On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 1:20 AM, Daira Hopwood da...@jacaranda.org wrote:
On 20/08/13 19:26, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
It is almost certain that most uses of EC would not infringe the
remaining patents.
But the patent holder can force anyone attempting to use them to spend
about $3-5
On 2013-08-21 3:38 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
What is the current state of patents on elliptic curve cryptosystems?
(It would also be useful to know when the patents on such patents as
exist end.)
Perry
Such a question will be answered not with light but with darkness.
On 22 August 2013 10:36, Phillip Hallam-Baker hal...@gmail.com wrote:
Preventing key substitution will require a combination of the CT ideas
proposed by Ben Laurie (so catenate proof notaries etc) and some form of
'no key exists' demonstration.
We have already outline how to make verifiable
On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 6:02 PM, Philip Whitehouse phi...@whiuk.com wrote:
Let me just see if I get where you're going:
So essentially you've increased the number of CAs to the number of
companies without really solving the PRISM problem. The sheer number mean
it's impractical to do much
On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 6:42 PM, Joe St Sauver j...@oregon.uoregon.eduwrote:
I wouldn't take Snowden's alleged opsec practice, or lack thereof, as
a demonstration proof that PGP and/or S/MIME are impossibly difficult for
technical people (or even motivated NON-technical people) to use when
On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 3:34 PM, Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
On 22 August 2013 10:36, Phillip Hallam-Baker hal...@gmail.com wrote:
Preventing key substitution will require a combination of the CT ideas
proposed by Ben Laurie (so catenate proof notaries etc) and some form of
'no key
