ecity.com/emachines/e11/86/seedark.html
Best regards,
Ivan Krstic
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
ight be given a (very) false sense
of security, as only a small percentage of the particles that Eve observes
register as transmission errors (<=15%, according to the LANL figure).
Best regards,
Ivan Krstic
-
The Cryptog
VaX#n8 wrote:
I've done a survey of the various crypting file system tools, would anyone
be interested in a summary of available options?
This would likely be an interesting read for many on the list. Perhaps
you can put up a PDF somewhere?
Cheers,
Ivan
---
On /. today:
An anonymous reader writes with today's announcement that "the Austrian
project for Quantum Cryptography[1] made the world's first Bank Transfer
via Quantum Cryptography Based on Entangled Photons; see also
Einstein-Podolski-Rosen Paradoxon[2]." (For more background, see the
recen
The good people at Wikipedia have started a cryptography subproject, "an
attempt to build a comprehensive and detailed guide to cryptography in
the Wikipedia." The project page:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:WikiProject_Cryptography
features a list of open tasks and things that need cleanu
Apologies for the late response. Finals have a knack for keeping me away
from the keyboard.
Ian Grigg wrote:
You are looking at QC from a scientific perspective.
What is happening is not scientific, but business.
[Points 1..7 snipped]
Hence, quantum cryptogtaphy. Cryptographers and
engineers wil
"As part of the Harvard University Science Center Lecture Series,
Michael O. Rabin, the T.J. Watson Sr. Professor of Computer Science at
Harvard University, lectures on hyper-encryption and provably
everlasting secrets.
In this lecture, Professor Rabin confronts the failure of present-day
comp
/. reports:
"An article on Security.ITWorld.com[1] seems to outline a coming
information arms race. The European Union has decided to respond to the
Echelon project [2] by funding research into supposedly unbreakable
quantum cryptography that will keep EU data out of Echelon's maw.
Leaving asid
This reminds me of a question I've been meaning to ask for a while. Has
there been any research done on encryption systems which encrypt two (or
n) plaintexts with n keys, producing a joint ciphertext with the
property that decrypting it with key k[n] only produces the nth plaintext?
In the par
Of course, there is such a thing as money that really and truly
*can't* be counterfeited. Elements such as gold, or other rare
commodities, for example, cannot be faked; something either is gold,
or it isn't. Also, useful objects and consumables in general cannot
be faked; something either is use
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> Actual practical impact on cryptography? Likely zero, even if it turns
> out the proof is correct (which of course we don't know yet), but it
> still is neat for math geeks.
Right. He constrains his proof to dealing with a specific subset of
Dirichlet zeta functions, whic
William Allen Simpson wrote:
Switches, routers, and any intermediate computers are fair game for
warrantless wiretaps.
It seems privacy and free speech are becoming lost concepts worldwide.
This just came out today:
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/worldbiz/archives/2004/07/03/2003177559
So not o
Ian Grigg wrote:
[...]
I can make a call, and nobody can read my location without doing
complicated tracking stuff with many cells.
I understand usually no more than three are required, and even two are
enough.
The day that the cops get their dream of cell phones being able to
signal location, that
John Denker wrote:
Here's another splint using the same general idea, but
with less complexity: calculate the hash once then
prepend that to the message and hash again, i.e.
hash3(M) := hash1[hash1(M) (+) M]
This is Schneier's and Ferguson's solution to then-known hash function
weaknesses in P
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
With
the author's consent, I'm soliciting opinions from this group about it:
http://phk.freebsd.dk/pubs/bsdcon-03.gbde.paper.pdf
I just gave the paper a quick read and am hoping this is not meant for
production use. The key problems to me appear to be that:
- the paper
.mit.edu/bloom-picayune/crypto/15423
There is still active work being done on a "virtual satellite"
implementation.
--
Ivan Krstic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> | GPG: 0x147C722D
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsub
back:
http://diswww.mit.edu/bloom-picayune/crypto/15520
Rubberhose was one of the things that came up, along with StegFS and
BestCrypt. Unfortunately, it seems like Rubberhose hasn't seen work in
over 5 years.
--
Ivan Krstic <[EMAIL PROTECTED
t a system whose single
point of failure -- the directory service -- was, at least until
recently, Roger's personal machine sitting in an MIT dorm room.
--
Ivan Krstic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> | GPG: 0x147C722D
-
The Cry
ere's
no anonymity to pierce! If Jerry's system had the ability to, say,
perform attacks on Tor and similar systems to gather data, then one
could argue for piercing anonymity as an accurate description.
--
Ivan Krstic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> | GPG: 0x147C722D
---
ttp://www.nu2.nu/pebuilder/
You might want to contact Bart directly
(http://www.nu2.nu/contact/bart/) and ask him for advice on how to proceed.
--
Ivan Krstic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> | GPG: 0x147C722D
-
The Cryptograp
20 matches
Mail list logo
