Re: TLS-SRP TLS-PSK support in browsers (Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-13 Thread James Cloos
 Werner == Werner Koch [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

Werner The last time I checked the Mozilla code they used their own crypto
Werner stuff.  When did they switched to OpenSSL and how do they solve the
Werner GPL/OpenSSL license incompatibility?

Indeed they do.  It is called nss, is available as a package of its own
on several dists, is written in C, is MPL|GPL|LGPL and has its own page at:

http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/

The Gentoo ebuild even installs a pkgconfig file.

I don't recall seeing anything !zilla using it, though.

-JimC
-- 
James Cloos [EMAIL PROTECTED] OpenPGP: 1024D/ED7DAEA6

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Re: TLS-SRP TLS-PSK support in browsers (Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-10 Thread Ian G

Peter Gutmann wrote:

Victor Duchovni [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:


While Firefox should ideally be developing and testing PSK now, without
stable libraries to use in servers and browsers, we can't yet expect anything
to be released.


Is that the FF devlopers' reason for holding back?  Just wondering... why not
release it with TLS-PSK/SRP anyway (particularly with 3.0 being in the beta
stage, it'd be the perfect time to test new features), tested against existing
implementations, then at least it's ready for when server support appears.  At
the moment we seem to be in a catch-22, servers don't support it because
browsers don't, and browsers don't support it because servers don't.



I would say that this would not hold the FF developers back, 
as they were definately capable of implementing TLS/SNI 
extension a year or two back, without any support from 
stable libraries in Apache httpd, Microsoft IIS, etc (still 
waiting...).


I'd also suggest that the TLS/SNI (which will apparently 
turn up one day in Apache) will have a much more dramatic 
effect on phishing than TLS-PSK/SRP ... because of the 
economics of course.  Lowering the barriers on all TLS use 
is far more important than making existing TLS use easier.


Of course, this is not a competition, as the effect adds, 
not competes.  The good thing is that we may actually get to 
see the effects of both fixes to TLS rollout at similar 
times.  In economics, it is a truism that we can't run the 
experiment, we have to watch real life, Heisenberg style, 
and this may give us a chance to do that.


Also, we can observe another significant factor in the mix: 
 the rollout of virtual machine platforms (xen and the 
like) is dramatically changed the economics of IP#s, these 
now becoming more the limiting factor than they were, which 
might also put more pressure on Apache ... to release 
earlier and more often.


iang

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Re: TLS-SRP TLS-PSK support in browsers (Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-10 Thread Werner Koch
On Thu,  7 Feb 2008 16:37, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:

 I don't have any idea why or why not, but all they can release now is
 source code with #ifdef openssl = 0.9.9  ... do PSK stuff ... #endif,

The last time I checked the Mozilla code they used their own crypto
stuff.  When did they switched to OpenSSL and how do they solve the
GPL/OpenSSL license incompatibility?


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner


-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Auschnahme regelt ein Bundeschgesetz.

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Re: TLS-SRP TLS-PSK support in browsers (Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-09 Thread Peter Gutmann
Victor Duchovni [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

While Firefox should ideally be developing and testing PSK now, without
stable libraries to use in servers and browsers, we can't yet expect anything
to be released.

Is that the FF devlopers' reason for holding back?  Just wondering... why not
release it with TLS-PSK/SRP anyway (particularly with 3.0 being in the beta
stage, it'd be the perfect time to test new features), tested against existing
implementations, then at least it's ready for when server support appears.  At
the moment we seem to be in a catch-22, servers don't support it because
browsers don't, and browsers don't support it because servers don't.

Peter.

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Re: TLS-SRP TLS-PSK support in browsers (Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-09 Thread Peter Gutmann
Frank Siebenlist [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

With the big browser war still going strong, wouldn't that provide fantastic
marketing opportunities for Firefox?

There's always the problem of politics.  You'd think that support for a free
CA like CAcert would also provide fantastic marketing opportunities for free
browser like Firefox, but this seems to be stalled pretty much idefinitely
because since CAcert doesn't charge for certificates, including it in Firefox
would upset the commercial CAs that do (there's actually a lot more to it than
this, see the interminable flamewars on this topic on blogs and whatnot for
more information).

If Firefox would support these secure password protocols, and the banks would
openly recommend their customers to use Firefox because its safer and
protects them better from phishing, that would be great publicity for
Firefox, draw more users, and force M$ to support it too in the long run...

Here's a suggestion to list members:

- If you know a Firefox developer, go to them and tell them that TLS-PSK and
  TLS-SRP support would be a fantastic selling point and would allow Firefox
  to trump IE in terms of resisting phishing, which might encourage banks to
  recommend it to users in place of IE.

- If you know anyone with some clout at Microsoft, tell them that your
  organisation is thinking of mandating a switch to Firefox because IE doesn't
  support phish-resistant authentication like TLS-PSK/TLS-SRP, and since you
  have x million paying customers this won't look good for MS.

- If you work for any banking regulators (for example the FFIEC), require
  failsafe authentication (in which the remote site doesn't get a copy of your
  credentials if the authentication fails) rather than the current two-factor
  auth (which has lead to farcical two-factor mechanisms like SiteKey).

Oh, and don't tell them I put you up to this :-).

Peter.

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Re: TLS-SRP TLS-PSK support in browsers (Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-09 Thread Victor Duchovni
On Thu, Feb 07, 2008 at 08:47:20PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:

 Victor Duchovni [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
 
 While Firefox should ideally be developing and testing PSK now, without
 stable libraries to use in servers and browsers, we can't yet expect anything
 to be released.
 
 Is that the FF devlopers' reason for holding back?  Just wondering... why not
 release it with TLS-PSK/SRP anyway (particularly with 3.0 being in the beta
 stage, it'd be the perfect time to test new features), tested against existing
 implementations, then at least it's ready for when server support appears.  At
 the moment we seem to be in a catch-22, servers don't support it because
 browsers don't, and browsers don't support it because servers don't.

I don't have any idea why or why not, but all they can release now is
source code with #ifdef openssl = 0.9.9  ... do PSK stuff ... #endif,
with binaries (dynamically) linked against the default OpenSSL on the
oldest supported release of each platform... For RedHat 4.x systems,
for example, that means that binary packages use 0.9.7...

Distributions that build their own Firefox from source may at some point
have PSK (once they ship OpenSSL 0.9.9). I don't think we will see this
available in many user's hands for 2-3 years after the code is written
(fielding new systems to the masses takes a long time...).

-- 

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Re: TLS-SRP TLS-PSK support in browsers (Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-06 Thread Ivan Krstić

On Feb 1, 2008, at 9:34 PM, Ian G wrote:
* Browser vendors don't employ security people as we know them on  
this mailgroup [...]  But they are completely at sea when it comes  
to systemic security failings or designing new systems.


I don't know about other browsers, but Mozilla's CSO-type is Window  
Snyder who I'd easily describe as a pretty top-notch security person.


--
Ivan Krstić [EMAIL PROTECTED] | http://radian.org
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Re: TLS-SRP TLS-PSK support in browsers (Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-06 Thread Peter Gutmann
Frank Siebenlist [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

That's actually a sad observation.

I keep telling my colleagues that this technology is coming any day now to
a browser near you - didn't realize that that there was no interest with the
browser companies to add support for this...

I know of a number of organisations (mostly governmental, but also some
financial) in various countries who are really, really keen to get support for
(as James Donald pointed out) cryptographically secured relationships (not
requiring PKI would be a big feature) into browsers, but no-one knows who to
beat over the head about it.  The last group I talked to (banks) were hoping
to use commercial pressure to get MS to add support for it in IE7^H^H8 at
which point Firefox would be forced to follow, but it's a slow process.

Why do the browser companies not care?
What is the adoption issue?
Still the dark cloud of patents looming over it?
Not enough understanding about the benefits? (marketing)
Economic reasons that we wouldn't buy anymore server certs?

I think it's a combination of two factors:

1. Everyone knows that passwords are insecure, so it's not worth trying to do
   anything with them.

   (My counter-argument to this is that passwords are only insecure because
   protocol designers have chosen to make them insecure, see my previous post
   about the quaint 1970s-vintage hand-over-the-password model used by SSH and
   SSL/TLS).

2. If you add failsafe authentication to browsers, CAs become redundant.

   (My counter-argument to this is to ask whether browser security exists in
   order to provide a business model for CAs or to protect users.  Currently
   it seems to be the former, with EV certs being a prime example).

There are probably other contributory reasons as well.

Peter.

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Re: TLS-SRP TLS-PSK support in browsers (Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-06 Thread Frank Siebenlist

Peter Gutmann wrote:

Frank Siebenlist [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:


That's actually a sad observation.

I keep telling my colleagues that this technology is coming any day now to
a browser near you - didn't realize that that there was no interest with the
browser companies to add support for this...


I know of a number of organisations (mostly governmental, but also some
financial) in various countries who are really, really keen to get support for
(as James Donald pointed out) cryptographically secured relationships (not
requiring PKI would be a big feature) into browsers, but no-one knows who to
beat over the head about it.  The last group I talked to (banks) were hoping
to use commercial pressure to get MS to add support for it in IE7^H^H8 at
which point Firefox would be forced to follow, but it's a slow process.



With the big browser war still going strong, wouldn't that provide 
fantastic marketing opportunities for Firefox?


If Firefox would support these secure password protocols, and the banks 
would openly recommend their customers to use Firefox because its safer 
and protects them better from phishing, that would be great publicity 
for Firefox, draw more users, and force M$ to support it too in the long 
run...




Why do the browser companies not care?
What is the adoption issue?
Still the dark cloud of patents looming over it?
Not enough understanding about the benefits? (marketing)
Economic reasons that we wouldn't buy anymore server certs?


I think it's a combination of two factors:

1. Everyone knows that passwords are insecure, so it's not worth trying to do
   anything with them.

   (My counter-argument to this is that passwords are only insecure because
   protocol designers have chosen to make them insecure, see my previous post
   about the quaint 1970s-vintage hand-over-the-password model used by SSH and
   SSL/TLS).



...these protocol would even make the use of one-time-passwords more 
secure (no MITM exposure - phishing), and make them securely usable 
without any server-certs...




2. If you add failsafe authentication to browsers, CAs become redundant.

   (My counter-argument to this is to ask whether browser security exists in
   order to provide a business model for CAs or to protect users.  Currently
   it seems to be the former, with EV certs being a prime example).



I was afraid that this cynical argument would play a role... so the 
server-cert racketeering scheme has just been made more profitable 
through more expensive but equally trustworthy EV-certs, which makes 
it more difficult to introduce alternatives that don't fit into this 
business model...


On the other hand, I'm sure that the marketeers will be able to sell 
server-certs together with those secure passwords protocols to the naive 
customers as it will be very difficult to explain why you do/don't need 
the certs and why it would more/less secure...


-Frank.

--
Frank Siebenlist   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Globus Alliance - Argonne National Laboratory

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Re: TLS-SRP TLS-PSK support in browsers (Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-06 Thread Victor Duchovni
On Wed, Feb 06, 2008 at 09:21:47AM -0800, Frank Siebenlist wrote:

 With the big browser war still going strong, wouldn't that provide 
 fantastic marketing opportunities for Firefox?
 
 If Firefox would support these secure password protocols, and the banks 
 would openly recommend their customers to use Firefox because its safer 
 and protects them better from phishing, that would be great publicity 
 for Firefox, draw more users, and force M$ to support it too in the long 
 run...

It is a bit early. OpenSSL 0.9.9 is not yet released. I wish OpenSSL
releases were more frequent, and each added fewer features, allowing
features to be released as they mature, this would also reduce pressure
to add features to stable releases (which occasionally break binary
compatibility, and lead to vendors back-porting fixes rather than deploying
the next patch level of the stable release).

While Firefox should ideally be developing and testing PSK now, without
stable libraries to use in servers and browsers, we can't yet expect
anything to be released.

-- 

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Re: TLS-SRP TLS-PSK support in browsers (Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-03 Thread Alex Alten

At 09:34 PM 2/1/2008 +0100, Ian G wrote:

* Browser vendors don't employ security people as we know them on this 
mailgroup, they employ cryptoplumbers. Completely different layer.  These 
people are mostly good (and often very good) at fixing security bugs.  We 
thank them for that!  But they are completely at sea when it comes to 
systemic security failings or designing new systems.


An excellent observation Ian!!

I too have run into this mindset at enterprises with inhouse security teams 
(mostly in Silicon Valley).  They focus on the nuts and bolts like 
producing/using cryptographic libaries, fixing security bugs in code or 
configuring network appliances to stop intrusions.  But it is really hard 
to find any of them with decent experience or knowledge at the overall 
software/hardware/people system design level. They are often very smart and 
educated engineers. I find that there's this mindless focus on using 
groups of security standards, e.g PKI / LDAP / SSL type of combinations, 
etc.  The DoD contractor firms seem to be a little bit better at 
recognizing the system level aspects of security, although they too are 
often blinded by the emphasis on COTS security products.


- Alex
--

Alex Alten
[EMAIL PROTECTED]



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Re: TLS-SRP TLS-PSK support in browsers (Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-01 Thread Ian G

Frank Siebenlist wrote:


Why do the browser companies not care?


I spent a few years trying to interest (at least) one 
browser vendor with looking at new security problems 
(phishing) and using the knowledge that we had to solve this 
(opportunistic cryptography).  No luck whatsoever.  My view 
of why it is impractical / impossible to interest the 
browser vendors in new ideas and new security might be 
summed as this:


* Browser vendors operate a closed security shop.  I think 
this is because of a combination of things.  Mostly, all 
security shops are closed, and there aren't any good 
examples of open security shops (at least that I can think 
of).  We see some outreach in the last few years (blogs or 
lists by some) but they are very ... protected, the moat is 
still there.


* Browser vendors are influenced heavily by companies, which 
have strong agendas.  Security programmers at the open 
browsers are often employed by big companies who want their 
security in.  They are not interested in user security. 
Security programmers need jobs, they don't do this stuff for 
fun.  So it is not as if you can blame them.


* Browser vendors don't employ security people as we know 
them on this mailgroup, they employ cryptoplumbers. 
Completely different layer.  These people are mostly good 
(and often very good) at fixing security bugs.  We thank 
them for that!  But they are completely at sea when it comes 
to systemic security failings or designing new systems.


* Which also means it is rather difficult to have a 
conversation with them.  For example, programmers don't know 
what governance is, so they don't know how to deal with PKI 
(which is governance with some certificate sugar), and they 
can't readily map a multi-party failure.  OTOH, they know 
what code is, so if you code it up you can have a 
conversation.  But if your conversation needs non-code 
elements ... glug glug...


* Browser vendors work to a limited subset of the old PKI 
book.  Unfortunately, the book itself isn't written, with 
consequent problems.  So certain myths (like all CAs must 
be the same) have arisen which are out of sync with the 
original PKI thinking ... and out of sync with reality ... 
but there is no easy way to deal with this because of the 
previous points.


* Browser vendors may be on the hook for phishing.  When you 
start to talk in terms like that, legal considerations make 
people go gooey and vague.  Nobody in a browser vendor can 
have that conversation.


Which is all to say ... it's not the people!  It's the 
assumptions and history and finance and all other structural 
issues.  That won't change until they are ready to change, 
and there are only limited things that outsiders can do.


Just a personal opinion.

iang

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