Re: it's not the crypto

2001-02-06 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold

At 8:58 AM -0500 2/5/2001, Steve Bellovin wrote:
Every now and then, something pops up that reinforces the point that
crypto can't solve all of our security and privacy problems.  Today's
installment can be found at
http://www.privacyfoundation.org/advisories/advemailwiretap.html

For almost all of us, the end systems are the weak points, not the
transmission!



While I certainly agree with your general point, I don't think this 
case is good exemplar.

"The exploit requires the person reading a wiretapped email
message to be using an HTML-enabled email reader that also
has JavaScript turned on by default."

The notion that e-mail should be permitted to contain arbitrary 
programs that are executed automatically by default on being opened 
is so over the top from a security stand point that it is hard to 
find language strong enough to condemn it.  It goes far beyond the 
ordinary risks of end systems.

The closest analogy I can thinking of is the early days of the 20th 
century when some doctors began prescribing radium suppositories for 
a variety of ills.

Arnold Reinhold




Re: it's not the crypto

2001-02-06 Thread Dan Geer


   The notion that e-mail should be permitted to contain arbitrary
   programs that are executed automatically by default on being opened
   is so over the top from a security stand point that it is hard to
   find language strong enough to condemn it.  It goes far beyond the
   ordinary risks of end systems.

And, yet, digital rights folk argue that the only way
data can be self protecting (the pre-requisite for data
being out and about on its own), is to wrap said data
in a program which the recipient must execute.  All the
music royalty or email self-destruction stuffs basically
take this position.  If auto-update of software really 
does take hold, whether by contract (UCITA) or by choice
(whopping convenient, that), receiving an executable with
long-lived aftereffect will be part of every ordinary
person's day.

Not denying your point at all -- merely trying to look
well down range.  I'm a send-by-reference-not-by-value
sort of guy, but as I see the world, e-mail attachments
are doubtless now the poor man's distributed filesystem,
and the momentum is with ever increasing amounts of 
executables being transmitted.  Consider, for an example
actually rather related to this Javascript e-mail issue,
the case of Zaplets (http://www.zaplet.com) which has
$100M+ saying that this is the future, or the stored
procedures in many specialized Oracle applications that
take the form of Java applets you download silently to
execute on your end.  

Contemplating retirement off the grid,

--dan






Re: it's not the crypto

2001-02-06 Thread Barney Wolff

Well, there's quite a distance between executing something that
is signed by a public entity during a transaction that I initiate,
and having code silently execute because something was pushed
to me unsolicited.

btw, the suggested workaround in the privacy advisory does not
appear to work - at least on my Outlook, turning off Javascript
for the Internet zone turns it off for IE too, which (alas!)
is too restrictive to be practical.  I have all the MS security
updates, according to their Office-Update site.

Barney Wolff

On Tue, Feb 06, 2001 at 04:58:39PM -0500, Dan Geer wrote:
 
The notion that e-mail should be permitted to contain arbitrary
programs that are executed automatically by default on being opened
is so over the top from a security stand point that it is hard to
find language strong enough to condemn it.  It goes far beyond the
ordinary risks of end systems.
 
 And, yet, digital rights folk argue that the only way
 data can be self protecting (the pre-requisite for data
 being out and about on its own), is to wrap said data
 in a program which the recipient must execute.  All the
 music royalty or email self-destruction stuffs basically
 take this position.  If auto-update of software really 
 does take hold, whether by contract (UCITA) or by choice
 (whopping convenient, that), receiving an executable with
 long-lived aftereffect will be part of every ordinary
 person's day.
 
 Not denying your point at all -- merely trying to look
 well down range.  I'm a send-by-reference-not-by-value
 sort of guy, but as I see the world, e-mail attachments
 are doubtless now the poor man's distributed filesystem,
 and the momentum is with ever increasing amounts of 
 executables being transmitted.  Consider, for an example
 actually rather related to this Javascript e-mail issue,
 the case of Zaplets (http://www.zaplet.com) which has
 $100M+ saying that this is the future, or the stored
 procedures in many specialized Oracle applications that
 take the form of Java applets you download silently to
 execute on your end.  
 
 Contemplating retirement off the grid,
 
 --dan