[cryptography] caring requires data

2014-10-13 Thread ianG
On 13/10/2014 01:03 am, coderman wrote: On 9/22/14, coderman coder...@gmail.com wrote: ... Please elaborate. TKIP has not been identified as a ‘active attack’ vector. hi nymble, it appears no one cares about downgrade attacks, like no one cares about MitM (see mobile apps and software

Re: [cryptography] caring requires data

2014-10-13 Thread ianG
On 13/10/2014 14:32 pm, coderman wrote: On 10/13/14, ianG i...@iang.org wrote: ... No, and I argue that nobody should care about MITM nor downgrade attacks nor any other theoretical laboratory thing. I also argue that people shouldn't worry about shark attacks, lightning or wearing body

[cryptography] What's the point of using non-NIST ECC Curves?

2014-10-13 Thread Derek Miller
Like many people, I consider the seed values used to generate the NIST Prime curves suspicious. However, considering one of the scenarios where these curves might be compromised (the NSA knew of weaknesses in certain curves, and engineered the NIST Prime curves to be subject to those weaknesses),

Re: [cryptography] What's the point of using non-NIST ECC Curves?

2014-10-13 Thread Krisztián Pintér
On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 4:51 PM, Derek Miller dreemkil...@gmail.com wrote: However, considering one of the scenarios where these curves might be compromised (the NSA knew of weaknesses in certain curves, and engineered the NIST Prime curves to be subject to those weaknesses) interestingly,

Re: [cryptography] What's the point of using non-NIST ECC Curves?

2014-10-13 Thread Ryan Carboni
I forget, what was the original inputs to the hash? On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 8:14 AM, Krisztián Pintér pinte...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 4:51 PM, Derek Miller dreemkil...@gmail.com wrote: However, considering one of the scenarios where these curves might be compromised (the

Re: [cryptography] caring harder requires solving once for the most demanding threat model, to the benefit of all lesser models

2014-10-13 Thread coderman
On 10/13/14, ianG i...@iang.org wrote: ... your welcome ;-) a considered and insightful response to my saber rattling diatribe. i owe you a beer, sir! Ah well, there is another rule we should always bring remember: Do not use known-crap crypto. Dual_EC_DRBG is an example of a crap

Re: [cryptography] What's the point of using non-NIST ECC Curves?

2014-10-13 Thread Stephen Farrell
On 13/10/14 15:51, Derek Miller wrote: Like many people, I consider the seed values used to generate the NIST Prime curves suspicious. However, considering one of the scenarios where these curves might be compromised (the NSA knew of weaknesses in certain curves, and engineered the NIST

Re: [cryptography] What's the point of using non-NIST ECC Curves?

2014-10-13 Thread Tony Arcieri
On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 7:51 AM, Derek Miller dreemkil...@gmail.com wrote: If the NIST curves are weak in a way that we don't understand, this means that ECC has properties that we don't understand. While there's djb's worry that the NSA may have tweaked a curve parameter in such a way as to

Re: [cryptography] What's the point of using non-NIST ECC Curves?

2014-10-13 Thread Derek Miller
Krisztian, Thanks for the additional scenario (I had not even considered trusting the NSA, so had not considered that scenario). However, both scenarios (NSA engineered them to be bad, NSA engineered them to be good) mean that the NSA knows a great deal more about weaknesses in Elliptic Curve

Re: [cryptography] What's the point of using non-NIST ECC Curves?

2014-10-13 Thread Tony Arcieri
On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 9:19 AM, Derek Miller dreemkil...@gmail.com wrote: However, both scenarios (NSA engineered them to be bad, NSA engineered them to be good) mean that the NSA knows a great deal more about weaknesses in Elliptic Curve Cryptography than we do. Doesn't that give you great

Re: [cryptography] What's the point of using non-NIST ECC Curves?

2014-10-13 Thread Ondrej Mikle
On 10/13/2014 06:14 PM, Tony Arcieri wrote: On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 7:51 AM, Derek Miller dreemkil...@gmail.com mailto:dreemkil...@gmail.com wrote: If the NIST curves are weak in a way that we don't understand, this means that ECC has properties that we don't understand. While

Re: [cryptography] What's the point of using non-NIST ECC Curves?

2014-10-13 Thread Krisztián Pintér
Derek Miller (at Monday, October 13, 2014, 6:19:07 PM): However, both scenarios (NSA engineered them to be bad, NSA engineered them to be good) mean that the NSA knows a great deal more about weaknesses in Elliptic Curve Cryptography than we do. Doesn't that give you great pause in using the

Re: [cryptography] RC4 Forevar! [was: RC4 is dangerous in ways not yet known - heads up on near injection WPA2 downgrade to TKIP RC4]

2014-10-13 Thread coderman
On 10/12/14, coderman coder...@gmail.com wrote: ... also, the definitive paper at http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/ still insists, For WPA/TKIP, the only reasonable countermeasure is to upgrade to WPA2. which is either incompetently incorrect, or intentional indirection. there is a third