[Publicity-list] DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice
* DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice May 26 - 27, 2004 DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ Organizers: Markus Jakobsson, RSA Laboratories, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ari Juels, RSA Laboratories, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Presented under the auspices of the Special Focus on Communication Security and Information Privacy and the Special Focus on Computation and the Socio-Economic Sciences.. To many technologists, electronic voting represents a seemingly simple exercise in system design. In reality, the many requirements it imposes with regard to correctness, anonymity, and availability pose an unusually thorny collection of problems, and the security risks associated with electronic voting, especially remotely over the Internet, are numerous and complex, posing major technological challenges for computer scientists. (For a few examples, see references below.) The problems range from the threat of denial-of-service-attacks to the need for careful selection of techniques to enforce private and correct tallying of ballots. Other possible requirements for electronic voting schemes are resistance to vote buying, defenses against malfunctioning software, viruses, and related problems, audit ability, and the development of user-friendly and universally accessible interfaces. The goal of the workshop is to bring together and foster an interplay of ideas among researchers and practitioners in different areas of relevance to voting. For example, the workshop will investigate prevention of penetration attacks that involve the use of a delivery mechanism to transport a malicious payload to the target host. This could be in the form of a ``Trojan horse'' or remote control program. It will also investigate vulnerabilities of the communication path between the voting client (the devices where a voter votes) and the server (where votes are tallied). Especially in the case of remote voting, the path must be ``trusted'' and a challenge is to maintain an authenticated communications linkage. Although not specifically a security issue, reliability issues are closely related and will also be considered. The workshop will consider issues dealing with random hardware and software failures (as opposed to deliberate, intelligent attack). A key difference between voting and electronic commerce is that in the former, one wants to irreversibly sever the link between the ballot and the voter. The workshop will discuss audit trails as a way of ensuring this. The workshop will also investigate methods for minimizing coercion and fraud, e.g., schemes to allow a voter to vote more than once and only having the last vote count. This workshop is part of the Special Focus on Communication Security and Information Privacy and will be coordinated with the Special Focus on Computation and the Socio-Economic Sciences. This workshop follows a successful first WOTE event, organized by David Chaum and Ron Rivest in 2001 at Marconi Conference Center in Tomales Bay, California (http://www.vote.caltech.edu/wote01/). Since that time, a flurry of voting bills has been enacted at the federal and state levels, including most notably the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). Standards development has represented another avenue of reform (e.g., the IEEE Voting Equipment Standards Project 1583), while a grassroots movement (http://www.verifiedvoting.org) has arisen to promote the importance of audit trails as enhancements to trustworthiness. ** Program: This is a preliminary program. Wednesday, May 26, 2004 7:45 - 8:20 Breakfast and Registration 8:20 - 8:30 Welcome and Opening Remarks Fred Roberts, DIMACS Director 8:30 - 9:15 Ron Rivest, MIT (tentative) 9:15 - 10:15 Rebecca Mercuri 10:15 - 10:45 Break 10:45 - 11:30 David Chaum 11:30 - 12:15 Michael Shamos, Carnegie Mellon University 12:15 - 1:30 Lunch 1:30 - 1:50 European online voting experiences Andreu Riera i Jorba, Universitat AutUnoma de Barcelona, Spain 1:50 - 2:10 Providing Trusted Paths Using Untrusted Components Andre Dos Santos, Georgia Institute of Technology 2:10 - 2:30 Internet voting based on PKI: the TruE-vote system Emilia Rosti, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy 2:30 - 2:50 Andy Neff, VoteHere, Inc. 2:50 - 3:10 E-voting with Vector Ballots : Homomorphic Encryption with Writeins and Shrink-and-Mix networks Aggelos Kiayas, University of Connecticut 3:10 - 3:30 How hard is it to manipulate voting? Edith Elkind, Princeton University and Helger Lipmaa, Helsinki University of Technology 3:30 - 3:50 Towards a dependability case for the Chaum e - voting scheme Peter Ryan
DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice
* DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice May 26 - 27, 2004 DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ Organizers: Markus Jakobsson, RSA Laboratories, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ari Juels, RSA Laboratories, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Presented under the auspices of the Special Focus on Communication Security and Information Privacy and the Special Focus on Computation and the Socio-Economic Sciences.. To many technologists, electronic voting represents a seemingly simple exercise in system design. In reality, the many requirements it imposes with regard to correctness, anonymity, and availability pose an unusually thorny collection of problems, and the security risks associated with electronic voting, especially remotely over the Internet, are numerous and complex, posing major technological challenges for computer scientists. (For a few examples, see references below.) The problems range from the threat of denial-of-service-attacks to the need for careful selection of techniques to enforce private and correct tallying of ballots. Other possible requirements for electronic voting schemes are resistance to vote buying, defenses against malfunctioning software, viruses, and related problems, audit ability, and the development of user-friendly and universally accessible interfaces. The goal of the workshop is to bring together and foster an interplay of ideas among researchers and practitioners in different areas of relevance to voting. For example, the workshop will investigate prevention of penetration attacks that involve the use of a delivery mechanism to transport a malicious payload to the target host. This could be in the form of a ``Trojan horse'' or remote control program. It will also investigate vulnerabilities of the communication path between the voting client (the devices where a voter votes) and the server (where votes are tallied). Especially in the case of remote voting, the path must be ``trusted'' and a challenge is to maintain an authenticated communications linkage. Although not specifically a security issue, reliability issues are closely related and will also be considered. The workshop will consider issues dealing with random hardware and software failures (as opposed to deliberate, intelligent attack). A key difference between voting and electronic commerce is that in the former, one wants to irreversibly sever the link between the ballot and the voter. The workshop will discuss audit trails as a way of ensuring this. The workshop will also investigate methods for minimizing coercion and fraud, e.g., schemes to allow a voter to vote more than once and only having the last vote count. This workshop is part of the Special Focus on Communication Security and Information Privacy and will be coordinated with the Special Focus on Computation and the Socio-Economic Sciences. This workshop follows a successful first WOTE event, organized by David Chaum and Ron Rivest in 2001 at Marconi Conference Center in Tomales Bay, California (http://www.vote.caltech.edu/wote01/). Since that time, a flurry of voting bills has been enacted at the federal and state levels, including most notably the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). Standards development has represented another avenue of reform (e.g., the IEEE Voting Equipment Standards Project 1583), while a grassroots movement (http://www.verifiedvoting.org) has arisen to promote the importance of audit trails as enhancements to trustworthiness. ** Program: This is a preliminary program. Wednesday, May 26, 2004 7:45 - 8:20 Breakfast and Registration 8:20 - 8:30 Welcome and Opening Remarks Fred Roberts, DIMACS Director 8:30 - 9:15 Ron Rivest (tentative) 9:15 - 10:15 Rebecca Mercuri 10:15 - 10:45 Break 10:45 - 11:30 David Chaum 11:30 - 12:15 Michael Shamos 12:15 - 1:30 Lunch 1:30 - 1:50 European online voting experiences Andreu Riera i Jorba 1:50 - 2:10 Providing Trusted Paths Using Untrusted Components Andre Dos Santos 2:10 - 2:30 Internet voting based on PKI: the TruE-vote system Emilia Rosti 2:30 - 2:50 Andy Neff 2:50 - 3:10 Aggelos Kiayas 3:10 - 3:30 How hard is it to manipulate voting? Edith Elkind and Helger Lipmaa 3:30 - 3:50 Towards a dependability case for the Chaum e - voting scheme Peter Ryan 3:50 - 4:20 Break 4:20 - 4:40 Secure practical voting systems: A Cautionary Note Quisquater 4:40 - 5:25 Rob Ritchie 5:25 - 6:10 Panel (moderator: David Chaum) 6:10 - 7:30 Buffet Dinner - Reception - DIMACS Lounge Thursday, May 27, 2004 7:45 - 8:30 Breakfast and Registration 8:30 - 9:15 Rice University hack - a - vote project Dan
DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice
* DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice May 26 - 27, 2004 DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ Organizers: Markus Jakobsson, RSA Laboratories, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ari Juels, RSA Laboratories, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Presented under the auspices of the Special Focus on Communication Security and Information Privacy and the Special Focus on Computation and the Socio-Economic Sciences.. To many technologists, electronic voting represents a seemingly simple exercise in system design. In reality, the many requirements it imposes with regard to correctness, anonymity, and availability pose an unusually thorny collection of problems, and the security risks associated with electronic voting, especially remotely over the Internet, are numerous and complex, posing major technological challenges for computer scientists. (For a few examples, see references below.) The problems range from the threat of denial-of-service-attacks to the need for careful selection of techniques to enforce private and correct tallying of ballots. Other possible requirements for electronic voting schemes are resistance to vote buying, defenses against malfunctioning software, viruses, and related problems, audit ability, and the development of user-friendly and universally accessible interfaces. The goal of the workshop is to bring together and foster an interplay of ideas among researchers and practitioners in different areas of relevance to voting. For example, the workshop will investigate prevention of penetration attacks that involve the use of a delivery mechanism to transport a malicious payload to the target host. This could be in the form of a ``Trojan horse'' or remote control program. It will also investigate vulnerabilities of the communication path between the voting client (the devices where a voter votes) and the server (where votes are tallied). Especially in the case of remote voting, the path must be ``trusted'' and a challenge is to maintain an authenticated communications linkage. Although not specifically a security issue, reliability issues are closely related and will also be considered. The workshop will consider issues dealing with random hardware and software failures (as opposed to deliberate, intelligent attack). A key difference between voting and electronic commerce is that in the former, one wants to irreversibly sever the link between the ballot and the voter. The workshop will discuss audit trails as a way of ensuring this. The workshop will also investigate methods for minimizing coercion and fraud, e.g., schemes to allow a voter to vote more than once and only having the last vote count. This workshop is part of the Special Focus on Communication Security and Information Privacy and will be coordinated with the Special Focus on Computation and the Socio-Economic Sciences. This workshop follows a successful first WOTE event, organized by David Chaum and Ron Rivest in 2001 at Marconi Conference Center in Tomales Bay, California (http://www.vote.caltech.edu/wote01/). Since that time, a flurry of voting bills has been enacted at the federal and state levels, including most notably the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). Standards development has represented another avenue of reform (e.g., the IEEE Voting Equipment Standards Project 1583), while a grassroots movement (http://www.verifiedvoting.org) has arisen to promote the importance of audit trails as enhancements to trustworthiness. ** Participation: Interested participants may contact the organizers. ** Registration Fees: (Pre-registration deadline: May 20, 2004) Regular Rate Preregister before deadline $120/day After preregistration deadline $140/day Reduced Rate* Preregister before deadline $60/day After preregistration deadline $70/day Postdocs Preregister before deadline $10/day After preregistration deadline $15/day DIMACS Postdocs $0 Non-Local Graduate Undergraduate students Preregister before deadline $5/day After preregistration deadline $10/day Local Graduate Undergraduate students $0 (Rutgers Princeton) DIMACS partner institution employees** $0 DIMACS long-term visitors*** $0 Registration fee to be collected on site, cash, check, VISA/Mastercard accepted. Our funding agencies require that we charge a registration fee during the course of the workshop. Registration fees include participation in the workshop, all workshop materials, breakfast, lunch, breaks and any scheduled social events (if applicable). * College/University faculty and employees of nonprofit and government organizations will automatically receive the reduced rate. Other participants may apply for a reduction of fees. They should email their request