Given how rare weak keys are in modern ciphers, I assert that code to cope
with them occurring by chance will never be adequately tested, and will be
more likely to have security bugs. In short, why bother?
On Mon, 9 Oct 2006 kkursawe at esat.kuleuven.ac.be wrote:
IIUC, TPM is pointless for disk crypto: if your laptop is stolen the
attacker can reflash BIOS and bypass TPM.
According to TCG Specification, the first part of the BIOS (called
Core Root of Trust for Measurement) should be
From: James A. Donald [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Dienstag, 10. Oktober 2006 06:40
What we want is that a bank client can prove to the bank it
is the real client, and not trojaned. What the evil guys at
RIAA want is that their music player can prove it is their
real music player,
I was suspecting that as DRM at least appears to one of the main
motivators (along side trojan/malware protection) for trustworthy
computing that probably you will not be able to put the TPM into debug
mode (ie manipulate code without affecting the hash attested in debug
mode). Ability to do so
OK. I found SHA-2 in RFC 4634 (only 3 months old), which refers back to
But I reach a dead-end with PKCS #7 (now RFC 3852). There's no support for
algorithm types (RFC 3279). Also PKCS #1 (now RFC 3447) needs an update for
SHA-2 with RSA encryption (OIDs, etc.).
On Mon, 9 Oct 2006, James A. Donald wrote:
Well obviously I trust myself, and do not trust anyone else all that
much, so if I am the user, what good is trusted computing?
One use is that I can know that my operating system has not changed
behind the scenes, perhaps by a rootkit, know that
What we want is that a bank client can prove to the bank
it is the real client, and not trojaned. What the evil
guys at RIAA want is that their music player can prove
it is their real music player, and not hacked by the end
user. Having a system that will only boot up in a known
On 10/9/06, Adam Back [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The bad part is that the user is not given control to modify the hash
and attest as if it were the original so that he can insert his own
code, debug, modify etc.
(All that is needed is a debug option in the BIOS to do this that only
the user can
On 10/10/06, Brian Gladman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I haven't been keeping up to date with this trusted computing stuff over
the last two years but when I was last involved it was accepted that it
was vital that the owner of a machine (not necessarily the user) should
be able to do the sort of
PKCS#7 has been superseded by the IETF's Cryptographic Message Syntax, CMS.
You should check within the S/MIME working group for updates.
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Alex Alten
Sent: Saturday, October 07, 2006 12:29 AM
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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