Re: [cryptography] sander ta-shma + bitcoin, b-money, hashcash (Re: Is BitCoin a triple entry system?)

2011-06-15 Thread Peter Gutmann
James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com writes:
On 2011-06-15 1:29 AM, Ian G wrote:
 Which, to my mind was the same sin as the alternate: obsession with
 privacy, including to the extent of eliminating the core requirements of
 money. The first law of money is that it has to be safe:

 http://forum.bitcoin.org/index.php?topic=16457.0

Reversible (soft) money has to have at its foundation irreversible and final
hard money.

I think the owner of the lost BTC is about to find this out the hard way if he
tries to follow one suggestion for recovering the bits:

  go to the police! 25k BTC are about $500.000, thats crazy! they can
  investigate and find out who it was.

at which point the police will either (a) laugh him out of the station or (b)
ask him to take a urine/blood test to figure out what he's on.

Peter.
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Re: [cryptography] sander ta-shma + bitcoin, b-money, hashcash (Re: Is BitCoin a triple entry system?)

2011-06-15 Thread Adam Back

Efficiency is relative.  Vs a central bank and Brands credentials its
inefficient - a handful of modexps vs say one hundred or a thousand.  Vs
bitcoin with longest hash chain wins, and minimum hash being 10 minutes work
for the entire network, I think straight DLREP on all the coins in a time
interval is OK.  And having to wait for a few intervals to have confidence
your transferred coin is in a non-orphan chain to have confidence vs pretty
much instant deposit.

Note you can tune the time interval size, and so the size of the DLREP
problem.  DLREP is linear in the number of coins.

Adam

On Tue, Jun 14, 2011 at 07:40:10PM +1000, James A. Donald wrote:

It is not a design, but an idea for a design.

There is no efficient zero knowledge proof that has the required
properties.

On 2011-06-14 6:13 PM, Adam Back wrote:

[...]
They use Merkle trees to improve the computation efficiency (reduce the
size of the representation problems that have to be presented and
verified).

I dont understood why bitcoin didnt use it


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Re: [cryptography] sander ta-shma + bitcoin, b-money, hashcash (Re: Is BitCoin a triple entry system?)

2011-06-14 Thread James A. Donald

On 2011-06-14 6:13 PM, Adam Back wrote:

See also:

Auditable Anonymous Electronic Cash by Tomas Sander and Amnon Ta-Shma
in crypto 1998.

http://www.math.tau.ac.il/~amnon/Papers/ST.crypto99.pdf

Its basically the idea of using non-interactive zero knowlede proof of
membership in a list of coins as an alternative to blinding.

The interesting thing is then the bank doesnt need a private key and doesnt
much need to be trusted. Anyone can audit the list of coins, it is
published; same for double spend database. The ZKP is a representation
problem (like Stefan Brands ecash/credentials).


They use Merkle trees to improve the computation efficiency (reduce the
size
of the representation problems that have to be presented and verified).
Like bitcoin it provides auditability, but better than bitcoin it provides
cryptographically secure anonymity. With bitcoin it is not anonymous, just
pseudonymous but traceable - because there is publicly auditable signature
chain showing transfers between pseudonyms.

Sander  Ta-Shma propose using it with a physical bank providing exchange,
but that could be replaced with variable cost hashcash like bitcoin.

I dont understood why bitcoin didnt use it


It is not a design, but an idea for a design.

There is no efficient zero knowledge proof that has the required properties.

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Re: [cryptography] sander ta-shma + bitcoin, b-money, hashcash (Re: Is BitCoin a triple entry system?)

2011-06-14 Thread James A. Donald

On 2011-06-15 1:29 AM, Ian G wrote:

Which, to my mind was the same sin as the alternate: obsession with
privacy, including to the extent of eliminating the core requirements of
money. The first law of money is that it has to be safe:

http://forum.bitcoin.org/index.php?topic=16457.0

This is the fundamental reason why we have reversable transactions in
systems to account for money ... (whatever we think of the result, there
is a reason why we have that feature).

This is also why nymous (public-key identified) transaction systems will
always beat out coin-based (blinded) systems in the long run.


This seems inconsistent with the May scale of monetary hardness, and the 
ancient appeal of gold money.


Reversible (soft) money has to have at its foundation irreversible and 
final hard money.  Thus, in the days of the gold standard, all the banks 
would do final settlement in gold, and people tended to pay in banknotes.

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