On Mon, Aug 26, 2013 at 07:12:21AM -0400, Richard Salz wrote:
I don't think you need all that much to get good secure private email.
You need a client that can make PEM pretty seamless; reduce it to a
button that says encrypt when possible. You need the client to be
able to generate a
Custom built hardware will probably be the smartest way to go for an
entrepreneur trying to sell these in bulk to people as home gateways anyway
Meanwhile, while Phill may have spent $25 for a USB Ethernet, I
frequently see them on sale for $10 and sometimes $5.
On 08/27/2013 01:17, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
On Mon, 26 Aug 2013 17:39:16 -0400 The Doctor dr...@virtadpt.net
wrote:
On 08/26/2013 09:26 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Mix networks are, however, a well technique. Onion networks, which
are related, are widely deployed right now in the form of
On Aug 26, 2013, at 5:27 PM, The Doctor dr...@virtadpt.net wrote:
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On 08/26/2013 08:46 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
Which is why I think Ted Lemon's idea about using Facebook type
friending may be necessary.
Or Gchat-style contacts.
Hi,
There is a host of older literature, too - P2P research, however, has become
a cold topic. Although I expect that it will see a revival in the face of
surveillance.
For people who are interested, the list I have (for a year or two back) is:
[list]
I would like to add the following:
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On 08/27/2013 02:32 AM, Sebastian Krahmer wrote:
Now, thats an interesting point! Once all email is encrypted, how
many mail providers would be interested in offering free service at
all,
Another question might be, how many e-mail services would
On 26/08/13 08:47 AM, Richard Clayton wrote:
Even without the recent uproar over email privacy, at some point, someone was
going to come up with a product along the following lines: Buy a cheap,
preconfigured box with an absurd amount of space (relative to the huge amounts
of space, like 10GB,
Iang wrote:
Why do we need the 1980s assumption of being able to send freely to
everyone, anyway?
tech.supp...@i.bought.your.busted.thing.com is one that comes to mind.
i...@sale.me.your.thing.com is another. I think the types of prior whitelist
only secure systems being discussed on-list
On 08/27/2013 18:34, ianG wrote:
Why do we need the 1980s assumption of being able to send freely to
everyone, anyway?
It's clear you're not a journalist or working in any other profession
where you actually need to be able to communicate spontaneously with
strangers.
wg
--
On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 2:04 PM, Wendy M. Grossman
wen...@pelicancrossing.net wrote:
It's clear you're not a journalist or working in any other profession
where you actually need to be able to communicate spontaneously with
strangers.
And if the people who attacked the NY Times' DNS today
On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 5:04 PM, Wendy M. Grossman
wen...@pelicancrossing.net wrote:
On 08/27/2013 18:34, ianG wrote:
Why do we need the 1980s assumption of being able to send freely to
everyone, anyway?
It's clear you're not a journalist or working in any other profession
where you
Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
One hypothesis that I would like to throw out is that there is no point in
accepting encrypted email from someone who does not have a key to encrypt
the response.
I'd agree, as I was in just this position in the last week or so: I got a gpg
encryped email from
I wonder if much of the work on secure DHT's and such is based on bad
assumptions. A DHT is just a key/value mapping. There are two reasons to want
to distribute such a thing: To deal with high, distributed load; and because
it's too large to store on any one node. I contend that the second
On Tue, 27 Aug 2013 21:13:59 -0400 Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com
wrote:
I wonder if much of the work on secure DHT's and such is based on
bad assumptions. A DHT is just a key/value mapping. There are two
reasons to want to distribute such a thing: To deal with high,
distributed load; and
On Tue, 27 Aug 2013 21:33:01 + radi...@gmail.com wrote:
Iang wrote:
Why do we need the 1980s assumption of being able to send freely
to everyone, anyway?
tech.supp...@i.bought.your.busted.thing.com is one that comes to
mind. i...@sale.me.your.thing.com is another. I think the types of
On Tue, 27 Aug 2013 22:04:22 +0100 Wendy M. Grossman
wen...@pelicancrossing.net wrote:
On 08/27/2013 18:34, ianG wrote:
Why do we need the 1980s assumption of being able to send freely
to everyone, anyway?
It's clear you're not a journalist or working in any other
profession where you
On Tue, 27 Aug 2013, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Say that you want to distribute a database table consisting of human
readable IDs, cryptographic keys and network endpoints for some
reason. Say you want it to scale to hundreds of millions of users.
This sounds remarkably like a description of
On 8/27/13 7:48 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
On Tue, 27 Aug 2013 22:04:22 +0100 Wendy M. Grossman
wen...@pelicancrossing.net wrote:
On 08/27/2013 18:34, ianG wrote:
Why do we need the 1980s assumption of being able to send freely
to everyone, anyway?
It's clear you're not a journalist or
On 8/27/13 7:45 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
On Tue, 27 Aug 2013 21:33:01 + radi...@gmail.com wrote:
Iang wrote:
Why do we need the 1980s assumption of being able to send freely
to everyone, anyway?
tech.supp...@i.bought.your.busted.thing.com is one that comes to
mind.
On Tue, 27 Aug 2013 19:57:30 -0600 Peter Saint-Andre
stpe...@stpeter.im wrote:
On 8/27/13 7:47 PM, Jonathan Thornburg wrote:
On Tue, 27 Aug 2013, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Say that you want to distribute a database table consisting of
human readable IDs, cryptographic keys and network
On 8/27/13 7:47 PM, Jonathan Thornburg wrote:
On Tue, 27 Aug 2013, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Say that you want to distribute a database table consisting of human
readable IDs, cryptographic keys and network endpoints for some
reason. Say you want it to scale to hundreds of millions of users.
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On Aug 27, 2013, at 9:41 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
On Tue, 27 Aug 2013 21:13:59 -0400 Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com
wrote:
I wonder if much of the work on secure DHT's and such is based on
bad assumptions. A DHT is just a key/value mapping. There are two
reasons to want to distribute
On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 10:18 PM, Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.comwrote:
On Tue, 27 Aug 2013 19:57:30 -0600 Peter Saint-Andre
stpe...@stpeter.im wrote:
On 8/27/13 7:47 PM, Jonathan Thornburg wrote:
On Tue, 27 Aug 2013, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Say that you want to distribute a
On Aug 27, 2013, at 9:48 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
On Tue, 27 Aug 2013 22:04:22 +0100 Wendy M. Grossman
wen...@pelicancrossing.net wrote:
On 08/27/2013 18:34, ianG wrote:
Why do we need the 1980s assumption of being able to send freely
to everyone, anyway?
It's clear you're not a
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The DHT model says that millions of Raspberry Pi's and thumb drives together
implement
this immense database. But since a DHT, by design, scatters the data around
the network
at random, *my* thumb drive is full of information that I will
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Suppose, as in Bitcoin, my email address *is* my public key
You can even use some hash compression tricks so you only need 9 or 10
characters to express the address as hash of the public key.
That works very well, until you have to change the
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