Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

2003-06-04 Thread Jeroen C. van Gelderen
n. -J [1] One exception would be the subset of mail roughly corresponding to security advisories. There OpenPGP signatures are the norm. [2] Airport "security" anyone? -- Jeroen C. van Gelderen - [EMAIL PROTECTED] A single glass of beer was passed, from which I was the last on

Re: replay & integrity

2003-07-10 Thread Jeroen C. van Gelderen
in a specific way... It might get you from per-session protection to across-all-session protection. But it can never protect against injecting two messages with identical meaning (replay) into the SSL layer twice. -J -- Jeroen C. van Gelderen - [EMAIL PROTECTED] War prosperity is like the prosperit

Re: replay & integrity

2003-07-10 Thread Jeroen C. van Gelderen
anism. Worse, the integrity protection didn't even work in TLS 1.0: "TLS v1.0 also provides an optional MAC which failed to thwart the attack..." [Vau02a]. [Vau02a] http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/php_code/publications/search.php?ref=Vau02a -J -- Jeroen C. van Gelderen - [EMAIL PROTECTED

Re: Reliance on Microsoft called risk to U.S. security

2003-09-27 Thread Jeroen C . van Gelderen
On Saturday, Sep 27, 2003, at 11:12 US/Eastern, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Fri, 26 Sep 2003, Bill Frantz wrote: The real problem is that the viewer software, whether it is an editor, PDF viewer, or a computer language interpreter, runs with ALL the user's privileges. If we ran these programs

Re: Reliance on Microsoft called risk to U.S. security

2003-09-27 Thread Jeroen C . van Gelderen
On Saturday, Sep 27, 2003, at 15:48 US/Eastern, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Sat, 27 Sep 2003, Jeroen C.van Gelderen wrote: I continue to believe that few users would grant an email message access to both the Internet and the Address Book when they are asked those two questions, provided that the

Re: Reliance on Microsoft called risk to U.S. security

2003-09-28 Thread Jeroen C . van Gelderen
On Saturday, Sep 27, 2003, at 20:31 US/Eastern, Zooko wrote: "Jeroen C. van Gelderen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: There is no way around asking the user because he is the ultimate authority when it comes to making trust decisions. (Side-stepping the issues in a (corporate) envir

Re: [e-lang] Re: Protocol implementation errors

2003-10-06 Thread Jeroen C . van Gelderen
On Sunday, Oct 5, 2003, at 11:03 US/Eastern, Jonathan S. Shapiro wrote: Peter: I agree that ASN.1 is statically checkable, and that this is an important property. However, ASN.1 is notoriously hard to parse, which leads to errors. I take it you a saying that ASN.1 syntax is hard to parse? Having

Re: [e-lang] Protocol implementation errors

2003-10-06 Thread Jeroen C . van Gelderen
On Thursday, Oct 2, 2003, at 17:50 US/Eastern, Bill Frantz wrote: From: -- Security Alert Consensus -- Number 039 (03.39) Thursday, October 2, 2003 Network Computing and the SANS Institute Powered by Neohapsis

Re: origin of SHA 224 initial hash values

2003-12-06 Thread Jeroen C . van Gelderen
On Dec 6, 2003, at 3:26, Jeremiah Rogers wrote: I'm having trouble pinpointing the origin of the initial hash values for SHA 224 and, for that matter, 128. These values are defined as hex representations of cube roots of primes for sha-1 of lengths 256, 384 and 512, but I can't find where they

RSA-576?

2003-12-09 Thread Jeroen C . van Gelderen
I didn't see anything on this list, but apparently RSA-576 has been factored: http://mathworld.wolfram.com/news/2003-12-05/rsa/ -JC - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PR