Re: [Cryptography] Iran and murder
2013/10/10 John Kelsey > The problem with offensive cyberwarfare is that, given the imbalance > between attackers and defenders and the expanding use of computer controls > in all sorts of systems, a cyber war between two advanced countries will > not decide anything militarily, but will leave both combattants much poorer > than they were previously, cause some death and a lot of hardship and > bitterness, and leave the actual hot war to be fought. > I think you'd only employ most the offensive means in harmony with the start of the hot war. That makes a lot more sense than annoying your opponent. > Imagine a conflict that starts with both countries wrecking a lot of each > others' infrastructure--causing refineries to burn, factories to wreck > expensive equipment, nuclear plants to melt down, etc. A week later, that > phase of the war is over. Both countries are, at that point, probalby > 10-20% poorer than they were a week earlier. I think this would cause more than 20% damage (esp. the nuclear reactor!). But I can imagine a slow buildup of disabled things happening. > Both countries have lots of really bitter people out for blood, because > someone they care about was killed or their job's gone and their house > burned down or whatever. But probably there's been little actual > degradation of their standard war-fighting ability. Their civilian > aviation system may be shut down, some planes may even have been crashed, > but their bombers and fighters and missiles are mostly still working. Fuel > and spare parts may be hard to come by, but the military will certainly get > first pick. My guess is that what comes next is that the two countries > have a standard hot war, but with the pleasant addition of a great > depression sized economic collapse for both right in the middle of it. > This would be a mayor plus in the eyes of the countries' leaders. Motivating people for war is the hardest thing about it. I do think the military relies heavily on electronic tools for coordination. And I think they have plenty of parts stockpiled for a proper blitzkrieg. Most the things you mentioned can be achieved with infiltration and covert operations, which are far more traditional. And far harder to do at great scale. But they are not done until there is already a significant blood thirst. I'm not sure what'd happen, simply put. But I think it'll become just another aspect of warfare. It is already another aspect of the cover operations, and we haven't lived a high-tech vs high-tech war. And if it does happen, the chance we live to talk about it is less than I'd like. You pose an interesting notion about the excessiveness of causing a great depression before the first bullets fly. I counter that with the effects of conventional warfare being more excessively destructive. ___ The cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [Cryptography] Iran and murder
2013/10/9 Phillip Hallam-Baker > I see cyber-sabotage as being similar to use of chemical or biological > weapons: It is going to be banned because the military consequences fall > far short of being decisive, are unpredictable and the barriers to entry > are low. > I doubt that's anywhere near how they'll be treated. Bio en Chem are banned for their extreme relative effectiveness and far greater cruelty than most weapons have. Bleeding out is apparently considered quite human, compared to chocking on foamed up parts of your own lungs. Cyberwarfare will likely be effectively counteracted by better security. The more I think the less I understand "fall far short of being decisive". If cyber is out you switch to old-school tactics. If chemical or biological happens it's either death for hundreds or thousands or nothing happens. Of course the bigger armies will want to keep it away from the "terrorists", it'd level the playing field quite a bit. A 200 losses, 2000 kills battle could turn into 1200 losses, 1700 kills quite fast. But that's not what I'd call a ban. ___ The cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [Cryptography] Iran and murder
The problem with offensive cyberwarfare is that, given the imbalance between attackers and defenders and the expanding use of computer controls in all sorts of systems, a cyber war between two advanced countries will not decide anything militarily, but will leave both combattants much poorer than they were previously, cause some death and a lot of hardship and bitterness, and leave the actual hot war to be fought. Imagine a conflict that starts with both countries wrecking a lot of each others' infrastructure--causing refineries to burn, factories to wreck expensive equipment, nuclear plants to melt down, etc. A week later, that phase of the war is over. Both countries are, at that point, probalby 10-20% poorer than they were a week earlier. Both countries have lots of really bitter people out for blood, because someone they care about was killed or their job's gone and their house burned down or whatever. But probably there's been little actual degradation of their standard war-fighting ability. Their civilian aviation system may be shut down, some planes may even have been crashed, but their bombers and fighters and missiles are mostly still working. Fuel and spare parts may be hard to come by, but the military will certainly get first pick. My guess is that what comes next is that the two countries have a standard hot war, but with the pleasant addition of a great depression sized economic collapse for both right in the middle of it. --John ___ The cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [Cryptography] Iran and murder
> We are more vulnerable to widespread acceptance of these bad principles than > almost anyone, ultimately, But doing all these things has won larger budgets > and temporary successes for specific people and agencies today, whereas > the costs of all this will land on us all in the future. The same could be (and has been) said about offensive cyber warfare. > --John -- Tim Newsham | www.thenewsh.com/~newsham | @newshtwit | thenewsh.blogspot.com ___ The cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [Cryptography] Iran and murder
On 2013-10-08 02:03, John Kelsey wrote: Alongside Phillip's comments, I'll just point out that assassination of key people is a tactic that the US and Israel probably don't have any particular advantages in. It isn't in our interests to encourage a worldwide tacit acceptance of that stuff. Israel is famous for its competence in that area. And if the US is famously incompetent, that is probably lack of will, rather than lack of ability. Drones give the US technological supremacy in the selective removal of key people ___ The cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [Cryptography] Iran and murder
On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 12:44 AM, Tim Newsham wrote: > > We are more vulnerable to widespread acceptance of these bad principles > than > > almost anyone, ultimately, But doing all these things has won larger > budgets > > and temporary successes for specific people and agencies today, whereas > > the costs of all this will land on us all in the future. > > The same could be (and has been) said about offensive cyber warfare. > I said the same thing in the launch issue of cyber-defense. Unfortunately the editor took it into his head to conflate inventing the HTTP referer field etc. with rather more and so I can't point people at the article as they refuse to correct it. I see cyber-sabotage as being similar to use of chemical or biological weapons: It is going to be banned because the military consequences fall far short of being decisive, are unpredictable and the barriers to entry are low. STUXNET has been relaunched with different payloads countless times. So we are throwing stones the other side can throw back with greater force. We have a big problem in crypto because we cannot now be sure that the help received from the US government in the past has been well intentioned or not. And so a great deal of time is being wasted right now (though we will waste orders of magnitude more of their time). At the moment we have a bunch of generals and contractors telling us that we must spend billions on the ability to attack China's power system in case they attack ours. If we accept that project then we can't share technology that might help them defend their power system which cripples our ability to defend our own. So a purely hypothetical attack promoted for the personal enrichment of a few makes us less secure, not safer. And the power systems are open to attack by sufficiently motivated individuals. The sophistication of STUXNET lay in its ability to discriminate the intended target from others. The opponents we face simply don't care about collateral damage. So I am not impressed by people boasting about the ability of some country (not an ally of my country BTW) to perform targeted murder overlooks the fact that they can and likely will retaliate with indiscriminate murder in return. I bet people are less fond of drones when they start to realize other countries have them as well. Lets just stick to defense and make the NATO civilian infrastructure secure against cyber attack regardless of what making that technology public might do for what some people insist we should consider enemies. -- Website: http://hallambaker.com/ ___ The cryptography mailing list [email protected] http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
