Re: [Cryptography] Traffic Analysis (was Re: PRISM PROOF Email)
On 08/27/2013 01:17, Perry E. Metzger wrote: On Mon, 26 Aug 2013 17:39:16 -0400 The Doctor dr...@virtadpt.net wrote: On 08/26/2013 09:26 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote: Mix networks are, however, a well technique. Onion networks, which are related, are widely deployed right now in the form of Tor, and work well. I see little reason to believe mix networks would not also work well for instant messages and email (see my other thread, begun yesterday.) What is considered acceptible latency these days for IM or e-mail? Supposedly, the highest acceptible latency for web browsing before the user gets bored and closes the tab is two or three seconds (supposedly...), so where would the lag for e-mail or IM fall anymore before users give up on it? I think tolerance for delays on the web is actually much lower than that -- even a full second probably drives many users away. That's why Tor has a much harder problem. In Email, however, no one really knows their latency -- it is rare that someone actually is aware that a message has just been sent. I routinely have SMSes take seconds to go through and yet I use SMS. I'd agree with this. On the Web, people are impatient because they're trying to complete a transaction in real time. It's very rare to expect an immediate response by email. With IM it depends on the individual conversation and the feedback you're getting. eg, if you're chatting with someone in real time and the software shows you the other person is typing a reply you'll wait, while if there's no feedback you may just assume they've left the room for some reason. But either way, it's not fatal. Latency issues really apply much more to things that stream - audio, video, voice calls. And high-speed trading, but that seems beyond the scope of this conversation. wg -- www.pelicancrossing.net -- all about me Twitter: @wendyg ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [Cryptography] Traffic Analysis (was Re: PRISM PROOF Email)
On Sun, 25 Aug 2013 23:40:35 -0400 Phillip Hallam-Baker hal...@gmail.com wrote: There has to be a layered approach. Traffic analysis is probably going to demand steganography and that is almost by definition outside standards work. I'm unaware of anyone who has seriously proposed steganography for that purpose -- I'm not even sure it would have the desired effect. Recall that the problem in blocking traffic analysis is to conceal that two endpoints are communicating. Mix networks are, however, a well technique. Onion networks, which are related, are widely deployed right now in the form of Tor, and work well. I see little reason to believe mix networks would not also work well for instant messages and email (see my other thread, begun yesterday.) I'm not particularly interested in standards work per se. If something becomes successful, that is probably the time to consider standardization if warranted. Perry -- Perry E. Metzgerpe...@piermont.com ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [Cryptography] Traffic Analysis (was Re: PRISM PROOF Email)
There has to be a layered approach. Traffic analysis is probably going to demand steganography and that is almost by definition outside standards work. The part of Prism that I consider to be blatantly unconstitutional is that they keep all the emails so that they can search them years later should the need arise. Strikes me that is the type of sophistry that John Yoo used when he wrote those memos claiming that torture isn't torture. There will be a reckoning in the end. Takes about twenty to thirty years before the point is reached that nobody in the establishment has a reason to protect the war criminals of years past. I have a little theory about the reason the CIA engineered coups were so successful from 53 to 73 and then suddenly stopped working. Seems to me that the CIA would have been nuts to try operation Ajax without some very powerful intel like being able to break the Persian codes. CIa stopped being able to mount those exercises after electronic ciphers were introduced. Given how the NSA used their powers last time round to topple democracies and install dictators I don't think they deserve a second chance. On Sun, Aug 25, 2013 at 3:34 PM, Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.comwrote: On Fri, 23 Aug 2013 09:38:21 -0700 Carl Ellison c...@acm.org wrote: Meanwhile PRISM was more about metadata than content, right? How are we going to prevent traffic analysis worldwide? The best technology for that is mix networks. At one point, early in the cypherpunks era, mix networks were something of an expensive idea. Now, however, everyone in sight is connected 24x7 to the internet. Similarly, at one point, bandwidthwas scarce, but now, most traffic is video, and even if instant messages and email equivalents took many hops through the network, the bandwidth used (except for mobiles, which need not be interior mix nodes per se) is negligible. Perry -- Perry E. Metzgerpe...@piermont.com ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography -- Website: http://hallambaker.com/ ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
