Hi Adam,
From: Adam Back [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 2004 17:54:56 -0400
To: Aram Perez [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], Cryptography [EMAIL PROTECTED], Adam
Back [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: should you trust CAs? (Re: dual-use digital signature
vulnerability)
On Wed
On Wed, Jul 28, 2004 at 10:00:01PM -0700, Aram Perez wrote:
As far as I know, there is nothing in any standard or good security
practice that says you can't multiple certificate for the same email
address. If I'm willing to pay each time, Verisign will gladly issue me a
certificate with my
At 02:09 PM 7/28/04 -0400, Adam Back wrote:
The difference is if the CA does not generate private keys, there
should be only one certificate per email address, so if two are
discovered in the wild the user has a transferable proof that the CA
is up-to-no-good. Ie the difference is it is
Aram Perez [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I agree with Michael H. If you trust the CA to issue a cert, it's not that
much more to trust them with generating the key pair.
Trusting them to safely communicate the key pair to you once they've generated
it is left as an exercise for the reader :-).
Hi Adam,
The difference is if the CA does not generate private keys, there
should be only one certificate per email address, so if two are
discovered in the wild the user has a transferable proof that the CA
is up-to-no-good. Ie the difference is it is detectable and provable.
As far as I
At 12:09 PM 7/28/2004, Adam Back wrote:
The difference is if the CA does not generate private keys, there
should be only one certificate per email address, so if two are
discovered in the wild the user has a transferable proof that the CA
is up-to-no-good. Ie the difference is it is detectable