On Jul 4, 2011, at 10:10 PM, coderman wrote:
H3 should be Gospel: There is Only One Mode and it is Secure
anything else is a failure waiting to happen…
Yeah, sure. I agree completely. How could any sane person not agree? We could
rephrase this as, The Nineties Called, and They Want Their
coderman coder...@gmail.com writes:
H3 should be Gospel: There is Only One Mode and it is Secure
Also known as Grigg's Law. The corollary, for protocols where there *are*
options, is There is one one cipher suite and that is Suite #1.
Peter.
___
On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 11:31 PM, Peter Gutmann
pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote:
... The corollary, for protocols where there *are*
options, is There is one one cipher suite and that is Suite #1.
hey, removing all other options can be an option.
uh oh, i just contradicted myself...
I was sitting around the other weekend with some friends and we were talking
about Bitcoin, and gossiping furiously about it. While we were doing so, an
interesting property came up.
Did you know that if a Bitcoin is destroyed, then the value of all the other
Bitcoins goes up slightly? That's
On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 11:11 PM, Jon Callas j...@callas.org wrote:
...
Yeah, sure. I agree completely.
no you don't ;)
How can I use this principle as a touchstone to let me know the right thing
to do. I suppose we could consider it a rule of thumb instead, but that flies
in the face of
On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 11:44 PM, Jon Callas j...@callas.org wrote:
...
Did you know that if a Bitcoin is destroyed, then the value of all the other
Bitcoins goes up slightly? That's incredible. It's amazing and leads to some
emergent properties.
this is not completely correct. it is only
On Jul 5, 2011, at 12:07 AM, coderman wrote:
On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 11:44 PM, Jon Callas j...@callas.org wrote:
...
Did you know that if a Bitcoin is destroyed, then the value of all the other
Bitcoins goes up slightly? That's incredible. It's amazing and leads to some
emergent
On Jul 4, 2011, at 11:35 PM, coderman wrote:
On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 11:11 PM, Jon Callas j...@callas.org wrote:
...
Yeah, sure. I agree completely.
no you don't ;)
Actually I do. I also believe in truth and justice and beauty, too. And
simplicity. I just value actionable, as well.
On 5/07/11 4:44 PM, Jon Callas wrote:
Did you know that if a Bitcoin is destroyed, then the value of all the other
Bitcoins goes up slightly? That's incredible. It's amazing and leads to some
emergent properties.
This assumes fixed value. As there is no definition of the value in
BitCoin,
I dont think you can prove you have destroyed a bitcoin, neither your own
bitcoin, nor someone else's. To destroy it you would have to prove you
deleted the coin private key, and you could always have an offline backup.
You could uncreate a coin by creating a chain removing it from existance,
Jon Callas writes:
-+
| Did you know that if a Bitcoin is destroyed, then the value of all
| the other Bitcoins goes up slightly? That's incredible. It's amazing
| and leads to some emergent properties.
|
I suspect that this is true of gold as well -- send it into
space or
Adi Shamir gave a talk at MIT last week at which I think he said that the
following cryptosystem was minimally sufficient:
XOR Key / Permutation / XOR Key
He seemed to me to imply that (informally speaking) any additional
complexity would be more likely to provide attack opportunities than
Nico Williams n...@cryptonector.com writes:
Why even have a tag?? The ASN.1 Packed Encoding Rules (think ONC XDR with 1-
byte alignment instead of 4-byte alignment) doesn't use tags at all.
Which makes them impossible to statically check, and leads to hellishly
complex decoders.
In
On Tue, 5 Jul 2011, Scott Guthery wrote:
Adi Shamir gave a talk at MIT last week at which I think he said that the
following cryptosystem was minimally sufficient:
XOR Key / Permutation / XOR Key
He seemed to me to imply that (informally speaking) any additional complexity
would be more
On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 3:21 PM, Jean-Philippe Aumasson
jeanphilippe.aumas...@gmail.com wrote:
See the Asiacrypt 2010 rump session talk An Optimal Attack On
Cryptosystems With Pre/Post Whitening Keys by Orr Dunkelman and Adi
Shamir:
Perhaps anybody else that was there or is familiar with Shamir's work along
this line might comment.
I was in Boston last Friday as well - Jean-Philippe is correct, the
second half of the talk was on the Even-Mansour system, and Adi talked
about his SLIDEX attack. He may have expanded on it a
there may be a pragmatic need for options dealing with existing
systems or business requirements, however i have yet to hear a
convincing argument for why options are necessary in any new system
where you're able to apply lessons learned from past mistakes.
You said it yourself: different
On 07/05/2011 09:09 AM, Steven Bellovin wrote:
More importantly (and to pick a less extreme scenario), security isn't
an absolute, it's a matter of economics. If the resource you're
protecting isn't worth much, why should you spend a lot?
And, one does not need to guess at how much a lot is;
On Tue, 5 Jul 2011, Scott Guthery wrote:
the following cryptosystem was minimally sufficient:
XOR Key / Permutation / XOR Key
A Construction of a Cipher From a Single Pseudorandom Permutation
http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.53.9789
One can see it as a hint that building
On Jul 5, 2011, at 2:44 57AM, Jon Callas wrote:
I was sitting around the other weekend with some friends and we were talking
about Bitcoin, and gossiping furiously about it. While we were doing so, an
interesting property came up.
Did you know that if a Bitcoin is destroyed, then the
On 5/07/11 3:59 PM, Jon Callas wrote:
There are plenty of people who agree with you that options are bad. I'm not one
of them. Yeah, yeah, sure, it's always easy to make too many options. But just
because you can have too many options that doesn't mean that zero is the right
answer. That's
On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 3:53 AM, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote:
I dont think you can prove you have destroyed a bitcoin, neither your own
bitcoin, nor someone else's. To destroy it you would have to prove you
deleted the coin private key, and you could always have an offline backup.
On 07/05/2011 08:07 PM, Taral wrote:
On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 3:53 AM, Adam Backa...@cypherspace.org wrote:
I dont think you can prove you have destroyed a bitcoin, neither your own
bitcoin, nor someone else's. To destroy it you would have to prove you
deleted the coin private key, and you
On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 7:16 PM, Marsh Ray ma...@extendedsubset.com wrote:
So this suggests the attacker who pwned Mt. Gox was probably doing it for
the lulz as they say. (Or maybe they didn't know about this property).
Next time they might just take all the bitcoins held in escrow by the
Did you know that if a Bitcoin is destroyed, then the value of all
the other Bitcoins goes up slightly? That's incredible. It's amazing
and leads to some emergent properties
Let's imagine that there was an artist who we'll call Aldi. He made a
lot of signed prints, which are worth whatever
Nico Williams n...@cryptonector.com writes:
In other words, in ASN.1 as it's used you have to know the schema and message
type in order to do a good job of parsing the message,
No you don't. I give as a counterexample dumpasn1, which knows nothing about
message types or schemas, but parses
On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 9:22 AM, Jon Callas j...@callas.org wrote:
Good points. But nonetheless, it's a really, really cool property of the
system that you can gain by destroying bitcoins. I mean heck -- let's create
another sub-constant, H_s which is the constant that shows when it better to
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