Re: jointly create a random value for corrupted party

2005-07-19 Thread Max
Anna Rikova wrote: maybe this is a silly question, but at the moment I don't know how to solve it. Assume there are 4 partys A,B,C,D. Now the parties B,C,D want to create a random value r for A, so that each party B,C,D can verify afterwards, that A uses indeed the random value r, but doesn't

Re: the limits of crypto and authentication

2005-07-19 Thread Jaap-Henk Hoepman
Only problem is that cell phones have become so utterly complex (hosting several processors and a plethora of software components) that it will never become the trusted device that we once thought it could be... Personal it is though Jaap-Henk On Sat, 09 Jul 2005 18:56:22 -0700 James A.

Re: the limits of crypto and authentication

2005-07-19 Thread Jaap-Henk Hoepman
Actually, Dutch banks already give users the option to recieve one-time pass-codes by SMS to authenticate internet banking transactions (instead of sending a list of those codes on paper by ordinary mail in advance). So it's less unrealistic than you think. Jaap-Henk On Sat, 09 Jul 2005

[Clips] Bellovin, et al., in WSJ: Where the Dangers Are

2005-07-19 Thread R.A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Sun, 17 Jul 2005 21:14:39 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [Clips] Bellovin, et al., in WSJ: Where the Dangers Are Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL

Re: the limits of crypto and authentication

2005-07-19 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
ref: http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm20.htm#10 the limits of crypto and authentication http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm20.htm#15 the limits of crypto and authentication http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm20.htm#17 the limits of crypto and authentication one of the issues raised in the x9.59

[Clips] Venona Ten Years Later: Lessons for Today

2005-07-19 Thread R.A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Sun, 17 Jul 2005 22:44:19 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [Clips] Venona Ten Years Later: Lessons for Today Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: ID theft -- so what?

2005-07-19 Thread Peter Gutmann
John Kelsey [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: One nontrivial reason is that many organizations have spent a lot of time and money building up elaborate rules for using PKI, after long negotiations between legal and technical people, many hours of writing and revising, gazillions of dollars in

Re: the limits of crypto and authentication

2005-07-19 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
Jaap-Henk Hoepman wrote: Actually, Dutch banks already give users the option to recieve one-time pass-codes by SMS to authenticate internet banking transactions (instead of sending a list of those codes on paper by ordinary mail in advance). So it's less unrealistic than you think. there is

Re: ID theft -- so what?

2005-07-19 Thread Peter Gutmann
James A. Donald [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: The PKI that was designed to serve no very useful function other than make everyone in the world pay $100 a year to Verisign is dead. Yet the technology is potent, and the problems of identity and authenticity are severe. We shall, bye and bye, see