Hi all,
I'm looking for an asynchronous messaging protocol with support for forward
secrecy: I found some ideas, some abstract paper but nothing ready to be
used.
OTR seems the preeminent protocol, but does not have support for
asynchronous communication.
This post
Well aside from the PGP PFS draft that you found (which I am one of the
co-authors of) I also had before that in 1998 observed that any IBE system
can be used to make a non-interactively forware secret system.
http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/nifs/
There were prior IBE systems (with expensive
On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 4:45 AM, Marco Pozzato mpodr...@gmail.com wrote:
Hi all,
I'm looking for an asynchronous messaging protocol with support for forward
secrecy: I found some ideas, some abstract paper but nothing ready to be
used.
OTR seems the preeminent protocol, but does not have
1) We advise mining the block in which you collect your bounty yourself;
scriptSigs satisfying the above scriptPubKeys do not cryptographically
sign
the transaction's outputs. If the bounty value is sufficiently large
other miners may find it profitable to reorganize the chain to kill
See:
http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/fatal-crypto-flaw-in-some-government-certified-smartcards-makes-forgery-a-snap/
for overview, and:
http://smartfacts.cr.yp.to/
for more details of the research.
Would it be advisable to implement a test, prior to any certification of an
RNG,
no. you can't test a rng by looking at the output. only the
algorithm and the actual code can be analyzed and reviewed. it is
because it is extremely easy to create a crappy rng that fools the
smartest analytical tool on the planet. it is not that easy to fool an
attacker that reverse
Krisztián Pintér writes:
no. you can't test a rng by looking at the output. only the algorithm
and the actual code can be analyzed and reviewed. it is because it
is extremely easy to create a crappy rng that fools the smartest
analytical tool on the planet. it is not that easy to fool an
no. you can't test a rng by looking at the output. only the algorithm and the
actual code can be analyzed and reviewed. it is because it is extremely easy to
create a crappy rng that fools the smartest analytical tool on the planet. it
is not that easy to fool an attacker that reverse
Mining power policy abuse (deciding which transactions prevail based on
compute power advantage for theft reasons, or political reasons, or taint
reasons) is what committed coins protect against:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=206303.0
(Its just a proposal, its not implemented).
Adam
http://threatpost.com/uk-cryptographers-call-for-outing-of-deliberately-weakened-protocols-products/102301
--
Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
HERMES - Center for Transparency and Digital Human Rights
http://logioshermes.org - http://globaleaks.org - http://tor2web.org
Has anyone here looked at Pond?
https://pond.imperialviolet.org/
Its by Adam Langley and while still very new and maybe in need of more
review, it seems quite promising.
On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 4:45 AM, Marco Pozzato mpodr...@gmail.com wrote:
Hi all,
I'm looking for an asynchronous messaging
On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 4:45 AM, Marco Pozzato mpodr...@gmail.com wrote:
I'm looking for an asynchronous messaging protocol with support for
forward secrecy
There's also Nitro, which is a CurveCP derivative:
http://gonitro.io/
Unfortunately they didn't implement the full CurveCP handshake,
On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 5:17 PM, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
li...@infosecurity.ch wrote:
http://threatpost.com/uk-cryptographers-call-for-outing-of-deliberately-weakened-protocols-products/102301
Right now, whistle blowers are vilified in the US. Just ask Jesselyn
Radack, Thomas Drake, William
Il 9/17/13 12:10 AM, Tony Arcieri ha scritto:
On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 4:45 AM, Marco Pozzato mpodr...@gmail.com
mailto:mpodr...@gmail.com wrote:
I'm looking for an asynchronous messaging protocol with support
for forward secrecy
There's also Nitro, which is a CurveCP derivative:
On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 3:22 PM, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
li...@infosecurity.ch wrote:
Shouldn't we first try to improve Internet Standard, and only after look
for custom (and usually not interoperable) implementation?
Well, if you want a forward secrecy for asynchronous communication using
On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 3:36 PM, Tony Arcieri basc...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 3:22 PM, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
li...@infosecurity.ch wrote:
Shouldn't we first try to improve Internet Standard, and only after look
for custom (and usually not interoperable) implementation?
On 2013-09-16, at 11:56 AM, Seth David Schoen sch...@loyalty.org wrote:
Well, there's a distinction between RNGs that have been maliciously
designed and RNGs that are just extremely poor
This has been something that I’ve been trying to learn more about in the past
week or so. And if this
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