heme talked about is
using some of the agreed-upon QKD bits to replenish the authentication
keying material. This does not seem very robust. Note that the press
release completely ignored all of these hard problems :-)
--
Greg Trox
3-154 (1979) for the
canonical paper on universal hashing.
--
Greg Troxel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
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That's pretty much what I was talking about when I said that it may be
possible to clone an arbitrarily large proportion of photons - and that
Quantum Cryptography may not actually be secure.
A key point is the probability that the measurement/cloning operation
has of disturbing the original
wledge that this will occur. So, as I see it the basic problem is
not one of security, but the fact that credit issuers etc. impose
costs on innocent third parties and get away with it.
--
Greg Troxel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
--
Victor Duchovni <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Secure in what sense? Did I miss reading about the part of QKD that
> addresses MITM (just as plausible IMHO with fixed circuits as passive
> eavesdropping)?
It would be good to read the QKD literature before claiming that QKD is
always unauthenticat
