John S. Denker wrote:
More specifically, anybody who thinks the scheme
I described is vulnerable to a timing attack isn't
paying attention. I addressed this point several
times in my original note. All transmissions
adhere to a schedule -- independent of the amount,
timing, meaning, and other
It's a /dev/urandom which has been labeled /dev/random. It claims
to be a Yarrow implementation so is presumably only 160 bits strong.
(See http://www.counterpane.com/yarrow-notes.html.)
From http://www.hmug.org/man/4/urandom.html:
/dev/urandom is a compatibility nod to Linux. On Linux,
John S. Denker writes:
More specifically, anybody who thinks the scheme
I described is vulnerable to a timing attack isn't
paying attention. I addressed this point several
times in my original note. All transmissions
adhere to a schedule -- independent of the amount,
timing, meaning, and
Quoting John S. Denker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
More specifically, anybody who thinks the scheme
I described is vulnerable to a timing attack isn't
paying attention. I addressed this point several
times in my original note. All transmissions
adhere to a schedule -- independent of the amount,
On Wednesday, August 27, 2003, at 04:09 PM, An Metet wrote:
This is from http://www.lawnerds.com/testyourself/criminal_rules.html:
Check out a better source (specifically 18 U.S.C. 371), or
http://www.rense.com/general9/cons.htm.
A person is guilty of conspiracy if:
- Two or more people
--- begin forwarded text
Status: U
From: James Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [Mac_crypto] Introducing SaferWep
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Id: Macintosh Cryptography mac_crypto.vmeng.com
List-Post: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Help:
On Thu, Aug 28, 2003 at 08:06:07AM -0400, John S. Denker wrote:
[...]
The solution I outlined is modelled after
procedures that governments have used for decades
to defend against traffic analysis threats to
their embassies and overseas military bases.
More specifically, anybody who thinks
At 05:01 PM 8/28/2003, Peter Hendrickson wrote:
First, the entropy pool in Yarrow is only 160 bits. From Section 6
Open Questions and Plans for the Future of the Yarrow paper
referenced above:
Yarrow-160, our current construction, is limited to at most 160 bits
of security by the size of its
http://news.telegraph.co.uk/core/Content/displayPrintable.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/08/29/ndiary29.xmlsite=5
The Telegraph
Code-breaker reveals a diarist to rival Pepys
(Filed: 29/08/2003)
A Puritan's journal written in cryptic shorthand to foil the King's men paints a vivid
picture of 1600s
On Fri, Aug 29, 2003 at 11:27:41AM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
As you mentioned, the FIPS-140-2 approved PRNG
are deterministic, they take a random seed and extend it
to more random bytes. But FIPS-140-2 has no
provision for generating the seed in the first place,
this is where
On 08/28/2003 04:26 PM, David Wagner wrote:
Are you sure you understood the attack?
Are you sure you read my original note?
The attack assumes that communications links are insecure.
I explicitly hypothesized that the links were
encrypted. The cryptotext may be observed and
its timing may be
11 matches
Mail list logo
