Re: [Cryptography] Impossible trapdoor systems (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")

2013-09-12 Thread Ray Dillinger

On 09/08/2013 11:49 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:


That said, your hypothetical seems much like "imagine that you can
float by the power of your mind alone". The construction of such a
cipher with a single master key that operates just like any other key
seems nearly impossible, and that should be obvious.


True.  A universal key that uses the same decryption operation as
a normal key is clearly stupid.

I guess the thing I was thinking of is that the "attacker" knows
a method that allows him to decrypt anything if he knows the IV,
but cannot recover the key used to encrypt it.

Which is of course a public-key system, where the decryption
method is the "private" key and the IV is the "public" key.
The thing I was thinking of as a "key" functions as a "nonce"
or subkey which allows people unrelated to the private key
holder to communicate semi-privately by shared secret, but
the private key is a backdoor on their communication.

Duh. Sorry, just wasn't thinking of the right "parallel mapping"
of what I described. For the cipher itself to function as a key
sort of escaped my attention.

Sorry to waste time.

Ray.


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Re: [Cryptography] Impossible trapdoor systems (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")

2013-09-09 Thread Jerry Leichter
On Sep 8, 2013, at 8:37 PM, James A. Donald wrote:
>> Your magic key must then take any block of N bits and magically
>> produce the corresponding plaintext when any given ciphertext
>> might correspond to many, many different plaintexts depending
>> on the key
> Suppose that the mappings from 2^N plaintexts to 2^N ciphertexts are not 
> random, but rather orderly, so that given one element of the map, one can 
> predict all the other elements of the map.
> 
> Suppose, for example the effect of encryption was to map a 128 bit block to a 
> group, map the key to the group, add the key to the block, and map back
Before our current level of understanding of block ciphers, people actually 
raised - and investigated - the question of whether the DES operations formed a 
group.  (You can do this computationally with reasonable resources.  The answer 
is that it isn't.)  I don't think anyone has repeated the particular experiment 
with the current crop of block ciphers; but then I expect the details of their 
construction, and the attacks they are already explicitly built to avoid, would 
rule out the possibility.  But I don't know.

Stepping back, what you are considering is the possibility that there's a 
structure in the block cipher such that if you have some internal information, 
and you have some collection of plaintext/ciphertext pairs with respect to a 
given key, you can predict other (perhaps all) such pairs.  This is just 
another way of saying there's a ciphertext/known plaintext/chosen plaintext/ 
chosen ciphertext attack, depending on your assumptions about how that 
collection of pairs must be created.  That it's conveniently expressible as 
some kind of mathematical structure on the mappings generated by the cipher for 
a given key is neither here nor there.

Such a thing would contradict everything we think we know about block ciphers. 
Sure, it *could* happen - but I'd put it way, way down the list of possibles.

-- Jerry

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Re: [Cryptography] Impossible trapdoor systems (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")

2013-09-08 Thread James A. Donald

On 2013-09-09 4:49 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:

Your magic key must then take any block of N bits and magically
produce the corresponding plaintext when any given ciphertext
might correspond to many, many different plaintexts depending
on the key. That's clearly not something you can do.


Suppose that the mappings from 2^N plaintexts to 2^N ciphertexts are not 
random, but rather orderly, so that given one element of the map, one 
can predict all the other elements of the map.


Suppose, for example the effect of encryption was to map a 128 bit block 
to a group, map the key to the group, add the key to the block, and map 
back.  To someone who knows the group and the mapping, merely a heavily 
obfuscated 128 bit Caesar cipher.


No magic key.


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