2016, at 22:23, Vladimir Didenko
> wrote:
>
> Resume: you can use nonblocking ssl socket with standard ssl module and
> PyOpenSSL. Though it requires some work from you (but it is not hard!).
The better way to use pyOpenSSL (and more recent stdlib ssl modules) is to use
Memory B
we'll have a new release fairly soon (I know the goal is to have
one out before April).
-glyph
> On Mar 2, 2020, at 10:36 PM, Ron Frederick wrote:
>
> You might want to see if AsyncSSH (https://asyncssh.readthedocs.io
> <https://asyncssh.readthedocs.io/>) can do what
> On Jun 30, 2024, at 10:45 AM, Ben Portner via Cryptography-dev
> wrote:
>
> I am thinking: Isn't this exactly where you come in and show *the one*
> configuration of the options and knobs that is safe to use? I mean, you are
> spelling it out right there. Many people (me included) have no i
> On Jul 10, 2024, at 2:45 PM, Benjamin W. Portner via Cryptography-dev
> wrote:
>
> Hi Glyph,
>
> thanks for chiming in and for the interesting insights from the
> implementation side. I wasn't aware of the difficulties involved in providing
> the recipien
> On Jul 10, 2024, at 2:45 PM, Benjamin W. Portner via Cryptography-dev
> wrote:
>
> Hi Glyph,
>
> thanks for chiming in and for the interesting insights from the
> implementation side. I wasn't aware of the difficulties involved in providing
> the recipien
> On Jul 15, 2024, at 11:23 AM, Ben Portner via Cryptography-dev
> wrote:
>
>> "What would you do with metadata about KDF parameters, if you had them?"
>
> Correct me if I'm wrong. I believe those parameters (initial vector, number
> of rounds...) are required to restore the AES key from the
You will note that
https://cryptography.io/en/latest/hazmat/primitives/asymmetric/ed25519/#cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519.Ed25519PrivateKey.public_key
has parentheses after it in its description. That's it. You just forgot the
parens. i.e., try:
public_bytes = csr.public_k
> On Sep 11, 2024, at 6:27 AM, Robert Moskowitz wrote:
>
>> This is a fairly elementary Python mistake. Our documents and
>> resources are generally oriented towards people who have an existing
>> familiarity with Python. I'd strongly encourage you to develop a
>> greater comfort with Python in
implicitly assumes this option
will never be used.
If running the test suite is impossible in such an interpreter, then perhaps it
would be better to detect this configuration and fail hard, rather than
piecemeal supporting bits of it, especially if bugs like this potentially cause
security issue
gs are in a bit of a muddled state; pyOpenSSL is still the only
package available to do many things (in particular: TLS) but pull requests are
being refused on the grounds that Cryptography has superseded it, when there
still isn't a clear interop strategy. These methods (especially if prope
> On Jan 4, 2016, at 5:59 AM, Hynek Schlawack wrote:
>
> AFAIK, there hasn’t been a PR refused for this reason so far but there have
> always been awkward nudges in that direction.
Sorry, I probably contributed to some confusion there. I thought I saw earlier
in the thread that PRs had been r
> On Jun 29, 2016, at 23:09, Jay Gupta wrote:
>
> could you provide concrete examples of your criticism of other Python
> cryptographic packages, especially about poor algorithm interpretations?
What specific criticism are you referring to? Cryptography developers have
been critical of other
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