* Dirk-Willem van Gulik:
Been looking at the Telnic (dev.telnic.org) effort.
In essence; NAPTR dns records which contain private details such as a
phone number. These are encrypted against the public keys of your
friends (so if you have 20 friends and 3 phone numbers visible to all
friends
On Sun, 10 Sep 2006, James A. Donald wrote:
Could you describe this attack in more detail. I do not see a
scenario where it would be useful.
Suppose that an attacker runs an activex control on the user's
computer and the control is able to ask a smart card connected to the
computer to perform
Leichter, Jerry wrote:
| It is known, that given such an oracle, the attacker can ask for
| decryption of all primes less than B, and then he will be able to
| sign PKCS-1 encoded messages if the representative number is B-smooth,
| but is there any way to actually recover d itself?
RSA is
I don't follow. For RSA, the only difference between encryption and
decryption, and public and private key, and hence between chosen
plaintext and chosen ciphertext, is the arbitrary naming of one of
a pair of mutually-inverse values as the private key and the other
as the public key.
| | It is known, that given such an oracle, the attacker can ask for
| | decryption of all primes less than B, and then he will be able to
| | sign PKCS-1 encoded messages if the representative number is B-smooth,
| | but is there any way to actually recover d itself?
|
| RSA is
| Hi.
|
| If an attacker is given access to a raw RSA decryption oracle (the
| oracle calculates c^d mod n for any c) is it possible to extract the
| key (d)?
If I hand you my public key, I have in effect handed you an oracle that
will compute c^d mod n for any c. What you are asking is whether
On Thu, 7 Sep 2006, Leichter, Jerry wrote:
| If an attacker is given access to a raw RSA decryption oracle (the
| oracle calculates c^d mod n for any c) is it possible to extract the
| key (d)?
If I hand you my public key, I have in effect handed you an oracle that
will compute c^d mod n for
Alexander Klimov asks:
If an attacker is given access to a raw RSA decryption oracle (the
oracle calculates c^d mod n for any c) is it possible to extract the
key (d)?
This is equivalent to asking whether factoring reduces to RSA inversion.
That is, given access to an RSA inversion oracle, can
| | If an attacker is given access to a raw RSA decryption oracle (the
| | oracle calculates c^d mod n for any c) is it possible to extract the
| | key (d)?
| If I hand you my public key, I have in effect handed you an oracle that
| will compute c^d mod n for any c. What you are asking is