I'd like one with Wearing an integer is not circumvention. on the
back or some such. :)
Large Integers are Not A Crime :-)
On the other hand, isn't the key really an MD5 hash of some haiku about
OK, so we know that
DVD-CSS was
Just Not Good Enough
?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L9HaNbsIfp0
James S. Tyre [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Law Offices of James S. Tyre 310-839-4114/310-839-4602(fax)
10736 Jefferson Blvd., #512
* Travis H.:
Also there's a semantic issue; am I attesting to the plaintext,
or the ciphertext? It's possible the difference could be important.
With sign, then encrypt, it's also possible that the receiver decrypts
the message, and then leaks it, potentially giving the impression that
the
At 20:59 -0400 1/5/07, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
http://www.cafepress.com/09f9
There is also http://www.cafepress.com/09f911029d74e35
Which has a wider range of extra artwork.
f
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The Cryptography Mailing List
A notable mention is http://www.cryptophone.com/ . They are the only
secure phone provider that allows for independent review of the source
code.
On 4/30/07, Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
According to an NY Times article
Dear cryptographers,
Prof. Sjouke Mauw and myself would like to invite you and your students to
submit research papers
to the 2nd Benelux Workshop on Information and System Security (WISSEC)
which will take place
*September 20-21, 2007 in Luxembourg.
* The purpose of the workshop is to share
Florian Weimer wrote:
With sign, then encrypt, it's also possible that the receiver decrypts
the message, and then leaks it, potentially giving the impression that
the signer authorized the disclosure. There has been a fair bit of
buzz about this confusion. But the lesson from that seems to be
On 01 May 2007 22:33, Jon Callas wrote:
On May 1, 2007, at 12:53 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
unsigned char* guess_key(void)
{
unsigned
char key[] = {0x0a, 0xFa, 0x12, 0x03,
0xD9, 0x42, 0x57, 0xC6,
0x9E, 0x75, 0xE4, 0x5C,
http://farm1.static.flickr.com/191/480556169_6d731d2416_o.jpg
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Currently,
http://www.google.com/search?hl=enq=%2209+f9+11+02+9d%22btnG=Search
reveals order of 50,000 hits. Doubtless soon it will be many times
that number.
When you treat the whole world, and especially your own customers, as
the enemy, eventually everyone will come to reciprocate.
Since this is the cryptography mailing list, there might be
interest in the cryptography behind this infamous key. This is from
http://www.aacsla.com/specifications/ , particularly the first spec,
Common Cryptographic Elements. The basic cryptography is from Naor, Naor
and Lotspiech,
Ivan Krstić wrote, On 3/5/07 4:50 AM:
But all the artwork is just ugly numbers in a monospace font
My thoughts too. This one looks much better, but I don't see a link
anywhere to get it. Perhaps the author just photoshopped the picture as
a proof of concept to go with his blog comment?
At 10:27 AM 5/2/2007, Aram Perez wrote:
http://farm1.static.flickr.com/191/480556169_6d731d2416_o.jpg
From another list:
This was one of my faves bits of html from last night
tr
td bgcolor=#09f911/td
td bgcolor=#029d74/td
/tr
tr
td bgcolor=#e35bd8/td
td bgcolor=#4156c5/td
/tr
tr
td
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Hal Finney) writes:
The interesting thing is that publishing a processing key like this does
not provide much information about which device was cracked in order
to extract the key. This might leave AACSLA in a quandary about what to
revoke in order to fix the problem.
Expanding my last message to make it clearer:
Schemes like the AACS one work quite well for satellite TV broadcast
protection. In such systems, one's goal is to disable the units owned
by rogue subscribers, but the only inventory that one might ruin by
a key invalidation is a bit of
At 02:15 PM 5/2/2007 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
I would be interested in further legal
discussion of the DMCA's ability to control the publication of mere
cryptographic keys, and in further technical discussion of AACS
and similar DRM technologies.
(Links at the site, posted by EFF Senior
* Perry E. Metzger:
This seems to me to be, yet again, an instance where failure to
consider threat models is a major cause of security failure.
Sorry, but where's the security failure? Where can you buy hardware
devices that can copy HD disks? Or download software that does, with
a readily
Florian Weimer [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
* Perry E. Metzger:
This seems to me to be, yet again, an instance where failure to
consider threat models is a major cause of security failure.
Sorry, but where's the security failure? Where can you buy hardware
devices that can copy HD disks? Or
Perry Metzger writes:
I will again solicit suggestions about optimal strategies both for
the attacker and defender for the AACS system -- I think we can learn
a lot by thinking about it. It would be especially interesting if
there were modifications of the AACS system that would be more hardy
Hal Finney wrote:
Perry Metzger writes:
Once the release window has passed,
the attacker will use the compromise aggressively and the authority
will then blacklist the compromised player, which essentially starts
the game over. The studio collects revenue during the release window,
and sometimes
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