Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>>I've noted to others on this before that for an application like
>>the IP fragmentation id, it might be even better if no repeats
>>occurred in any block of 2^31 (n being 32) but the sequence did not
>>repeat itself (or at least could be harmlessly reseeded at very very
>
> [...]
> The Yarrow RNG uses counter-mode as a PRNG. However in the paper they
> describe some effects you may want to avoid by re-keying depending on
> your application as the stream becomes distinguishable from random
> output.
>
> Adam
This is essentially because if your output sequence of n-
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>I've noted to others on this before that for an application like
>the IP fragmentation id, it might be even better if no repeats
>occurred in any block of 2^31 (n being 32) but the sequence did not
>repeat itself (or at least could be harmlessly reseeded at very very
>long
On 09/06/2003 02:09 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> For making things like IP fragmentation ids and other similar
> protocol elements unpredictable,
OK, that more-or-less defines an objective.
> it would be useful to have what I'll call a cryptographic ergodic
> sequence generator
I'm not at all sur
You might also look at RC5-16. RC5 is defined on 64, 32, 16 and 8 bit
words with respectively 128, 64, 32 and 16 bit block sizes.
Using counter-mode as suggested by someone earlier in the thread would
be the obvious way to get a sequence with a period of 2^n.
The Yarrow RNG uses counter-mode as
At 06:54 PM 9/6/2003, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Tim Dierks <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> I'm sure that it would be possible to design a Feistel-based block
> cipher with variable block size, supporting some range of even values
> of n.
Perhaps -- I don't know of a good one.
I'm not a cryptographer, s
Greg Rose <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> The characteristic you ask for is exactly that of an n-bit block
> cipher in Counter Mode. For example, that's exactly why we developed
> Skip32, which is on our web page; we needed an unpredictable but
> non-repeating 32 bit nonce.
I was unaware there *wer
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
> Why does it need to be strictly non repeating?
For applications like block numbers in protocols, it is highly
desirable to avoid overlap for as long as possible.
I've noted to others on this before that for an application like
the IP fragmentation id, it might be even
"John S. Denker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> On 09/06/2003 02:09 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> > For making things like IP fragmentation ids and other similar
> > protocol elements unpredictable, it would be useful to have what I'll
> > call a cryptographic ergodic sequence generator -- that
Tim Dierks <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> At 02:09 PM 9/6/2003, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> >For making things like IP fragmentation ids and other similar protocol
> >elements unpredictable, it would be useful to have what I'll call a
> >cryptographic ergodic sequence generator -- that is, a generato
At 02:09 PM 9/6/2003 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
For making things like IP fragmentation ids and other similar protocol
elements unpredictable, it would be useful to have what I'll call a
cryptographic ergodic sequence generator -- that is, a generator that
will produce a sequence of n bit numbe
On Sat, 6 Sep 2003, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>
> For making things like IP fragmentation ids and other similar protocol
> elements unpredictable, it would be useful to have what I'll call a
> cryptographic ergodic sequence generator -- that is, a generator that
> will produce a sequence of n bit nu
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
For making things like IP fragmentation ids and other similar protocol
elements unpredictable, it would be useful to have what I'll call a
cryptographic ergodic sequence generator -- that is, a generator that
will produce a sequence of n bit numbers such that there are no
re
At 02:09 PM 9/6/2003, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
For making things like IP fragmentation ids and other similar protocol
elements unpredictable, it would be useful to have what I'll call a
cryptographic ergodic sequence generator -- that is, a generator that
will produce a sequence of n bit numbers su
On 09/06/2003 02:09 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> For making things like IP fragmentation ids and other similar
> protocol elements unpredictable, it would be useful to have what I'll
> call a cryptographic ergodic sequence generator -- that is, a
> generator that will produce a sequence of n bit n
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