Re: [Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys

2013-09-08 Thread Peter Gutmann
Jeffrey I. Schiller j...@mit.edu writes:

If I was the NSA, I would be scavenging broken hardware from “interesting”
venues and purchasing computers for sale in interesting locations. I would be
particularly interested in stolen computers, as they have likely not been
wiped.

Just buy second-hand HSMs off eBay, they often haven't been wiped, and the
PINs are conveniently taped to the case.  I have a collection of interesting
keys (or at least keys from interesting places, including government
departments) obtained in this way.

Peter.
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Re: [Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys

2013-09-07 Thread Phillip Hallam-Baker
On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 10:20 AM, Jeffrey I. Schiller j...@mit.edu wrote:


 If I was the NSA, I would be scavenging broken hardware from
 “interesting” venues and purchasing computers for sale in interesting
 locations. I would be particularly interested in stolen computers, as
 they have likely not been wiped.


+1

And this is why I have been so peeved at the chorus of attack against
trustworthy computing.

All I have ever really wanted from Trustworthy computing is to be sure that
my private keys can't be copied off a server.


And private keys should never be in more than one place unless they are
either an offline Certificate Signing Key for a PKI system or a decryption
key for stored data.

-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/
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Re: [Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys

2013-09-07 Thread Jim Popovitch
On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 10:20 AM, Jeffrey I. Schiller j...@mit.edu wrote:
 One of the most obvious ways to compromise a cryptographic system is
 to get the keys. This is a particular risk in TLS/SSL when PFS is not
 used. Consider a large scale site (read: Google, Facebook, etc.) that
 uses SSL. The private keys of the relevant certificates needs to be
 literally on hundreds if not thousands of systems.

$5k USD to anyone one of the thousands of admins with access

-Jim P.
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