/cryptval/140-1/1401val2003.htm
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Dave Kleiman
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
www.netmedic.net
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Damien O'Rourke
Sent: Friday, March 21, 2003 11:14
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Cryptoproce
ey lock on and
start tracking you. Notice I said "daily" basis. Might give a hint to how
they "ran out".
Dave
_
Dave Kleiman
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
www.netmedic.net
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behal
because of ignorant voters
and politicians.
It will:
A) Make a lot of attorneys rich.
B) Get torn apart by case law, after making said attorneys rich.
But that is just my opinion :)
Dave
_
Dave Kleiman
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
www.netmedic.net
-Original Message-
From
g the cable or dealing with the rivers of data it
contains.
--
Dave Emery N1PRE, [EMAIL PROTECTED] DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass.
PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18
very interesting.
http://www.eetimes.com/story/OEG20021107S0031
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Bill Frantz wrote:
> There is a common example of this corner case where the memory is
> paged. The page containing the key is swapped out, then it is read
> back in and the key is overwritten, and then the page is deallocated.
> Many OSs will not zero the disk copy of the key.
Given the nature of
On Tuesday, Dec 10, 2002, at 08:48 US/Eastern, Eugen Leitl wrote:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/55/28489.html
Research signals safer smart cards
By ComputerWire
Posted: 09/12/2002 at 22:49 GMT
Cryptography Research Inc, the company behind the design of the SSL
v3.0
protocol that is
systems in which case DRM will most likely be broken endlessly.
Comments?
Dave
Ps please excuse the inability to hear the questions from the floor, I
recorded it will a small digital recorder on the podium.
From: Dave Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [IP] Streaming REAL Audio now availa
Sorry that is not what I said. Where did you get that from the above?
On 2/4/03 11:28 AM, "Trei, Peter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Adam Shostack[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] writes:
>>
>> I believe that DRM systems will require not just an authorized boot
>> sequence, but a secure remote attestati
d procedures (and even
hardware) to prevent anyone in possession of the shuttle crypto
equipment from exploiting any keys or other information that was there.
--
Dave Emery N1PRE, [EMAIL PROTECTED] DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass.
PGP finge
Hmm. another simpler theory to remove Shannon from the discussion.
assume that the original assertion is correct - that for each plaintext p
and each cyphertext c there exists only one key k that is valid to map
encrypt(p,k)=c. In this case, for each possible cyphertext c, *every*
possible plainte
Ed Gerck wrote:
> This may sound intuitive but is not correct. Shannon proved that if
> "n" (bits, bytes, letters, etc.) is the unicity distance of a
> ciphersystem, then ANY message that is larger than "n" bits CAN be
> uniquely deciphered from an analysis of its ciphertext -- even though
> that
ed in order to protect sensitive military links.
--
Dave Emery N1PRE, [EMAIL PROTECTED] DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass.
PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18
-
The Cryptograph
is ending as both optical and rf TEMPEST is much easier with raster
scan pixel at a time CRT displays than it is with modern more parallel
flat panel display designs.
--
Dave Emery N1PRE, [EMAIL PROTECTED] DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass.
PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F
Change the Key Stupid ?
Just a nice simple question.
I have previously implemented a process to generate new dsa/rsa keys for
ssh and transfer them over the existing encrypted session with time
interval t, the following connection will use the new keys & so
forth..
The reason behind this wa
reusch wrote:
> Via the Cryptome, http://www.cryptome.org/, "RU sure", look
> at http://www.aeronautics.ru/news/news002/news082.htm.
> I'm amazed at their claims of radio interception. One would
> expect that all US military communications, even trivial ones,
> are strongly encrypted, given the eas
s worrisome to some of us working on software defined
radio code in Mass... which might or could be used in ways that
might be found illegal under this bill.
--
Dave Emery N1PRE, [EMAIL PROTECTED] DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass 02493
PGP fing
n this list in the Boston area there is a hearing
scheduled on the Mass Bill at 10 Am in Room 222 of the Mass State House
in Boston.
It was introduced in Mass by a Rep Stephen Tobin of Boston and listed
on the state website as "legislation to establish a crime of illegal
internet and br
On Tue, Apr 01, 2003 at 12:43:23PM -0500, Derek Atkins wrote:
> Dave Emery <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> > For those on this list in the Boston area there is a hearing
> > scheduled on the Mass Bill at 10 Am in Room 222 of the Mass State House
> > in
ou're already familiar with to something new.
There's a striking number of parallels between the CSA and the DMCA and I
suggest reading them both together to get a sense of what the DMCA will mean
in reality. Why, the CSA even
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