-Caveat Lector-
an excerpt from:
The Great Heroin Coup - Drugs, Intelligence, & International Fascism
Henrik Kruger
Jerry Meldon, Translator
South End Press©1980
Box 68 Astor Station
Boston, MA 02123
ISBN 0-89608-0319-5
240pps - one edition - out-of-print
Orginally published in Danish
Smukke Serge og Heroien
Bogan 1976
--[6]--
Six
NIGHTMARE OF THE AGENTS:
THE BEN BARKA AFFAIR
The October 1965 kidnaping of the Moroccan exile leader Mehdi Ben Barka was
the most controversial and daring affair involving Christian David. Of the
twentieth century's most consequential political melodramas, the Ben Barka
case ranks with the murder of John F. Kennedy. It remains an unsolved puzzle,
with unexploded fireworks that still haunt spooks on both sides of the
Atlantic.
There is a semiofficial scenario, but it is full of holes. To make the story
hold water many of the involved have been killed, threatened, or ruined. In
1980, fifteen years after Ben Barka's disappearance, that story remains as
dubious and full of holes as ever.
The current version goes something like this:
The Moroccan King Hassan II, Interior Minister General Mohammed Oufkir, and
his security chief, Colonel Ahmed Dlimi, conspired with members of the French
government and its intelligence arm, the SDECE, to lure Ben Barka to Paris,
where he would be turned over to Moroccan espionage agents.
The abduction was executed as planned on October 29. Ben Barka was taken to a
house in the Paris suburb, Fontenay-le-Vicomte. The following evening General
Oufkir, Colonel Dlimi, and Moroccan intelligence agents arrived. Soon
thereafter Ben Barka was tortured and killed by Oufkir himself, and buried by
hired crooks.
Implicated were the Moroccan government, certain leading French politicians,
the French intelligence agency SDECE, and gangsters connected to it; no one
else, according to the official version, was involved.
De Gaulle believed, with good reason, that he had been hoodwinked by some of
his own men who had been in cahoots with the CIA, which he blamed for the
entire affair. Amazingly, though, the CIA came out smelling like a rose. The
only ones to be disgraced in the ensuing trial were the Moroccans and French
intelligence, their underworld allies having long since been compromised..
Not coincidentally, the trial was punctuated by interruptions, postponements,
the liquidation of two star witnesses, the disappearance of a number of the
implicated, and the deaths of three French attorneys for the Ben Barka family.
Oufkir and members of his security staff were sentenced in absentia to life
in prison. Several Frenchmen, among them police and intelligence agents,
receiived-up to eight years. SDECE chief Paul Jacquier was sacked. Prime
Minister Georges Pompidou, Interior Minister Roger Frey, and de Gaulle's
son-in-law-, member of Parliament Pierre Lemarchand, were all blasted by de
Gaulle.
To the stunned populace that was as far as the scandal went, and it was far
enough. But what really happened? Why did so many struggle so desperately to
keep the lid on? So far the succession of theories and rumors have all lacked
credibility. However, in recent years additional aspects of the Ben Barka
affair have come to light through scattered details in many books and
articles. Alone, these facts seem insignificant. Together they form a lead
that can be followed.
I emphasize strongly that the following scenario is my own. My linking of the
many facts is hypothetical. The following, therefore, is not necessarily "the
truth about the Ben Barka affair" nor an exhaustive account of what occurred,
because this is not a book about the Ben Barka affair. Rather, I try to show
that we still haven't been told the truth, that the CIA was involved, and
that the Ben Barka affair has to this day left some unfinished business in
the netherworld of spooks. Furthermore, this will clarify one reason for
Christian David's anxieties in jail.
Mehidi Ben Barka wa's forty-four years old when he disappeared. From an early
age he had been a zealous champion of Moroccan independence and of a
Socialist future for his country. For a period in the late forties he was the
mathematics instructor of Hassan, son of Mohammed V, who became the present
King Hassan II. In 1952, with Morocco still under French rule, Ben Barka was
banished to the desert, and there he devoted much of his time to study.
In 1956 Morocco gained its independence. Three years later Ben Barka founded
the Union Nationale des Forces Populaire (UNFP). In 1961 Hassan was crowned
and appointed himself the prime minister.
In the 1963 National Assembly election Ben Barka's party, the UNFP, won
twenty-eight seats, while another reformist party, Istiqlal, gained
forty-one. The two were expected to form a coalition, which was a threat to
the king's ruling party, FDIC, which itself claimed sixty-nine seats.
In July 1963, two months after the election, security chief Oufkir disclosed
a "plot" against the king. A sworn devotee of feudal rule and a flaming
anti-Communist, Oufkir cracked down hard against the "conspirators." In March
1964 the court of Rabat sentenced seventyseven opposition politicians. Eleven
were condemned to death, though eight had already fled. Among those sentenced
to death in absentia was Ben Barka. According to a report of the
International Commission of Jurists, which followed the trial, evidence for
the plot was scanty at best.
Whether or not the plot was Oufkir's fabrication, its uncovering was a boon
to his career. From 1964 on he was Morocco's interior minister and strong
man, the man the CIA supported and worked with in Morocco. At the time
Ethiopia and Morocco were America's two most important African allies. They
received the lion's share of U.S. economic and military aid, and Morocco's
Kenitra air base was a focal point of CIA activity in Africa and the Middle
East.
The U.S. ambassador to Morocco in 1965, Henry J. Tasca, later became known
for his service in Greece, where he supported the colonels' junta. The CIA
station chief, Robert Wells, coordinated CIA assistance to the Moroccan
security police in eradicating political opponents of the regime.
The Americans took a keen interest in Ben Barka in 1965 when he set up a
Geneva base for his Third World travels. Ben Barka had been elected chairman
of the steering committee for the first Tricontinental Congress, to be held
3-10 January 1966 in Havana, Cuba. The conference was slated to be a Third
World milestone, demonstrating solidarity and brotherhood in the battle
against imperialism. It was a thorn in the side of the U.S. in more ways than
one. The Americans hadn't given up hope of "liberating" Cuba. Moreover,
Washington had good reason to fear that the budding Third World solidarity
would lead to a strong, united front against the U.S. and American business
interests abroad.
In 1965 King Hassan began airing the possibility of pardoning Ben Barka and
allowing him to return to participate in politics, under the king's
conditions. Hassan went so far as to send an emissary to Geneva to negotiate
with Ben Barka. It's impossible to know whether the king's gesture was
sincere. Hassan might have been part of the plot from the very beginning.
More likely, though, the king was hoping to entice Ben Barka back to Morocco
of his own free will, but needed the help of the French.
The hoodwinking grew out of discussions between Oufkir and the CIA.
Ambassador Tasca inquired at CIA Paris headquarters about the possibility of
helping return Ben Barka to Morocco.[1] The CIA was primarily interested in
preventing Ben Barka's attendance at the Tri-continental Congress, and in
learning of preparations already under way. Moreover, the CIA wanted to keep
Ben Barka out of Moroccan politics. All three goals could only be realised by
liquidating him or taking him to Morocco and putting him under permanent
house arrest.
Oufkir was most concerned with ensuring Ben Barka's permanent absence from
Moroccan politics. His second priority was serving the CIA. The possibility
cannot be overlooked that the CIA and Oufkir had already made plans for
Morocco's future. .-. plans that led to Oufkir's catastrophic coup attempt
seven years later.
And what of the affair's scapegoats? How did France feel about Ben Barka's
return to Morocco and his trip to the Tricontinental Congress? In my opinion
France was led by the nose by its own intelligence agents who were actually
cooperating with the CIA. After all, the Ben Barka affair took place at the
nadir of Franco-American relations. De Gaulle, intent on strengthening
France's Third World relations to the detriment of the USA's, had just
returned from Latin America, where he had expressed whole-hearted support for
Third World nationalism.
De Gaulle was very much interested in the Tricontinental Congress, and even
more so in Ben Barka's reconciliation with King Hassan and subsequent return
to Moroccan politics. That would undermine the U.S. position in North Africa
and weaken Oufkir, whom de Gaulle despised for aiding OAS figures following
the war in Algeria. It was not in France's official interest to have Ben
Barka killed. But within de Gaulle's own party hierarchy were people who went
their own way, at times working with the CIA.
As usual, one can't help suspecting de Gaulle's grey eminence, Jacques
Foccart, who was going his own way, at the time, in Latin America. However,
Foccart had just seen his African policies backfire, and would likely
hesitate before risking another major blunder. Moreover, until then Foccart
had been secretly supplying Ben Barka with money and arms.[2]
It must have been either King Hassan or his trusted Colonel Dlimi who, in
search of French assistance, presented a plan for collaboration to the likes
of Interior Minister Roger Frey, Jacques Foccart, and Pierre Lemarchand. The
plan, however, was hardly as elaborate as the one hatched by Oufkir and the
CIA, with or without King Hassan's consent. The plan shown to de Gaulle's
people probably was limited to bringing Ben Barka to Paris and holding him
there on suspicion of narcotics smuggling, until he and the Moroccans had
reached an agreement on Hassan's offer.[3] What's most important is that the
plan involved the French and the Moroccans only. Judging from appearances,
Hassan even asked Lemarchand at the start to negotiate with Ben Barka. Papers
later found on a murdered key witness indicate that Lemarchand had jotted
down the king's conditions for presentation to Ben Barka.
The French agreed to lure Ben Barka to Paris, in the belief it would help
both the king and the exiled leader. Foccart and Lemarchand also anticipated
viewing plans for the Tricontinental Congress so that they could suitably
adjust French policy.
According to plan, both Moroccan and French espionage agents shadowed Ben
Barka in Geneva. But Oufkir sought independent intelligence -intended neither
for Hassan nor for the French. Had he assigned the job to the CIA, it would
have been too risky, since it would quickly have aroused French suspicions.
He requested instead the aid of the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad.[4]
Though it might sound strange today, Israel and Morocco were on excellent
terms in the sixties-so excellent -that Moroccan espionage agents were
trained in Israel.
Oufkir, claiming his own men were not up to the assignment, requested the
loan of Israeli agents from Mossad chief Meir Amit. Amit agreed and sent a
team of agents to shadow Ben Barka in Geneva. A few days later they phoned in
a report that French and Moroccan agents were stumbling over one another's
feet. The Mossad chief called off his men and told Oufkir he didn't need
three sets of agents to spy on one man.
Oufkir entrusted his business in France to his agent Mohammed Miloued, code
named "Chtouki". The two spun a web of conspiracy involving exclusively
French-men who either were deceived by or were working with the CIA. Getting
Ben Barka to Paris would be taken care of by de Gaulle's unsuspecting staff.
For the practical details the French hired the gangster Georges Figon, an
acquaintance of Lemarchand's who moved in many different circles.
Quite casually they located the film director Georges Franju, who was then
planning an antiimperialist film and fancied having Ben Barka in a starring
role. It was excellent bait, for if Ben Barka agreed to come to Paris to
discuss the film, he would bring his file on the approaching Tri-continental
conference. The go-between was reportedly Phillipe Bernier, a friend of
Figon's who knew Ben Barka personally.
Ben Barka took the bait. Enthusiastic about the movie, he agreed to meet in
Paris with Franju, Bernier, and Figon on 29 October 1965 at the "Drugstore"
restaurant on Boulevard Saint-Germain-des-Pres.
Prior to Ben Barka's arrival, however, Georges Figon caused trouble.
Nervous, he asked to be remunerated for services rendered. In Jo Attia's bar,
Le Gavroche, he confided to acquaintances that he'd soon be paid a small
fortune. Among those acquaintances was Chris-tian David. Oufkir decided he'd
had it with Figon, who he most likely knew was working for Lemarchand.[5]
Oufkir offered him a lucrative job in Morocco, but Figon declined, having
been ordered to hang on.
Around noon on October 29, Ben Barka was walking through Paris with his
friend Azemouri, a Moroccan student. The two were on their way to meet with
the filmmakers. A patrol car pulled up in front of the Brasserie Lipp
restaurant on Boulevard Saint-Germain-des-Pres. Two men hopped out, flashed
police badges, and asked Ben Barka to join them.
There were already three men in the car: Orly airport chief Antoine Lopez,
French narcotics lieutenant Louis Souchon, and the latter's assistant, Roger
Voitot. An agent for the SDECE, Lopez was close to Oufkir, who had promised
him the directorship of Royal Air Maroc if anything went wrong. Georges
Pompidou had Lopez working closely as a special agent with America's Paris
narcotics office, a beehive of CIA activity.[6] Souchon and Voitot were
similarly collaborating with U.S. narks. Lopez, however, had apparently
convinced them the action was sanctioned by Jacques Foccart.
The abduction was initially camouflaged as a drug raid. Had anything misfired
at the start, they could always have claimed, truthfully enough, that Ben
Barka was a suspected trafficker.
The car with Ben Barka and the three cops headed out of Paris, followed
closely by another containing Georges Boucheseiche, Julien le Ny, Pierre
Dubail, and Jean Palisse — all from Jo Attia's gang. Like Attia, Boucheseiche
had worked for the SDECE. However, his true loyalty was to General Oufkir,
under whose wing he ran nightclubs and brothels in Morocco.
The two cars drove twenty kilometers out of Paris to Fontenay-le-Vicomte,
where Ben Barka was led into a house owned by Boucheseiche. Lopez, Souchon,
and Voitot drove away immediately, leaving behind the four gangsters and two
Moroccan agents. Shortly thereafter Lopez phoned Commandant Finville of the
SDECE, alias Marcel Leroy, and delivered the message: "Pedro to Thomas-the
package has been delivered."
At the time, Marcel Leroy, who was later fired and imprisoned for his
complicity in the Ben Barka affair, was highly valued by the Americans. The
CIA got him out of jail by blackmailing the SDECE and French politicos
through Phillipe Thyraud de Vosjoli, the French spy who became friendly with
the CIA after uncovering the Soviet rocket bases on Cuba. De Vosjoli's Le
Comite, which the French press speculated was ghostwritten by Leroy,[7]
discloses the previously mentioned French murder committee whose job under de
Gaulle was to cut down the president's enemies.[8] In the book de Vosjoli
insists that Colonel Marcel Mercier, not Leroy, was the "evil SDECE man" in
the Ben Barka affair.
In a curious chapter apparently added to Le Comite at the eleventh hour,
Leroy describes being summoned, shortly before the Ben Barka incident, to the
Matignon building where Pompidou had his offices. There, to his surprise, he
was ordered by a certain Monsieur Legros to collaborate with Antoine Lopez on
a drug control measure, Ben Barka's abduction. Leroy claims to have refused
unless the order came directly from his immediate supervisor, which it later
did.
The Legros whom Marcel Leroy met in the Matignon office may well have been
Fernand Legros, the playboy, millionaire, art dealer, CIA agent, and member
of Pompidou's entourage who later crossed paths with Christian David under
unusual circumstances. Legros was a double agent. Appearing to work for both
the SDECE and CIA, his loyalty rested with the Americans. A personal friend
of Henry Kissinger's, Legros was the man the CIA assigned to snoop on UN
secretary general Dag Hammarskjold. Legros helped the CIA kidnap the African
leader Moise Tshombe. And in 1965 Legros was in personal contact with Ben
Barka in Geneva, where Legros maintained a residence and a large art
gallery.[9]
When Leroy receives the "Pedro to Thomas" message, a big question mark
arises. Was the "package" delivered to the appropriate place? Should Ben
Barka have been taken to an altogether different location by agreement with
the French? And did Lopez really tell Lemarchand that Ben Barka had been
"freed" by passengers (Boucheseiche's mugs) in another car and hidden from
the police?
Everything suggests something happened which the police could do nothing
about. Telephone wires began humming and the Moroccans dashed into Paris,
perhaps to appear as much overcome by panic and dismay as were the French.
First came Chtouki, then, hours later, security chief Dlimi. Finally, a day
after the kidnaping, General Oufkir himself arrived.
>From here on no one seems to agree on anything. There's absolutely no proof
for the official version that put Oufkir in Fontenay-le-Vicomte to murder Ben
Barka that same evening. The only basis for that theory is a 10 January 1966
L'Express article in which Figon recounts seeing Oufkir torture and murder
Ben Barka in the Paris suburb on the evening of October 30. However, the
article's origin is a mystery. A copy of Figon's account was delivered to the
editors of L'Express by gangster Joseph Zurita of the Felix Lesca mob, whose
members had strong ties to Pierre Lemarchand.[10] Figon's eyewitness account
of Oufkir murdering Ben Barka was later disavowed by the magazine, but not
before it gained acceptance. Moreover, there was no official disavowal by the
French government.
One thing is certain. Oufkir would not have murdered Ben Barka before the
eyes of someone like Figon — whom he mistrusted and had tried to eliminate,
whom he knew would run to Lemarchand. Had the unthinkable in fact occurred,
had Figon accidentally seen Oufkir murder Ben Barka, then Figon would not
have lived to tell about it.
One more thing about Figon's article sounds implausible. It says he took a
taxi to Boucheseiche's house. In such a delicate matter, that would have
sufficed to seal not only Figon's fate but the taxi driver's as well. I
believe the article can be discounted.
Alternatively, Chtouki, Dlimi, and Oufkir might well have come to France to
ensure Ben Barka's transfer to Morocco. Either Dlimi or Oufkir were to have
held the French in check as Ben Barka was taken away, and it would have to
have been Dlimi, since he was the one who later avoided prosecution.
The French might have become suspicious, with Figon panicking and running to
Lemarchand. The Lesca gang, with Christian David, could then have entered the
plot at this early stage. Lemarchand might have tried to prevent the
abduction to Morocco by sending his Lesca gang barbouzes to
Fontenay-le-Vicomte. That could easily have led to conflict. Ben Barka could
have been killed during the struggle, or someone could have murdered him and
made it appear an accident.
Ben Barka could have been killed by Oufkir, a Moroccon security agent, the
CIA, one of Boucheseiche's hoods, or one of Lemarchand's barbouzes. All were
candidates, but the French, naturally, were most suspicious of Oufkir.
Moreover, none of the following, publicly aired hypotheses can be totally
disregarded: that the French murdered him because he possessed information
embarrassing to high-ranking individuals — perhaps regarding international
narcotics trafficking; that Ben Barka committed suicide upon realizing he was
bound for Morocco; or that he was murdered not in France, but in Morocco.
Each contains a grain of plausibility.
In an interview published on 19 October 1966 in the Lebanese daily El Hayat,
Colonel Dlimi maintained that Ben Barka was still alive when he and Oufkir
left France, and was to have been flown to Morocco on the evening of 3
November 1965. He allegedly waited in vain that entire night at a tiny
airport in the town of Msili.
Eleven days passed before rumors of Ben Barka's disappearance began to leak
out. He could have been kidnaped or murdered any time within those eleven
days, and by any of the parties involved. Among them, however, Oufkir and the
CIA had by far the strongest motives.
It's my firm belief that the CIA was behind the whole affair, that Oufkir and
possibly some of his men were CIA tools, and that the French, with stunning
naivete, allowed themselves to be duped into the CIA's ingenious scheme ...
all of which, of course, could only happen because a number of French agents
were working with the CIA. Whether Oufkir, a gangster, or a CIA agent killed
Ben Barka is secondary. What's important is that the agency was behind it.
In order to back up this claim it's essential to focus on the period
immediately following the murder. All the participants were busy covering
their tracks. Only the CIA succeeded, because the agency had made exclusive
use of Moroccans and Frenchmen. The French, on the other hand, appear to have
been caught with their pants down.
De Gaulle was fuming. "Somebody's taken me for a complete idiot," he raged,
vowing to get to the bottom of the affair. He was convinced the CIA was
involved, but could not touch them. All he could do was crack down on
Frenchmen he suspected were CIA lackeys. Collaboration with the CIA went
beyond certain French intelligence units to the highest government
circles-the men closest to de Gaulle. That is precisely what the president
suspected, and why he felt so powerless.
If one believes Leroy when he says his orders to cooperate with Antoine Lopez
on the Ben Barka affair came directly from "a certain Monsieur Legros" in a
Matignon office, then one can't help but trace CIA tracks directly to Prime
Minister Pompidou. The connection becomes crystal clear in light of the clash
between de Gaulle and Pompidou that grew to implacable hate in de Gaulle's
last years -and in light of Pompidou's later cooperation with the Americans
-especially in the area of narcotics.
Why, then, didn't Lemarchand step forward to tell his story and pull the
French out of the fire? In the first place, until the affair leaked out he
was busy camouflaging his own role and trying to determine what really
happened to Ben Barka. He knew very well that the French had been woven into
the web, and probably feared it was worse than it seemed.
Furthermore, Lemarchand's CIA counterparts had better cards to play. They
knew all about Lemarchand's hiring Georges Figon to entice Ben Barka to
Paris, since the Moroccans had talked Lemarchand into doing so. If that
information slipped out, Lemarchand, Foccart, and de Gaulle would all be up
the creek without a paddle. There would be no way for them to retaliate. And
that wasn't the only trump in the hand of the Americans. They could finger
Lopez, Souchon, and Voitot -all French cops - as Ben Barka's kidnappers. But
the ace up the CIA's sleeve was the uncertainty of de Gaulle's people about
what really happened to Ben Barka. All the French could do was clam up and
try to cut their losses.
Gangster Figon, a key to the mystery surrounding the actual Ben Barka
kidnaping, remained a question mark in the ensuing drama. Though the
Moroccans had promised him a fortune, Figon never saw a cent. While fellow
thugs Boucheseiche, le Ny, Dubail, and Palisse had their pockets full and
enjoyed asylum in Morocco, Oufkir refused to pay Figon. This again
underscores that either Figon had given Oufkir reason for suspicion, or that
Oufkir simply didn't bother paying a Lemarchand man who was not a sworn
conspirator.
Money had been Figon's only motive. As to Lemarchand, he now had to think
twice before passing out traceable funds. Figon became increasingly
embittered and finally decided to make the best of the situation.
I suspect Figon committed two major blunders. His first was to speak to
reporters, not seriously, but enough to cause some confusion. The second was
to put the squeeze on Lemarchand for money. Judging from appearances,
Lemarchand responded by having his Lesca gang barbouzes soften up Figon, who
then decided it was time to become scarce. Though Figon had given several
acquaintances the impression he feared the Lesca gang, he went into hiding
with Joseph Zurita and Louis Nesmoz, two thugs who claimed they'd broken with
Lesca in anger.[11] That was mistake number three, because Zurita and Nesmoz
never did lose touch with the mob and Lemarchand.
Meanwhile de Gaulle's crowd concluded, perhaps after gaining wind of certain
"rumors," that Ben Barka had been knocked off by Oufkir. That suited them
just fine. Moreover, someone, it seems, persuaded Figon to dictate his
account into a tape later transcribed for an article. The article might also
have been edited prior to delivery, since it was submitted by gangster Zurita
and not Figon himself. On 10 January 1966 L'Express published the celebrated
story which blamed Oufkir for killing Ben Barka in front of Figon.
Though the thought of Figon witnessing the murder was hard to swallow, the
CIA could not rebuff him just then without coming out in the open. And
Oufkir's own denial landed on deaf ears.
In a letter produced at a later trial, Newsweek's Paris correspondent, Edward
Behr, claiming to have heard the Figon tape, said there was no mention on it
of the latter's witnessing Oufkir murder Ben Barka. The tape itself proved
useless, as something was later recorded over the conversation with Figon.
Behr was transferred to Newsweek's Hong Kong bureau shortly after the Ben
Barka incident.[12]
As to Figon, he seems to have gone along with the article's fabrication.
Immediately following its publication his finances took a sharp turn for the
better. He sported a new false passport and told friends he'd either travel
abroad or move to a luxurious apartment. He was called in for interrogation
but never got a chance to explain the article to the police. On 17 January
1966 he was found in his 14 Rue des Renaudes apartment with a bullet in his
head.
Rue des Renaudes had been swarming with police supposedly there to protect
Figon, and no one else was seen entering his apartment. The police listed his
death as a suicide and swept the loose ends under the rug. In Figon's
suitcase they found King Hassan's conditions for the return of Ben Barka to
Moroccan politics. They were on documents drawn up by Lemarchand.[13]
During the trial of the Ben Barka case, orders were issued for the arrest of
General Oufkir and Colonel Dlimi, both of whom were safely in Morocco.
Nonetheless, on 18 October 1966 Dlimi came secretly to Paris and registered
in a hotel, the Peter the First of Serbia. This hotel was distinguished as
the haunt of spooks, and the home of a mercenary recruiting office for Moise
Tshombe's Congolese army. The office's directors, Andre Labay, Thierry de
Bonnay, Michel Leroy, and Lucien Swarm, were all close friends of CIA agent
Fernand Legros.[14] The next day, October 19, Dlimi reported to French police
for interrogation.
In October 1972, following six uneventful years, a bomb exploded in far away
Brazil. Mobster/ spook Christian David, one of Lemarchand's and Foccart's
most trusted agents, confessed, allegedly under torture: "I saw to it Ben
Barka's body disappeared. General Oufkir paid me 15 million old francs for
the job ... and 1, together with a certain Monsieur X, broke into the
apartment on Rue des Renaudes minutes before Figon 'committed suicide.' The
police didn't notice us because we went through building no. 11 on the
parallel Rue Theodule-Ribot."[15]
The confession of Beau Serge is nothing short of fantastic. It reveals how
intelligence agents operate, especially under duress. Those few lines contain
a gross lie, an important message, and a warning. And I would even insist
that the confession was composed in detail by the CIA. It's puzzling how the
French and American press could have swallowed it whole.
First there's the torture business. Newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic
dwelt on David's mauled appearance upon arrival in the U.S., and on the
agonies inflicted upon him in the torture chamber. I've learned enough about
Brazilian torturers and police to know that these experts don't leave marks,
and under no circumstances would they molest a prisoner bound for extradition
to either France or the United States.[16]
Another intriguing fact about David has never been mentioned. A few months
after his extradition to the U.S., it was disclosed that the chief
whipping-boy for the Brazilian security force in Sao Paulo, Sergio Fleury,
along with several of his men and their colleagues in the narcotics squad,
had accepted bribes to protect David's drug ring.[17] Moreover, three of
David's SAC brethren were closely connected to Fleury. They served as
advisors to, and more than once personally assisted the chief hatchet man in
the torture of prisoners.[18]
No, Christian David was not tortured in Brazil. His horrible appearance upon
arrival in the U.S. stemmed, instead, from a desperate attempt - that
included slashing his wrist and swallowing glass - at hospitalization and
access to escape.[19] Something else, then, was in the air. Why would the
Brazilians force a confession on a matter, like the Ben Barka affair, in
which they had no interest? And why was the prisoner's statement immediately
publicized when it had nothing to do with the charges levelled against him?
The revelation that David was tortured certainly did not come from the
Brazilians, who to this day deny that such things happen. It could only have
come from one source, the CIA. That is the only way to explain reports of a
hardened criminal and experienced spook opening up on an ever-explosive
subject. Let us not forget that, in 1972, CIA agents were still sent out by
the dozens to be interrogators and advisors in Brazilian police
headquarters.[20] According to Le Monde reporter, James Sarazin, CIA agents
were in fact present at the interrogation of Christian David.[21] No such
important information could have unintentionally slipped through their
fingers into print.
There remains another, even more important aspect that seems to have totally
escaped notice: a very special agent of the CIA was then spending much of his
time in Brazil. That agent was Fernand Legros, perhaps the same Legros whom
Marcel Leroy eventually fingered as the man who gave the orders for the Ben
Barka kidnaping.
Although Christian David's "confession" was probably composed meticulously to
suit the aims of the CIA, that does not mean it contains no truth. That would
not have been very smart. One thing, however, was astounding: Oufkir took the
ultimate blame. That had happened often enough in the past — but never at the
hands of his old bedfellows and protectors in the agency. Why?
For that there's a simple explanation: Oufkir's death two months earlier, on
16 August 1972, in the wake of an unsuccessful coup d'etat against King
Hassan.[22] The CIA, which had engineered the attempt, had nothing more to
lose in Morocco. It was now in the agency's interest to bury the Ben Barka
affair with Oufkir.
Furthermore, French President Pompidou had just cleaned house at the
intelligence agency SDECE, which was now coming to terms with the CIA. Having
David implicate Oufkir was the CIA's way of extending its hand to the French.
Beau Serge, moreover, had been working not for Oufkir, but for Lemarchand.
All too little attention has been focussed on the latter underworld
connection. The gangsters who it can be proven were bought and paid for by
Oufkir — and therefore perhaps by the CIA - all fled to Morocco. On the other
hand, Lesca gang thugs, closely associated with Lemarchand, wound up in Latin
America, where they regrouped around David and continued to work for SAC and
the SDECE.
Oufkir's fate was shared by gangsters Boucheseiche, le Ny, Dubai], and
possibly Palisse as well. All were executed in a Moroccan prison, on orders
from Dlimi, for complicity in the Oufkir/CIA coup attempt. The witnesses
closest to Oufkir in the Ben Barka affair, and protected by him afterward,
were thus put out of the picture.[23]
International spook Luis Gonzalez-Mata, a close friend of General Oufkir's,
claims the latter told him the CIA had planned to murder Ben Barka and had
constantly plotted behind his (Oufkir's) back: "Ben Barka was alive when I
left him in Paris," insisted Oufkir.[24]
Another striking aspect of David's "confession" is its undisguised warning to
Monsieur X. If X doesn't play ball, he'll be exposed; and Monxieur X
certainly knows that the CIA is aware of his identity. If he believes the
business about the torture, he's also aware that torturers don't deal in
unknowns like X and Y. If he doesn't believe it, then he must know that the
CIA made a deal with Christian David for information—a deal that saved David
from extradition to France and a possible date with the guillotine. The fact
that Monsieur X is mentioned at all can only mean he played an important role
in the affair and perhaps in French politics as well. The CIA, furthermore,
followed up the warning with reports that Figon's pistol was found in the
possession of Christian David.[25]
I won't hazard a guess as to Monsieur X's identity, only that he might well
belong to the older wing of the Gaullist party that can't come to terms with
rapprochement with the Americans. That is why he's told to watch his step.
In the interim there has been a notable shift in CIA posture on the Ben Barka
affair. In 1975 Daniel Guerin published Les Assassins de Ben Barka, also
alleging CIA involvement. Time magazine promptly published a curious article
purporting to prove that Ben Barka had been murdered by either Oufkir or
Dlimi. In fact, the article contained no new facts. What was new, though, was
that the Americans were pointing the finger at Dlimi, without justification -
perhaps as a warning.
This caused matters to take a grotesque twist. As Guerin later informed me,
both Antoine Lopez and the widow of Boucheseiche told him they would be
willing to testify that Ben Barka had been kidnaped from Boucheseiche's house
by other gangsters, and that Oufkir and Dlimi had never seen Ben Barka in
Paris. Here we observe Dlimi hard at work defending himself against U.S.
allegations. Having become good friends with the CIA, the French were
suddenly out of the picture. Now the CIA's formerly good friends and
presently not-such-good friends in Morocco had their turn to be run through
the treadmill. Back to square one: the Moroccans and the CIA.
I believe Figon was murdered because nobody could count on his silence, under
interrogation, about the fabrication of the story against Oufkir. Too much
was at stake. If it leaked out that the prode Gaulle faction had fabricated
the story, it would have been hard to convince people of the same faction's
innocence in the Ben Barka assassination.
And I believe Christian David helped knock off Georges Figon. Otherwise the
CIA's warning to Monsieur X would be meaningless. And otherwise David would
not have acted the way he did on 2 February 1966 -fourteen days after Figon's
"suicide." On that day, the head of the police department's antigangster
squad, Lieutenant Maurice Galibert, received a tip that a man implicated in
the Ben Barka case could be found at the Saint Clair restaurant.
Galibert dashed off with officers Gouzier and Gibeaux. Upon arrival at the
Saint Clair, they spotted Christian David playing cards with Belkacem
Mechere, the deputy prefect of the interior ministry police.[26] When
Galibert asked David to come downtown, Mechere protested. David flashed his
SAC ID, but Galibert stood his ground. David shrugged his shoulders and
fetched his coat from the checkroom.
Suddenly he stuck his hand in his coat pocket, drew a pistol and shot all
three policemen. Galibert died on the spot. The other two were badly wounded.
And Beau Serge got away.
Notes
1. Time, 29 December 1975.
2. Ibid.
3. Some of the funds for Ben Barka's revolutionary activities allegedly came
from the smuggling of morphine base.
4. Time, op. cit. 5. C. Clement: Oufkir (Editions Jean Dullis, 1974).
6. See chapter fourteen. 7. The book Le Comite is dedicated to the family of
Marcel Leroy.
8. Le Comite hit the market just as the U.S. was deep into its investigation
of the CIA. The strategy behind that was simple: it's easier to defend
oneself from attack when one can claim the others are doing the same. The
CIA, most
likely, was also behind de Vosjoli's first book, Lamia, which inspired Leon
Uris's Topaz.
9. In an interview especially for this book, Legros confirmed that the Geneva
gallery was a base for his espionage activities on behalf of the CIA; see
also R. Peyrefitte: La Vie Extraordinaire de Fernand Legros (Albin Michel,
1976). 10. D. Guerin: Les Assassins de Ben Barka (Guy Authier, 1975).
11. A. Jaubert: Dossier D ... comme Drogue (Alain Moreau, 1974).
12. Guerin, op. cit.
13. Ibid.
14. Peyrefitte, op. cit.
15. Writer/philosopher Daniel Guerin, who has dedicated his life to
unraveling the Ben Barka affair, and is gathering material for a reopening of
the case on behalf of Ben Barka's son Bachir, told me he had tested out the
claim in David's confession. He had confirmed that it's possible for an
adroit man to go through the backyard of 11 Rue Theodule-Ribot and then climb
up cornices to Figon's apartment.
16. H. Kruger: Doktoren (Bogan, 1975) and Likvider Boilesen (Breien, 1978).
17. A. Lopez: L'Escadron de la Mort (Casterman, 1973). According to the 23
May 1973 Nouvel Observateur, Sergio Fleury led the group which did in the
David gang in Brazil. It was also Fleury and his men who questioned David.
18. P. Chairoff: Dossier B ... comme Barbouzes (Alain Moreau, 1975).
19. LAurore, 20 November 1972.
20. CIA agents were not only advisors and interrogators in the traditional
sense. In Latin America they were both instructors in and practitioners of
torture -see A.J. Langguth, New York Times, 11 June 1979. Furthermore, those
who have difficulties comprehending anti-U.S. feelings in Iran will be
interested to know that a senior CIA official instructed agents of SAVAK, the
Iranian secret police created by the Shah in the late fifties with assistance
from the CIA, on techniques for torture. According to Jesse J. Leaf, for five
years the chief CIA analyst on Iran before his 1973 resignation, the CIA's
methods "were based on German torture techniques from World War 11" - see
S.M. Hersh, New York Times, 7 January 1979.
21. J. Sarazin: Dossier M ... comme Milieu (Alain Moreau, 1977).
22. Oufkir ordered jet fighters into the air to shoot down the king's plane.
According to French general Claude Clement (Clement, op. cit.), when that
failed, Oufkir was executed by King Hassan himself. Colonel Dlimi first shot
Oufkir in the back and shoulder, dropping him flat on his stomach. The king
then took Dlimi's pistol and fired at Oufkir's neck. The bullet exitted
through the general's left eye, shattering the sunglasses that had been his
trademark.
23. LAurore, 24 August 1972.
24. L. Gonzalez-Mata: Cygne (Grasset, 1976). 25. Chairoff, op. cit.
26. The Newsday Staff: The Heroin Trail (Souvenir Press, 1974).
--[cont]--
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris
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