On Sat, 4 Dec 2010, Jens Kubieziel wrote:
Hi,
recently I had a discussion about biometric data. The following problem
occured:
Assume someone wants to register at a website. He swipes his finger over
his fingerprint reader. The reader generates strong passphrase from the
fingerprint and other
On Fri, 7 Jan 2011, travis+ml-rbcryptogra...@subspacefield.org wrote:
Hey all,
I'm attempting to create an extensive archive of papers on -graphy and
-analysis, locally stored and broken down by category/hierarchy,
according to my own personal taxonomy. Maybe one day I'll try to
figure out
On Tue, 5 Jul 2011, Scott Guthery wrote:
Adi Shamir gave a talk at MIT last week at which I think he said that the
following cryptosystem was minimally sufficient:
XOR Key / Permutation / XOR Key
He seemed to me to imply that (informally speaking) any additional complexity
would be more
On Mon, 2 Jan 2012, lodewijk andr?? de la porte wrote:
The reason for regular change is very good. It's that the low-intensity
brute forcing of a password requires a certain stretch of time. Put the
change interval low enough and you're safer from them.
We've had someone talk on-list about a
On Wed, 1 Feb 2012, Nico Williams wrote:
On Wed, Feb 1, 2012 at 3:49 AM, Francois Grieu fgr...@gmail.com wrote:
The talk does not give much details, and I failed to locate any article
with a similar claim.
I would find that result truly remarkable, and it is against my intuition.
The video
On Mon, Feb 6, 2012 at 9:52 PM, Steven Bellovin s...@cs.columbia.edu wrote:
http://arstechnica.com/business/guides/2012/02/google-strips-chrome-of-ssl-revocation-checking.ars
--Steve Bellovin, https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
Interesting blog post on this topic by Adam Langley
On Wed, 15 Feb 2012, Steven Bellovin wrote:
On Feb 15, 2012, at 11:56 45AM, Ben Laurie wrote:
I did this years ago for PGP keys. Easy: take all the keys, do
pairwise GCD. Took 24 hours on my laptop for all the PGP keys on
keyservers at the time. I'm trying to remember when this was, but I
I'm looking for a stand-alone implementation of DES in C. Can anyone point
me to one (or send me one of their own)? Note: I know that there exist C
crypto libraries that include DES, but I'd rather not install an entire
library just to get access to DES.
(For those who are curious: this is
On Thu, 16 Feb 2012, Billy Brumley wrote:
I pointed my students to this clean one for a course I recently ran:
http://mayor.fri.uniza.sk/v731/u2/des.c
Thanks -- this worked for me, and satisfied the test vectors I ran it on.
No further replies are needed.
On Mon, 20 Feb 2012, Harald Hanche-Olsen wrote:
[Kevin W. Wall kevin.w.w...@gmail.com (2012-02-20 07:11:52 UTC)]
So my first question: Are there ANY combined cipher modes
for block ciphers that do not cause the ciphers to act as a key
stream? (That seems to be cause most of the ones I found
On Mon, 26 Mar 2012, Thierry Moreau wrote:
Florian Weimer wrote:
* Thierry Moreau:
The unusual public RSA exponent may well be an indication that the
signature key pair was generated by a software implementation not
encompassing the commonly-agreed (among number-theoreticians having
surveyed
On Fri, 28 Sep 2012, d...@geer.org wrote:
I was asked to read this
Fundamentals of a classical chaos-based cryptosystem with some quantum
cryptography similarities
Vidal G, Baptista MS Mancini H
International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos
World Scientific Publishing Company
I am not
On Sat, 26 Jan 2013, ianG wrote:
Apologies in advance ;) but a cryptography question:
I'm coding (or have coded) a digital signature class in RSA. In my research
on how to frame the input to the RSA private key operation, I was told words
to effect just use OAEP and you're done and dusted.
Isn't it obvious? (I mean, there is some value in formalizing the model,
but still...)
Consider authentication of A to B. If there is nothing distinguishing
(impersonator) Mallory from (honest) A, then anything A can do can also be
done by Mallory.
On Thu, Jun 6, 2013 at 1:31 PM, Ralph Holz
The Weil and Tate pairings give (cryptographically useful) *bilinear* maps.
Cryptographically useful *multilinear* maps were unknown until recently:
https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/610
https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/183
On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 11:27 AM, Scott Guthery s...@acw.com wrote:
In
On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 10:11 AM, John Young j...@pipeline.com wrote:
NSA Technical Journal published The Unbreakable Cipher in Spring 1961.
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/tech_journals/The_Unbreakable_Cipher.pdf
Excerpts:
[Quote]
David Kahn, Lyen Otuu Wllwgh WI Etjown pp. 71,
On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 1:30 PM, Greg Rose g...@seer-grog.net wrote:
On Sep 25, 2013, at 9:40 , Jonathan Katz jk...@cs.umd.edu wrote:
Every cipher is breakable, given enough traffic: in principle, yes, as
long as the traffic (formally, the entropy of the traffic) is larger than
the key
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 4:15 PM, Filip Paun paunfi...@gmail.com wrote:
Suppose I have a message M for which I generate an RSA-2048 digital
signature as follows:
H = SHA-256(M)
S = H^d mod N
Assume N = p*q is properly generated and d is the RSA private key.
And I verify the signature
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 7:42 PM, Filip Paun paunfi...@gmail.com wrote:
Hello,
Thank you for your feedback. Please see my comments below.
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 3:59 PM, Jonathan Katz jk...@cs.umd.edu wrote:
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 4:15 PM, Filip Paun paunfi...@gmail.com wrote:
Suppose I
19 matches
Mail list logo
