On Fri, Oct 03, 2003 at 05:55:25PM +0100, Jill Ramonsky wrote:
Having been greatly encouraged by people on this list to go ahead with a
new SSL implementation,
That's a pretty good idea, I also encourage you (and volunteer to
point of confusion/contention right now
Canon provides a so called Data Verification Kit
which allegedly allows to detect whether a digital
image has been tampered with since it has been taken
with a digital camera.
I found the announcement at
How it works
this is not a technical question, but a rather
academic or abstract one:
Do Cryptographers burn?
Cryptography is a lot about math, information theory,
proofs, etc. But there's a certain level where all this
is too complicated and time-consuming to follow all those
theories and claims. At
On Sat, Apr 03, 2004 at 11:49:15PM +0100, Dave Howe wrote:
If you mean he gave a false assurance of the security of a product for a
friend - why would he do that? I can't think of any of my friends who would
want me to tell them sofware was secure if it wasn't.
I suppose that depends on
On Mon, Apr 26, 2004 at 08:21:43PM +0100, Graeme Burnett wrote:
Would anyone there have any good predictions on how
cryptography is going to unfold in the next few years
or so? I have my own ideas, but I would love
to see what others see in the crystal ball.
My guess is that it is
does anyone know good jokes about
cryptography, cryptographers, or security?
[Moderator's note: I know of several security systems that are jokes
in and of themselves, but that doesn't seem to be what you meant. :)
I need a literature reference for a simple problem of
It can be easily shown that there is no lossless
compression method which can effectively compress every possible
input. Proof is easy: In a first step, consider all
possible messages of length n bit, n0.
On Tue, Aug 31, 2004 at 05:07:30PM -0500, Matt Crawford wrote:
Plus a string of log(N) bits telling you how many times to apply the
Uh-oh, now goes over the judge's head ...
Yeah, I just posted a lengthy description why I think that this
counterexample is not a
On Wed, Sep 01, 2004 at 04:02:02PM +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote:
comp.compression FAQ, probably question #1 given the number of times this
comes up in the newsgroup.
(I've just checked, it's question #9 in part 1. Question #73 in part 2 may
also be useful).
Thanks, that's a pretty good
I have again one of these special, strange, freaky questions.
I'm still investigating some unusual activities in
science and cryptography.
There are some handwritten notes, they seem
to be some kind of transcript of slides from a talk
about cryptography. I need to find out when, where,
On Thu, Sep 16, 2004 at 12:41:41AM +0100, Ian Grigg wrote:
It occurs to me that a number of these ideas could
be written up over time ... a wiki, anyone? I think
it is high past time to start documenting crypto
Wikis are not that good for discussions, and I do believe
could you please translate atleast the abstract for the rest of us :-)
Sure, some of the first paragraphs:
As a german codebreaker in World War II
Klaus Schmeh 23.9.2004
For the first time a witness reported, who was involved in
does anyone know where I can get a
Jefferson Wheel or a replica?
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Dean, James wrote:
The order of the wheels can't be changed.
So this encryption device doesn't use any key?
Only the most trivial; you choose the row to transmit.
From what I've seen on the web not even that:
Unlike the original Jefferson wheel these toys are not
intended to choose any row,
On Sat, Jan 29, 2005 at 01:09:32PM -0500, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
This chip is used in anti-theft
automobile immobilizers and in the ExxonMobil SpeedPass.
If I recall correctly, there are two different electronic
functions in key cars. One is the theft protection where the chip
On Fri, Nov 04, 2005 at 09:16:16AM +, Nick Owen wrote:
No, this is not it. It is this attack and similar:
The phishers are not using valid certificates, but users are so immune
to warnings about certificates that they don't pay attention to them.
It may be
against spam, we should take this into consideration.
Maybe in near future the advantages of that noise produced by millions
of bots will outweigh the disadvantages?
Comments are welcome.
The Cryptography Mailing
On Wed, Apr 26, 2006 at 03:18:40PM -0400, Sean W. Smith wrote:
I like the definition in Kaufman-Perlman-Speciner:
A completely generic term used by the security community to include
both people and computer systems. Coined because it is more
dignified than 'thingy' and because
On Wed, Apr 26, 2006 at 10:41:12PM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
Ah -- corporate key escrow. An overt back door for Little Brother, rather
than a covert one for Big Brother
You should check the list of recipient keys in PGP messages from time
to time anyway. I recently found a bug in
I recently tested an RSA SecurID SID800 Token
The token is bundled with some windows software designed to make
user's life easier. Interestingly, this software provides a function
which directly copies the current
On Fri, Sep 08, 2006 at 10:26:45AM -0700, Lance James wrote:
Another problem from what I see with Malware that steals data is the
formgrabbing and on event logging of data. Malware can detect if
SecureID is being used based on targeted events, example: Say HSBC
has this been mentioned here before?
I just had my crypto mightmare experience.
I was in a (german!) outdoor shop to complete my equipment
for my next trip, when I came to the rack with luggage padlocks
(used to lock the zippers).
While the german brand locks were as usual, all the
On Mon, Feb 26, 2007 at 09:23:30PM -0800, Allen wrote:
combination lock brands in the $30 to $45 USD range where you can
set the combination to whatever you want. Guess what? They all
seemed to use the same key to enable setting the combination.
Why make it that
On Tue, Feb 27, 2007 at 01:09:00AM -0500, David Chessler wrote:
This is why I don't bother with padlocks until I get to the hotel
room. It is a good idea to slow down the petty thief, but a twist
tie from a plastic bag will work. I use the nylon straps used to
hold cable bunches in place.
On Mon, Feb 26, 2007 at 10:36:22PM -0600, Taral wrote:
I'm just waiting for someone with access to photograph said keys and
post it all over the internet.
It does not need access to the keys.
Do you know that car Volkswagen Golf? As far as I know also sold in
In the eighties
made two pictures of the padlock with the backdoor:
shows the TSA keywhole: Just a very simple standard
key cylinder, pretty easy to produce a general key from any lock.
But that's waste of time. The lock suffers from the same weakness
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