Re: jointly create a random value for corrupted party

2005-07-19 Thread Max
Anna Rikova wrote: maybe this is a silly question, but at the moment I don't know how to solve it. Assume there are 4 partys A,B,C,D. Now the parties B,C,D want to create a random value r for A, so that each party B,C,D can verify afterwards, that A uses indeed the random value r, but doesn't kn

Re: the limits of crypto and authentication

2005-07-19 Thread Jaap-Henk Hoepman
Only problem is that cell phones have become so utterly complex (hosting several processors and a plethora of software components) that it will never become the trusted device that we once thought it could be... Personal it is though Jaap-Henk On Sat, 09 Jul 2005 18:56:22 -0700 "James A. Do

Re: the limits of crypto and authentication

2005-07-19 Thread Jaap-Henk Hoepman
Actually, Dutch banks already give users the option to recieve one-time pass-codes by SMS to authenticate internet banking transactions (instead of sending a list of those codes on paper by ordinary mail in advance). So it's less unrealistic than you think. Jaap-Henk On Sat, 09 Jul 2005 20:38:38

[Clips] Bellovin, et al., in WSJ: Where the Dangers Are

2005-07-19 Thread R.A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Sun, 17 Jul 2005 21:14:39 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> From: "R.A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: [Clips] Bellovin, et al., in WSJ: Where the Dangers Are Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL

Re: the limits of crypto and authentication

2005-07-19 Thread Anne & Lynn Wheeler
ref: http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm20.htm#10 the limits of crypto and authentication http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm20.htm#15 the limits of crypto and authentication http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm20.htm#17 the limits of crypto and authentication one of the issues raised in the x9.59 busine

[Clips] Venona Ten Years Later: Lessons for Today

2005-07-19 Thread R.A. Hettinga
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Re: ID "theft" -- so what?

2005-07-19 Thread Peter Gutmann
John Kelsey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >One nontrivial reason is that many organizations have spent a lot of time and >money building up elaborate rules for using PKI, after long negotiations >between legal and technical people, many hours of writing and revising, >gazillions of dollars in consul

Re: the limits of crypto and authentication

2005-07-19 Thread Anne & Lynn Wheeler
Jaap-Henk Hoepman wrote: > Actually, Dutch banks already give users the option to recieve one-time > pass-codes by SMS to authenticate internet banking transactions (instead of > sending a list of those codes on paper by ordinary mail in advance). So it's > less unrealistic than you think. there i

ADMIN: list server move...

2005-07-19 Thread Perry E. Metzger
The list has just moved from one mail server to another. No one should notice anything, but if anyone does, please send me mail. Perry - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL P

Re: ID "theft" -- so what?

2005-07-19 Thread Peter Gutmann
"James A. Donald" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >The PKI that was designed to serve no very useful function other than make >everyone in the world pay $100 a year to Verisign is dead. > >Yet the technology is potent, and the problems of identity and authenticity >are severe. We shall, bye and bye,