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From: Nicko van Someren [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to
authenticate software releases
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List-Id: Macintosh Cryptography mac_crypto.vmeng.com
Dobbertin's 1996 collision demonstration is another good reason not
to use md5, but is obviously hasn't gotten the open source community
or Apple to stop. Whether my attack will be any more successful in
effecting change remains to be seen. Publishing SHA1 hashes in
parallel with md5 seems
--- begin forwarded text
From: Nicko van Someren [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to
authenticate software releases
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To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Vinnie Moscaritolo [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to
authenticate software releases
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The attacks by Dobbertin on MD5 only allow to find collisions in the
compression function, not the whole MD5 hash.
But it is a sign that something might be fishy about MD5.
MD5 output is 128 bits. There are two types of collision finding
attacks that can be applied. In the first you are given
At 4:51 PM +0100 4/5/04, Nicko van Someren wrote:
...
While I agree that it is somewhat lax of Apple to be using MD5 for
checking its updates it's far from clear to me that an attack of the
sort described above would ever be practical. The problem is that
the while there are methods for
hi, mr. reinhold --
there's stronger reason than the ones you cite,
to distrust md5 as a message-digest. see these
old sci.crypt threads, and the google-search below,
for discussions of hans dobbertin's 1996 crack
of md5:
http://tinyurl.com/2ox7g
http://tinyurl.com/3x446
