* Jack Lloyd:
On Sat, Oct 17, 2009 at 02:23:25AM -0700, John Gilmore wrote:
DSA was (designed to be) full of covert channels.
True, but TCP and UDP are also full of covert channels.
And you better randomize some bits covered by RRSIGs on DS RRsets.
Directly signing data supplied by
* Victor Duchovni:
The optimization is for DDoS conditions, especially amplification via
forged source IP DNS requests for . IN NS?. The request is tiny,
and the response is multiple KB with DNSSEC.
There's only one required signature in a . IN NS response, so it
isn't as large as you suggest.
* John Gilmore:
So the standard got sent back to the beginning and redone to deal with
the complications of deployed servers and records with varying algorithm
availability (and to make DSA the officially mandatory algorithm).
Which took another 5 or 10 years.
And it's still not clear that
Florian Weimer fwei...@bfk.de writes:
* Perry E. Metzger:
Actually, there are routine attacks on DNS infrastructure these days,
but clearly they're not cryptographic since that's not
deployed. However, a large part of the point of having DNSSEC is that we
can then trust the DNS to be
Florian Weimer wrote:
And you better randomize some bits covered by RRSIGs on DS RRsets.
Directly signing data supplied by non-trusted source is quite risky.
(It turns out that the current signing schemes have not been designed
for this type of application, but the general crypto community is
