Re: Difference between TCPA-Hardware and other forms of trust

2003-12-20 Thread Seth David Schoen
: that other people can't trust your computer without also trusting its owner. So if these proposals don't have that effect, I'd be glad to hear why not. -- Seth David Schoen [EMAIL PROTECTED] | Very frankly, I am opposed to people http://www.loyalty.org/~schoen/ | being programmed

Re: example: secure computing kernel needed

2003-12-26 Thread Seth David Schoen
technology where the cost to the service provider of making a false attestation could be made substantial, which it is not now). I'm not sure exactly what things separate these. -- Seth David Schoen [EMAIL PROTECTED] | Very frankly, I am opposed to people http://www.loyalty.org/~schoen

Re: Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card (was: example: secure computing kernel needed)

2003-12-28 Thread Seth David Schoen
still disable it in the TPM on that machine if you control the machine. The steganographic thing is implausible because the TPM is a passive device which can't control other components in order to get them to signal information. -- Seth David Schoen [EMAIL PROTECTED] | Very frankly, I am opposed

Re: Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card (was: example: secure computing kernel needed)

2003-12-31 Thread Seth David Schoen
get me to sign things as FOO for him.) -- Seth David Schoen [EMAIL PROTECTED] | Very frankly, I am opposed to people http://www.loyalty.org/~schoen/ | being programmed by others. http://vitanuova.loyalty.org/ | -- Fred Rogers (1928-2003