*1 Anyone who attempts to generate random numbers by
deterministic means is, of course, living in a
state of sin. -- John Von Neumann
That said, it seems that most of these attacks on Pseudorandom
generators some of which are deliberately flawed, can be ameliorated
somewhat by using
Op 19 sep. 2013, om 19:15 heeft Phillip Hallam-Baker hal...@gmail.com het
volgende geschreven:
Let us say I want to send an email to al...@example.com securely.
...
ppid:al...@example.com:example.net:Syd6BMXje5DLqHhYSpQswhPcvDXj+8rK9LaonAfcNWM
...
example.net is a server which will resolve
On 18 September 2013 22:23, Lucky Green shamr...@cypherpunks.to wrote:
According to published reports that I saw, NSA/DoD pays $250M (per
year?) to backdoor cryptographic implementations. I have knowledge of
only one such effort. That effort involved DoD/NSA paying $10M to a
leading
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 4:15 PM, Ben Laurie b...@links.org wrote:
On 18 September 2013 21:47, Viktor Dukhovni cryptogra...@dukhovni.orgwrote:
On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 08:04:04PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
This is only realistic with DANE TLSA (certificate usage 2 or 3),
and thus will
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 5:11 PM, Max Kington mking...@webhanger.com wrote:
On 19 Sep 2013 19:11, Bill Frantz fra...@pwpconsult.com wrote:
On 9/19/13 at 5:26 AM, rs...@akamai.com (Salz, Rich) wrote:
I know I would be a lot more comfortable with a way to check the mail
against a piece of
Working on Prism Proof email, I could use information on how to configure
various email clients to support S/MIME decryption using a previously
generated key package.
While descriptions of how the user can configure S/MIME would be nice, what
I am really after is information on the internals so
Salz, Rich writes:
I would say this puts you in the sub 1% of the populace. Most
people want to do things online because it is much easier and gets
rid of paper. Those are the systems we need to secure. Perhaps
another way to look at it: how can we make out-of-band verification
