Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

2005-01-09 Thread Taral
On Sat, Jan 08, 2005 at 10:46:17AM +0800, Enzo Michelangeli wrote: > But that was precisely my initial position: that the insight on the > internal state (which I saw, by definition, as the loss of entropy by the > generator) that we gain from one bit of output is much smaller than one > full bit.

Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

2005-01-09 Thread Ian G
William Allen Simpson wrote: There are already other worthy comments in the thread(s). This is a great post. One can't stress enough that programmers need programming guidance, not arcane information theoretic concepts. We are using computational devices, and therefore computational infeasibility

Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

2005-01-08 Thread William Allen Simpson
Wondering how in the world we got into this endless debate, I went back and re-read the entire thread(s). I think that early comments were predictive, where Ian Grigg wrote: ... Crypto is such a small part of security that most all crypto people move acros

Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

2005-01-08 Thread Enzo Michelangeli
- Original Message - From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, January 07, 2005 9:30 AM Subject: Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing) > > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Enzo > > Michelangeli > > Sent:

Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

2005-01-07 Thread John Kelsey
>From: John Denker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Sent: Jan 5, 2005 2:06 PM >To: Enzo Michelangeli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com >Subject: Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing) ... >You're letting your intuition about "usable ra

Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

2005-01-07 Thread Jerrold Leichter
| > You're letting your intuition about "usable randomness" run roughshod | > over the formal definition of entropy. Taking bits out of the PRNG | > *does* reduce its entropy. | | By how much exactly? I'd say, _under the hypothesis that the one-way | function can't be broken and other attacks fai

Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

2005-01-07 Thread Taral
On Thu, Jan 06, 2005 at 04:35:05PM +0800, Enzo Michelangeli wrote: > By how much exactly? I'd say, _under the hypothesis that the one-way > function can't be broken and other attacks fail_, exactly zero; in the > real world, maybe a little more. Unfortunately for your analysis, *entropy* assumes t

Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

2005-01-07 Thread Michael_Heyman
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Enzo > Michelangeli > Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 7:50 PM > > This "entropy depletion" issue keeps coming up every now and > then, but I still don't understand how it is supposed to > happen. If the PRNG uses a really non-i

Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

2005-01-06 Thread Enzo Michelangeli
- Original Message - From: "John Denker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Thursday, January 06, 2005 3:06 AM > Enzo Michelangeli wrote: [...] > > If the PRNG uses a > > really non-invertible algorithm (or one invertible only > > with intractable complexity), its output gives no insight > > w

Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

2005-01-05 Thread John Denker
Enzo Michelangeli wrote: > > This "entropy depletion" issue keeps coming up every now and then, but I > still don't understand how it is supposed to happen. Then you're not paying attention. > If the PRNG uses a > really non-invertible algorithm (or one invertible only with intractable > complexity