[cryptography] No proof.

2013-09-23 Thread ianG
On 23/09/13 02:07 AM, Shawn Wilson wrote: Again some proof would be nice. No proof. Don't forget who you are dealing with. We have to suspend normal degrees of skepticism and work with reasonable judgement, balance of probabilities. The NIST/RSA breach event exceeds by a country mile

[cryptography] Deleting data on a flash?

2013-09-23 Thread ianG
On 23/09/13 07:12 AM, Dev Random wrote: I've been thinking about this for a while now and I don't see a way to do this with today's mobile devices without some external help. The issue is that it's pretty much impossible to delete data securely from a flash device. Why is that? That means

Re: [cryptography] Deleting data on a flash?

2013-09-23 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 11:02:45AM +0300, ianG wrote: On 23/09/13 07:12 AM, Dev Random wrote: I've been thinking about this for a while now and I don't see a way to do this with today's mobile devices without some external help. The issue is that it's pretty much impossible to delete data

Re: [cryptography] Deleting data on a flash?

2013-09-23 Thread Adam Back
While I get wear leveling is a problem, I'm not sure if the flash in a phone is even going to use wear-leveling, but say for the sake of argument it does. It is however not a completely brand-new problem, relatedly spinning disks now and then suffer sector failures, and the failed sectors are

Re: [cryptography] Deleting data on a flash?

2013-09-23 Thread Moritz
On 09/23/2013 10:02 AM, ianG wrote: The issue is that it's pretty much impossible to delete data securely from a flash device. Why is that? The flash memory controller hides the real storage cells from you and spreads writes across all cells equally for wear-leveling. You cannot directly

Re: [cryptography] Deleting data on a flash?

2013-09-23 Thread Peter Gutmann
Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org writes: Apparently or so I've heard claim SSDs also offer lower level APIs to actually wipe physical (not logically wear-level mapped) cells, to reliably wipe working cells. Anyone know about those? They could be used where available and to the extent they are

Re: [cryptography] Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption

2013-09-23 Thread Michael Rogers
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Thanks Trevor and Adam for your comments on this - I take your point about the importance of forward secrecy for metadata, so I'll abandon the idea of using ephemeral-static ECDH to protect the metadata. On 20/09/13 01:55, Trevor Perrin wrote:

Re: [cryptography] Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption

2013-09-23 Thread Michael Rogers
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 23/09/13 05:12, Dev Random wrote: I've been thinking about this for a while now and I don't see a way to do this with today's mobile devices without some external help. The issue is that it's pretty much impossible to delete data securely

Re: [cryptography] Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption

2013-09-23 Thread Natanael
I made a suggestion like this elsewhere: Store the keys split up in several different files using Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme. Encrypt each file with a different key. Encrypt those keys with a master key. XOR each encrypted key with the SHA256 of their respective encrypted files. Put those

Re: [cryptography] Deleting data on a flash?

2013-09-23 Thread Trevor Perrin
On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 1:25 AM, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote: For wear-leveling its more tricky, but it I think the trick to deletion would be to delete and temporarily fill the disk - even wear leveling has to delete then. Reardon et al have some good analysis of this [1,2]. They

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] What is Intel(R) Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation

2013-09-23 Thread coderman
On Sun, Sep 22, 2013 at 9:21 PM, Jeffrey Walton noloa...@gmail.com wrote: ... Painting with a broad brush, part of the solution is a remote administration board that can''t be removed. Cf, Fujitsu LOM (Lights Out Management), HP ILO (Integrated Lights Out) HP RILO (Remote Integrated Lights

[cryptography] secure deletion on SSDs (Re: Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption)

2013-09-23 Thread Adam Back
(Changing the subject line to reflect topic drift). Thats not bad (make the decryption dependant on accessibility of the entire file) nice as a design idea. But that could be expensive in the sense that any time any block in the file changes, you have to re-encrypt the encryption or, more

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] What is Intel(R) Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation

2013-09-23 Thread coderman
On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 1:33 PM, Jeffrey Walton noloa...@gmail.com wrote: ... Do you just snatch the source code and intellectual property, or do you use it as a springboard into other things? (I've never really thought about it). for better or for worse (mostly better) these systems have

[cryptography] secure deletion on SSDs (Re: Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption)

2013-09-23 Thread Adam Back
On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 01:39:35PM +0100, Michael Rogers wrote: Apple came within a whisker of solving the problem in iOS by creating an 'effaceable storage' area within the flash storage, which bypasses block remapping and can be deleted securely. However, iOS only uses the effaceable storage

Re: [cryptography] Attack Driven Defense - infosec rant [was: What is Intel(R) Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation]

2013-09-23 Thread coderman
On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 4:17 PM, coderman coder...@gmail.com wrote: ... the source code provides hard coded keys/passwords or pointers to files where interesting bits lay, someone asks: how do you find the interesting sources? this is something i pride myself on, having dealt with scores of