Or in other words, the first requirement for perimeter security is
a perimeter.
Wireless networks have no interior. Merging them with a
perimeter-protected network will yield a network with
the character of the wireless net. This is at once the
the beauty of community nets and the end
At 05:44 PM 9/24/2001, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In increasingly many environments, the term perimeter makes little sense.
See, for example, the CCS-2000 paper on Distributed Firewalls by Sotiris
Ioannidis et al. You can get it (among other places) from
Heh.
I've been arguing for YEARS that classic firewalls, as they have been
used for even more years, have been a disservice to network security.
You know, the whole hard, crunchy exterior with soft, chewy interior
sort of thing. Instead if we had ubiquitous multi-level secure
services (using
At 08:10 PM 9/21/01 -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
At 10:34 AM -0400 9/20/2001, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
[1] New encryption technology closes WLAN security loopholes
We don't need a new proprietary technology. IPSec tunnels from the
wireless node to
At 10:34 AM -0400 9/20/2001, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
[1] New encryption technology closes WLAN security loopholes
Next Comm has launched new wireless LAN security technology called
Key Hopping. The technology aims to close security gaps in Wired
