Re: [cryptography] Your GPU's “Fingerprint” Could Lead to New Security Methods

2012-10-30 Thread Beryl Lusen
On Tue, Oct 30, 2012 at 10:08:06AM +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
 
 In the online world, a World of Warcraft account can be worth serious money.
 With such an incentive, malware is set to steal your WoW login and password,
 should you become infected. To protect an account, WoW users have the option
 of purchasing an authenticator for a minor fee of $6.50. Of course, if you
 lose the authenticator or if it breaks, poof! goes your game access.
 
 Security veterans recognize this as two-factor authentication: a password and
 a separate, physical security device that the owner must have in their
 possession. While two-factor authentication can greatly increase your
 security, it also represents another point of vulnerability because you can
 always lose the device.
 
 Researchers in Europe have come up with an alternative. Instead, your
 computer's graphics processor unit (GPU) would be the authenticator,
 identifying a user by tying him to his specific GPU.

/snip

As someone who used to play WoW extensively and was in games development for 
quite a while, I wouldn't find this approach desirable either as a player or a 
developer for this sort of application.  What happens when I swap out my GPU 
for an upgrade?  What about players who play on multiple machines, or use their 
account at a friend's house?  If the key supplied by a GPU gets somehow 
compromised, don't I have to tell the user to buy another?  With authenticators 
I none of these sorts of issues; moreover, I have a clear integration path for 
incorporating the technology, and a simple, well-defined customer service path 
- they offer much more of a whole product solution.  Taking a step back from 
WoW and looking at the larger social-mobile trend you see the same sorts of 
problems; as a user I want secure access from any manner of devices that may 
change on a frequent basis, and as a developer/operator I want a simple, secure 
way to manage that.

I'm not saying there isn't utility in such an approach as is proposed, only 
that it seems to me such utility is predicated on an environment where you 
supply and control the user's hardware and may dictate the user's workflow.  An 
example along these lines would serve better than citing WoW.

-Beryl 
___
cryptography mailing list
cryptography@randombit.net
http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography


Re: [cryptography] Your GPU's ???Fingerprint??? Could Lead to New Security Methods

2012-10-30 Thread Jonas Wielicki
On 30.10.2012 14:30, Natanael wrote:
 Yeah, this looks like TPM with software protection instead of hardware
 protection.
 
 Rootkits can screw it up.

I guess that is why the researchers suggested an on-GPU
challenge-response protocol implementation which would not hand out the
initial SRAM state directly to any software.

 Den 30 okt 2012 14:27 skrev Solar Designer so...@openwall.com:
 
 This is very curious, but ...

 On Tue, Oct 30, 2012 at 10:08:06AM +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
 Cloning the actual SRAM state in a GPU is not possible, said Dr. Lange.
 What
 we've done so far in our research is reading out this SRAM state. We can
 of
 course copy this readout. What we're aiming for is to put an
 authentication
 system in place where the GPU never hands over the raw data. Instead the
 GPU
 uses it in a challenge-response protocol, just like the secret key in a
 signature system or zero-knowledge protocol. This does rely on the OS
 and/or
 hypervisor shielding the card from bad requests, such as ???hand over
 all your
 secrets,??? she said.

 ... since it relies on OS and/or hypervisor security anyway, about the
 same functionality and security (not a lot of it) can be achieved by
 keeping the secret in a disk file (protected with filesystem/OS
 permissions) and having the crypto implemented in an OS driver (or
 privileged program).  Use of a GPU does not appear to provide much
 advantage on top of that.  It can't be physically cloned, but if OS
 security fails, then the GPU's secrets can be cloned and the
 authentication protocol simulated in host software (on attacker's
 machine, without the GPU).

 Alexander
 ___
 cryptography mailing list
 cryptography@randombit.net
 http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

 
 
 
 ___
 cryptography mailing list
 cryptography@randombit.net
 http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
 

___
cryptography mailing list
cryptography@randombit.net
http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography