* Saqib Ali:
Can somebody explain me how this so-called Homomorphic split-key
encryption works?
Isn't this just a protocal which performs a cryptographic primitive
using split key material, without actually recombining the keys?
(Traditional Shamir secret sharing needs a trust party for key
On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 10:08 AM, Florian Weimer f...@deneb.enyo.de wrote:
* Saqib Ali:
Can somebody explain me how this so-called Homomorphic split-key
encryption works?
Isn't this just a protocal which performs a cryptographic primitive
using split key material, without actually
I don't see why you'd want split keys when it's already homomorphic.
What would be the additional gain of that?
Unless they need half the key to do the homomorphic computations.
Also, homomorphic encryption and computation is usually slow. VERY slow.
On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 17:22, Nico Williams
On Sun, 19 Feb 2012 17:08:25 +0100
Florian Weimer f...@deneb.enyo.de wrote:
* Saqib Ali:
Can somebody explain me how this so-called Homomorphic split-key
encryption works?
Isn't this just a protocal which performs a cryptographic primitive
using split key material, without actually
Hi Florian,
If the system involves split key / shared secrets (m of n), then it
wouldn't be a homomorphic system. Would it?
Saqib
On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Florian Weimer f...@deneb.enyo.de wrote:
* Saqib Ali:
Can somebody explain me how this so-called Homomorphic split-key
Ben Laurie wrote:
On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 8:39 PM, Thierry Moreau
thierry.mor...@connotech.com wrote:
Ben Laurie wrote:
On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 7:32 PM, Thierry Moreau
thierry.mor...@connotech.com wrote:
Isn't /dev/urandom BY DEFINITION of limited true entropy?
$ ls -l /dev/urandom
On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 5:39 PM, Thierry Moreau
thierry.mor...@connotech.com wrote:
Ben Laurie wrote:
On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 8:39 PM, Thierry Moreau
thierry.mor...@connotech.com wrote:
Ben Laurie wrote:
On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 7:32 PM, Thierry Moreau
thierry.mor...@connotech.com wrote:
* Saqib Ali:
If the system involves split key / shared secrets (m of n), then it
wouldn't be a homomorphic system. Would it?
I think the homomorphic part alludes to the fact that full
reconstruction of the entire key is not needed to perform the
cryptographic operation. In essence, I suspect
Florian,
That's what I suspected as well. Unfortunately, it appears that
Porticor's homomorphic split-key system is a closed one, so we may
never see the details. But I think they are using the word
Homomorphic to mislead people.
Saqib
On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 9:58 AM, Florian Weimer
On 2012-02-20 2:08 AM, Florian Weimer wrote:
Can somebody explain me how this so-called Homomorphic split-key
encryption works?
Homomorphic means you combine the keys without finding out the key that
you are combining - Everyone gives you an encrypted copy of their key
fragment, and when you
There are multiparty computation too, but that's a bit different since it's
essentially an encrypted VM where everybody runs one part. It could do the
same thing without a snigle trusted party, though.
On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 22:34, James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com wrote:
On 2012-02-20 2:08
On 2012-02-20 7:55 AM, Ali, Saqib wrote:
Hi James,
I am still not sure why you need homomorphism in this case. What is
the benefit of using homomorphism to porticor's customer, for example?
With RSA split keys, you need a trusted party to combine them - but if
the trusted party is
Hi James,
Exactly. True Homomorphism (or a fully Homomorphic system) does not
require the hosting party to have any knowledge of the key, but still
facilitates computational functions on the data without the need for
decrypting the data.
Having homomorphism is a split key / shared secret (m of n
My guess is that since fully homomorphic systems will be very slow
that one could use it to guard just a tiny secret. But what's the
point? Who cares if you can protect the customer's keys, if you can't
protect the customer's plaintext data?
Nico
--
Hi list,
This should be a pretty simple question for this list, so please pardon
my ignorance. But better to ask than to continue in ignorance. :-)
NIST refers to combined cipher modes as those supporting *both*
authenticity and confidentiality, such as GCM and CCM.
So my first question: Are
[Kevin W. Wall kevin.w.w...@gmail.com (2012-02-20 07:11:52 UTC)]
So my second question is, if all the combined cipher modes all
cause a cipher to act as if it is in a streaming mode, is it okay
to just choose a completely RANDOM IV for each encryption?
I'll bite on this one, leaving the
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