Re: [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia

2013-10-04 Thread Watson Ladd
On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 3:25 PM, wrote: > On Oct 3, 2013, at 12:21 PM, Jerry Leichter wrote: > > As *practical attacks today*, these are of no interest - related key > attacks only apply in rather unrealistic scenarios, even a 2^119 strength > is way beyond any realistic attack, and no one would

Re: [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized

2013-10-04 Thread Watson Ladd
On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 1:35 PM, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: > IMO readability is very hard to measure. Likely things being where you > expect them to be, with minimal confusing characters but clear "anchoring" > so you can start reading from anywhere. > > If someone could write a generative

Re: [Cryptography] Sha3

2013-10-04 Thread David Johnston
On 10/1/2013 2:34 AM, Ray Dillinger wrote: What I don't understand here is why the process of selecting a standard algorithm for cryptographic primitives is so highly focused on speed. ~ What makes you think Keccak is faster than the alternatives that were not selected? My implementations sug

Re: [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized

2013-10-04 Thread Peter Gutmann
writes: >The (U.S.) medical records system that started at the Veterans' >Administration and has now spread to all but all parts of the U.S. Federal >government that handle electronic health records is ASCII encoded, and >readable. Called "The Blue Button,"[1] there is even an HL7->Blue Button >

Re: [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ised

2013-10-04 Thread James A. Donald
On 2013-10-04 09:33, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote: The design of WSDL and SOAP is entirely due to the need to impedance match COM to HTTP. That is fairly horrifying, as COM was designed for a single threaded environment, and becomes and incomprehensible and extraordinarily inefficient security