Re: timing attack countermeasures (nonrandom but unpredictable de lays)

2005-11-30 Thread Travis H.
Why do you need to separate f from f+d? The attack is based on a timing variation that is a function of k and x, that's all. Think of it this way: Your implementation with the new d(k,x) added in is indistinguishable, in externally visible behavior, from a *different* implementation f'(k,x)

Re: timing attack countermeasures (nonrandom but unpredictable de lays)

2005-11-30 Thread leichter_jerrold
| Why do you need to separate f from f+d? The attack is based on a timing | variation that is a function of k and x, that's all. Think of it this way: | Your implementation with the new d(k,x) added in is indistinguishable, in | externally visible behavior, from a *different* implementation

Re: timing attack countermeasures (nonrandom but unpredictable de lays)

2005-11-17 Thread leichter_jerrold
| In many cases, the observed time depends both on the input and on some | other random noise. In such cases, averaging attacks that use the same | input over and over again will continue to work, despite the use of | a pseudorandom input-dependent delay. For instance, think of a timing |