Bill Frantz wrote:
> There is a common example of this corner case where the memory is
> paged. The page containing the key is swapped out, then it is read
> back in and the key is overwritten, and then the page is deallocated.
> Many OSs will not zero the disk copy of the key.
Given the nature of
Hmm. another simpler theory to remove Shannon from the discussion.
assume that the original assertion is correct - that for each plaintext p
and each cyphertext c there exists only one key k that is valid to map
encrypt(p,k)=c. In this case, for each possible cyphertext c, *every*
possible plainte
Ed Gerck wrote:
> This may sound intuitive but is not correct. Shannon proved that if
> "n" (bits, bytes, letters, etc.) is the unicity distance of a
> ciphersystem, then ANY message that is larger than "n" bits CAN be
> uniquely deciphered from an analysis of its ciphertext -- even though
> that
reusch wrote:
> Via the Cryptome, http://www.cryptome.org/, "RU sure", look
> at http://www.aeronautics.ru/news/news002/news082.htm.
> I'm amazed at their claims of radio interception. One would
> expect that all US military communications, even trivial ones,
> are strongly encrypted, given the eas