Steve,
I assume that you mean the owner of the on-line financial service
when you say "operator," correct? In which case what exactly are
the auditors going to be looking at when comes time to audit but
the operator's identity, whereabouts, the servers and a portion
of the assets are undisclo
At 08:23 PM 3/29/2007, Allen wrote:
Steve,
I assume that you mean the owner of the on-line financial service when you
say "operator," correct? In which case what exactly are the auditors going
to be looking at when comes time to audit but the operator's identity,
whereabouts, the servers and
Steve Schear writes:
> Here is the situation. An on-line financial service, for example a DBC
> (Digital Bearer Certificate), operator wishes his meat space identity,
> physical whereabouts, the transaction servers and at least some of the
> location(s) of the service's asset backing to remain
Steve Schear wrote:
Here is the situation. An on-line financial service, for example a DBC
(Digital Bearer Certificate), operator wishes his meat space identity,
physical whereabouts, the transaction servers and at least some of the
location(s) of the service's asset backing to remain secret.
Ian G wrote:
E.g., Ricardian contracts (my stuff) take the user agreement as a
document and bind it into each transaction by means of the hash of the
contract; they also ensure various other benefits such as the contract
being available and readable to all at all times, and the acceptability
On Fri, 30 Mar 2007, Ian G wrote:
> The reserve assets' location(s) is fairly important from a customer trust
> perspective. People look at the overall safety and make their own judgements.
> One person might decide that New York is safe and another will find that a
> horrible thought (for those w
