must
have powerpoint-fu whereas I'm using lyx
Any opinions?
--
Crypto ergo sum. http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/
Do unto other faiths as you would have them do unto yours.
If you are a spammer, please email j...@subspacefield.org to
--
Obama Nation | It's not like I'm encrypting... it's more like I've
developed a massive entropy deficiency |
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---
ire, if people came away with the notion
that _now_ they are educated enough on crypto to make informed
decisions about new combinations. Maybe I should make a point of
telling them that this is not the case.
--
Obama Nation | It's not like I'm encrypting... it's more like I'
7;m not sure if
that's wise.
I'm plowing through the O'Reilly OpenSSL book, but are there other
resources out there that could help me, or others like me?
--
Obama Nation | It's not like I'm encrypting... it's more like I've
developed a massive entropy defi
ere a survey somewhere? If not, would people
like to help me create one by emailing me references to extant PRNG
definitions?
--
Obama Nation | It's not like I'm encrypting... it's more like I've
developed a massive entropy deficiency |
http://www.subsubpacefield.org/~trav
5) Multiple clients petitioning the daemon for random bits at once.
However, this is also a good thing; two consecutive values used by a
client may not be consecutive outputs from the PRNG subsystem.
Comments?
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
"We already have
n Russian, so you can subtract that from
2 times the entropy of typical Russian plaintext, and if that's
greater than zero, you're working magic.
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson
G
ength is the same or
higher. What I'm saying is that a chain is only as strong as its
weakest link, and my protocol has one less link.
> at little or no extra cost. You can buy a PCI board with a low-end Hifn crypto
> chip on it for less than $80 online.
For anyone who is interest
a garage door?
http://www.cap-lore.com/Garage/
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B
--
this is a one-way function, so
you'd have to mount a search on the key used if you want to be able to
interpret how the network traffic is used downstream.
Of course you'd want a cipher such that encryption with a random key
doesn't introduce any bias.
--
http://www.lightconsultin
lse positive, so in fact your chances
of actually having the condition are merely 1 in 100.
For a prolonged explanation, see this paper:
http://www.raid-symposium.org/raid99/PAPERS/Axelsson.pdf
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
"We already have enough fast, insecure systems.
t
offers opinions (see the complaints of vagueness above).
Summary:
All that having been said, I still have more confidence in Skype than
I did before reading the paper.
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier &
t and
simple, what I mean is that it obviously has no weaknesses, as opposed
to having no obvious weaknesses.
--
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"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B
tconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson
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op in the CD and it announces its
availability to various locator services to act as a Tor, mixmaster,
or whatever node. Again, keep me informed if anyone starts work on
this.
--
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"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schne
the irreversible payment using Western
Union, and later finds out the credit card used to make the paypal
payment was stolen when paypal reverses the transaction, leaving the
victim short.
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
"We already have enough fast, insecure systems."
e TA resistance (esp. in the presence of an attacker who may
prevent transmission of segments).
--
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"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2
as an
exercise for the reader.
--
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"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B
-
aints is a very confused one.
--
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"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B
The latest hashes, such as SHA-1, gave up on Feistel. It's not
necessary for the hash to be invertible, but OTOH there's no guarantee
of the lack of collisions.
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier
.
Perhaps he intends to hide the hash inside the encryption, in which
case he might be better off doing authentication+encryption.
--
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"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 1
over a certain
size, then perhaps you can claim some kind of resilience against them.
*shrug*
--
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"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2
elow. I
got to successfully use classical cryptanalysis on a relatively modern
system! That is a rare joy. CFS really needs a re-write, there's no
real good alternatives for cross-platform filesystem encryption to my
knowledge.
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
"We alr
> Does ISAKMP do encryption where the input is
> meant to be secret, instead of the key?
I meant MAC, not encryption, sorry.
Of course encryption inputs are secret.
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- S
isn't
something I'm willing to concede to any vendor, or for that matter any
other person. I like knowing what my computer is doing, to the bit
and byte level, or at least being able to find out.
--
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"We already have enough fast, insecu
Apparently that's not true for most bases
of Carmichael numbers. Is that the distinction that makes
Miller-Rabin a stronger primality test?
It's amazing how many words that took to state, and I didn't even
specify the squaring process.
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/
ght after installation I tried using it to read a container
copied from a corrupted Windows machine, but was not successful. It
is unclear to me if this was due to the corruption which occured, or
some kind of incompatibility between the Windows and Linux ports.
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~t
appear to save some exponentiations, but it also appears to
check that the last (temporally) non-1 square root of 1 we used was
-1, which it must be if n is prime, making it a stronger test than
Fermat's. Wikipedia concurs that MR is preferred over Fermat,
primarily (pun intended) because of
course, you're auditing network flows over a certain size
or lasting a certain amount of time.
--
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"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 6
In Practical Cryptography, Schneier discusses a new PRNG design called Fortuna.
It has some neat features.
He also discusses problems with the ANSI PRNG here:
http://www.schneier.com/paper-prngs.html
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
"We already have enough fast, insec
delay function.
--
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"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B
-
The
to.pdf
--
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"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B
-
The Crypto
rtain and don't quite know where to start reading on the
subject.
--
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"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5
ion of the inputs. Averaging with repeated
evaluations of the same k and x allows one to compute the mean value
of r, and the sum f+d, but I don't see how that helps one seperate f
from d. What am I missing?
--
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"We already have enough fast
t both timing and power consumption
side-channel attacks?
--
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"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B
---
ction is just
another output to the attacker, and should have the same properties
that any other output has with respect to the inputs one wishes to
keep secret. It does not have to be constant.
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
"We already have enough fast, insecu
essor machine and it's still
slow. The load climbs to 10 or 12 all too easily, then stuff becomes
unresponsive (perhaps because swap is one of the things I'm
encrypting).
--
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"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." --
useful for finding problems in code branches that
aren't taken frequently and thus might be missed by test vectors. I'm
not sure how many ciphers have this characteristic, I think Schneier
mentioned that IDEA does, among others.
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ ->&
even necessary that *trapdoor* one-way functions exist,
which is a common assumption in public-key systems.
For more information, see "Pseudorandomness and Cryptographic
Applications", ISBN 0-691-02546-0, by Michael Luby. Warning:
theory-intensive.
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/
action to remedy this situation if I am not overlooking
something simple.
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><- Knight of the Lambda Calculus
"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier &
then an investigation of the physical proceses involved and careful
measurement (of the generation device, not the digital output!) is the
only proper way to get some assurance. I'll sidestep the question of
whether anything is really nondeterministic for the moment (God is
omniscient, o
Does anyone here have any links to voting system designs that use
cryptography to achieve their goals? I'm curious what could be
achieved in that direction.
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><- Knight of the Lambda Calculus
"We already have enough fast, insecure syste
g.com/~travis/ -><- Knight of the Lambda Calculus
"We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B
-
The Cryptography Ma
s not necessarily a power of 2?
3) Is there any point in offering a permutation generator that is not
cryptographically strong?
--
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"My love for mathematics is unto 1/x as x approaches 0."
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C
braries and programs don't distinguish between the two, and so you
risk giving the attacker known plaintext when post-processing them
(and you don't know exactly how much unless you dive into file format
specifics). Would it be useful enough to merit the effort?
--
http://www.lightconsulting
edia? Is it doing a satisfactory job?
Your opinions welcome.
--
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"My love for mathematics is unto 1/x as x approaches 0."
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98
I'm open to any
suggestions along these lines.
--
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"My love for mathematics is unto 1/x as x approaches 0."
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B
---
I am discussing implementing a very simple version of this with the
author. If anyone else is interested in participating or just
watching, email me and I'll keep you in the loop.
--
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"My love for mathematics
c, fast-paced
environment?
And with that, I'm out. :-P
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"My love for mathematics is like 1/x as x approaches 0."
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B
account for 50% of the current
vulnerabilities the way buffer overflows do.
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"My love for mathematics is like 1/x as x approaches 0."
GPG fingerprint: 50A
also no way to disable that warning.
> > An expert will reflexively click through a dialog that
> > is almost certainly a false negative.
>
> That's just not true.
It reminds me of the base-rate fallacy:
http://www.raid-symposium.org/raid99/PAPERS/Axelsson.pdf
--
http:
On 12/19/05, Richard Levitte - VMS Whacker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> C has three really strong points:
>
> - portability. It's one of the most wide-spread and portable
> compiled languages that I know of.
I beg your pardon? If I want to store 128 bits of information, and
access the 8 most
cation so far, though some use libraries ("modules") that aren't
available on the target.
I realized halfway through this that I was thinking of applications
that use crypto, and not crypto algorithms per se. But pretty much we
sound like we're in agreement on most things.
--
http://w
g to that effect, so that the percieved performance problem
is minimized. Lie to the users? Remind me to not use that guy's
software. I'll take correct over fast any day.
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><- P=NP if (P=0 or N=1)
"My love for mathematics is like 1/x
le encryption?
The other day I was thinking of using a very large key to select a
permutation at random from the symmetric group S_(2^x). That would be
a group, but I don't see how you knowing that I'm using a random
permutation would help you at all.
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~
in.
Predictable seed -> predictable output. If that bootstrap is wrong,
you can treat everything else as an oracle and still get a good
distinguisher.
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"You are free... to do as we tell you!" ->
On 12/23/05, Philipp Gühring <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> It´s easy to say that it´s their responsibility.
> But how should they do it?
Very carefully.
Picking random numbers is far too important to be left to chance.
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/
"Vast emptines
strength of your cipher from 2^x to 2^(x/2)?
Almost true. The cardinality of the symmetric group S_(2^x) is
(2^x)!, so it reduces it from (2^x)! to roughly sqrt((2^x)!). That's
still a lot.
I suspect this is some information-theoretic limit for x-bit block ciphers.
--
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tconsulting.com/~travis/
"Vast emptiness, nothing sacred." -- Bodhidharma -><-
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h *are* tied to a email
address and have shorter expiration times.
Does anyone have any suggestions on how to do this, or suggestions to
the effect that I should be doing something else?
--
"If I could remember the names of these particles, I would have been a botanist"
-- Enrico Fermi -&g
been a botanist"
-- Enrico Fermi -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/
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'd have been a botanist"
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y.
*bonks forehead*
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Two chapters are online here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/sp/
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"If I could remember the names of these particles, I would have been a botanist"
-- Enrico Fermi -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E
ut if that
doesn't work out my second bet is on computation en masse.
--
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-- Enrico Fermi (apropos, no?) -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/
GPG fingerprint
saying he was working on a OTP system, but
never heard any more about it (let's not discuss him though please,
this thread is about one time pads).
--
"The generation of random numbers is too important to be left to chance."
-- Robert R. Coveyou -><- http:
http://www.cryptodox.com/Main_Page
--
"The generation of random numbers is too important to be left to chance."
-- Robert Coveyou -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/
GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E
all that
> Stinson has a really nice survey of this either webbed or in his
> book. (Anyone else remember?)
I have his book, I'll check both. I seem to remember him discussing
authentication a lot in the book.
--
"The generation of random numbers is too important to be left to ch
y if the attacker gets
access to the overwritten data, but it degrades into an attack on the
conventional cipher.
I wonder how remanance in flash drives fares.
--
"The generation of random numbers is too important to be left to chance."
--
them pitted:
http://www.thinkgeek.com/gadgets/security/6d7f/
--
"The generation of random numbers is too important to be left to chance."
-- Robert Coveyou -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/
GPG fingerpr
solitude is either a wild beast or a god." -><-
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u suppose this trick works?
The official details are, of course, vague.
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GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9D
ne calls to 14 prepaid mobile phones where the calls were
recorded.''
I bet you can find a manual for one of these switches online somewhere,
should you be suitably motivated.
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"fill with random bits"
protects against.
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---
Assume that one is the sole user of a LAN and that the 10-20 machines
on this network have a need for unpredictable numbers.
Assume further that it is not cost-effective to furnish each with a
HWRNG, even one as inexpensive as a sound card (for example, they may
not have a spare slot on the mother
.
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think of?
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rk for discussing
various paranoid delusions." -- Don Alvarez
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A cracker would have to exhaustively test the input
space for every incorrect guess at the password, whereas a valid
password would require one half the amount of computation (on
average), ignoring collisions.
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"Cryptography is nothing more than a mathematical framework for discuss
http://www.hamachi.cc/security
Based on a cursory look over this, I'm impressed by both the level of
detail and the level of security apparently afforded. Too bad I can't
see the source code.
--
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Does it avoid the need to get a "path"
to the recipient or their server?
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outs.
Aside: Can anyone tell me why the constants used in ipad and opad for
HMAC were chosen? If they're not arbitrary, I'd like to know the
rationale behind them.
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like a much smaller number of pure qubits."
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ram.com/BBPFormula.html
I dub this "pi pad".
Is this idea transcendental or irrational?
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GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484
[Moderator's note: I'd say "
s thinking that one could hash the first block, copy the
intermediate state, finalize it, then continue the intermediate result
with the next block, and finalize that. Is this safe? Is there a
better alternative?
--
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GPG f
generator, the equation is:
i' = (i * 1103515245 + 12345) & 0x7fff
As far as low-hanging fruit goes, the higher generator types still
never set the highest order bit (RAND_MAX is 0x7fff), and the
outputs are unaltered pool contents.
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urrent state of knowledge?
--
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ted to be sure I was understanding it correctly...
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ust one use it in order to
retain it?
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ngs
I used to run NetBSD 1.6 IIRC, and for some reason cgd was in previous
and later releases but not that one. I found that puzzling.
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quot; -- Steven Wright
Security Guru for Hire http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484
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Hire http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484
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ect" -- Steven Wright
Security Guru for Hire http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484
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own to all but about ten guys in Intel.
Writing your own "jump to ring zero" instruction is left as an
exercise to the reader.
--
"Curiousity killed the cat, but for a while I was a suspect" -- Steven Wright
Security Guru for Hire http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ ->&
;s trickier to handle
than a 1:1 correspondence.
--
"Curiousity killed the cat, but for a while I was a suspect" -- Steven Wright
Security Guru for Hire http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395
right now so I can't
tell you if it's vulnerable.
--
"Curiousity killed the cat, but for a while I was a suspect" -- Steven Wright
Security Guru for Hire http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
GPG fingerprint: 9D3
ect" -- Steven Wright
Security Guru for Hire http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484
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