The Thousand Conspiracy - Secret Germany Behind the Mask Paul Winkler Charles Scribner’s Sons©1943 New York 381 pps. – First Edition – Out-of-print --[6]-- CHAPTER VI THE LAST ACT OF THE TRAGICOMEDY ON MAY 30, 1932, Bruening resigned. Von Papen followed as Chancellor and was succeeded on December 2, 1932, by General von Schleicher. Von Papen's and Schleicher's governments were the last two before Hitler's advent to power on January 30, 1933. The main trends underlying these events were the following: (a) When von Papen succeeded to power he expected to have Hitler's support. It was with this in mind that he had procured subsidies from the industrialists for Hitler. The latter's support would be very useful to him, for although he governed with the aid of Presidential "decrees of dissolution," no Chancellor could afford to dismiss the Reichstag too often. The Nazis were the most important party in the Reichstag. Although they did not have a majority at their disposal, their support was nevertheless of great value to a government head. Besides, Hitler was an excellent "bogeyman" who could serve to hold in check the parties of Germany's left, and intimidate countries abroad. The latter, under the effects of this intimidation, would be much more apt to make concessions to Germany in the direction desired by the Prusso-Teutonics. Von Papen figured that the bargain he had concluded with the Fuehrer was fair and satisfactory to both. He therefore expected it to last, the more so because Hitler could not hope to accede to power himself. Indeed the Marshal had pronounced an absolute veto of this possibility and the Reichswehr did not look upon it favorably either. (b) Von Papen knew that he could count on the support of the real masters of Germany, the ruling Junker clique and heavy industry. He served them well and had no doubts about his reward. Also, he had been on an equal footing with Schleicher in the overthrow of Bruening, and the general accepted a place in his cabinet as Minister of the Reichswehr. The Reichswehr would therefore be behind him too. Possessing, in addition, Hindenburg's friendship and counting on Hitler's integrity, von Papen imagined that he would remain at the head of the government for many years. (c) Von Papen, believing his regime to be a lasting one, let it be understood that he had plans reaching far into the future. To consolidate his position positively he projected a reform of the Weimar Constitution, a reform which would have procured him quasi-dictatorial powers and would have put an end to the parliamentary system, condemned to death by the Prusso-Teutonics. Then, in the field of foreign policy, von Papen recommended ideas in the direction of a "European Federation" under German control, and spoke of a rebirth of the Holy Roman Empire. He had not, of course, taken any of his ideas from Hitler but rather from purely Prusso-Teutonic sources. Nevertheless one may say that if he had been able to maintain himself in power he would have tried to carry out, internally as well as abroad, schemes almost identical to those which Hitler was to produce later. The result would have been practically the same and probably Prussian Gennany under von Papen's control would have taken a direction about identical with the one she took under Hitler. True, von Papen would have carried out some of his plans at a different tempo, not possessing Hitler's brutally determined spirit. But what he lacked in brutality he compensated for in subtlety and his regime would doubtless have deceived foreign countries much longer. Hitler's one merit is that of having brought the danger into the foreground, into the public eye. The characteristic brutality of his expression and action has resulted in making the world aware of the threat for which actually the Prusso-Teutonic forces are responsible-more aware than if a more commonplace individual, von Papen, for example, had pursued the same course. The reason why von Papen was not the one finally to put these plans into practice for the Prusso-Teutonics was that Hitler did not intend him to be. Hitler was incontestably the stronger of the two. He was not going to allow von Papen to get the credit for the performance, nor to content himself with the role of "bogeyman." He might consider this role but only if he could play it as a star. He had realized that von Papen expected to maintain himself in power as compensation for his faithful service to the Prusso-Teutonics. He therefore decided that he would not let him have that privilege: that he himself would occupy that post and serve the same interests with even greater devotion, allowing von Papen at most a position in the background. Blackmail and Intrigue The following sequence of events developed from the interplay of the motives discussed above: 1.—Von Papen organized his cabinet with Schleicher as Minister of War and representatives of the Junkers as holders of the greater number of portfolios. Von Papen dismissed the Reichstag and prepared, in agreement with Hitler, new elections in which the Nazis expected to increase their number of seats. The von Papen-Hitler alliance seemed firmly cemented. 2.—On July 2 0, 1932, von Papen forcibly removed from office the Socialist government of Prussia. As a reaction against the feudal powers secretly controlling public affairs, the people of Prussia had placed Socialist governments in power in the state of Prussia after the Great War. Since Prussia represented about two-thirds of the area and population of Germany, its Socialist governments were a nuisance to the feudal powers who intended to keep effective domination over Germany's affairs. By putting an end, with his coup d'Etat, to the contradictory situation existing in Prussia, von Papen rendered another important service to his friends. The Prime Minister of Prussia, Otto Braun, and Severing, Minister of Interior (both of whom were Socialists), were frightened by the terroristic acts of the PrussoTeutonics and did not dare to resist, although they had a considerable police force at their disposal. The legal excuse given by von Papen for his coup d'Etat was clearly on uncertain ground and was later invalidated by the Supreme Court of Leipzig. No matter; control of Prussian affairs was to remain in the future directly with the Reich. 3.—Von Papen managed to satisfy his "bosses" on all matters. Decrees authorized wage reductions. Osthilfe subsidies were granted wholesale to the Junkers. Satisfaction was given the Nazis as well: the measure calling for dispersal of the SA and SS, issued under Bruening, was suspended. 4—New elections were held on July 31. The Nazi is now obtained 230 seats in the Reichstag out of a total of 608. Hitler did not yet have a majority but he had nevertheless won the day. His future now looked most promising. 5.—On August 13, at von Papen's' suggestion, Hitler went to see President von Hindenburg. The Chancellor thought that Hindenburg's authority would be sufficient to persuade Hitler to accept a post within the cabinet. Von Papen hoped that as part of the government, Hitler would continue his support. Hitler told Hindenburg frankly that he did not want a subordinate place in the cabinet. He wanted to be Chancellor or nothing. Hindenburg went into a rage but it did no good. Hitler gave him to understand plainly that from that day on he would be on the opposing side. The Hitler-von Papen alliance was terminated for the time being. It had definitely served Hitler's purpose because he had obtained the new elections he wanted and had come out of these stronger than before. He had also avoided the dissolution of his "self-defense troops" which the previous regime had considered. Having secured what he wanted Hitler could now go into opposition to the government. >From then on the government was again in danger. 6.—Hitler carried out his threat on September 12. The government met with a reverse in the Reichstag, Nazis and Communists voting against it. The result: 513 against, 32 for. Nevertheless von Papen did not resign; he dissolved Parliament. Elections were set for November 6. In the meantime von Papen arranged to have the industrialists cut off Hitler's subsidies. The Nazis would therefore find themselves in financial straits during the electoral campaign and the election returns would reflect this. Only twelve millions voted for the Nazis instead of the fourteen million at the last election, and as a result the National-Socialist party lost thirty-five seats. 7.— Von Papen, by forcing Hitler into elections without the financial aid he used to procure for him, hoped to put him into a position of inferiority. He expected that a new agreement with Hitler would thus be easier to achieve. The Nazi party was indeed passing through a severe moral and financial crisis. For the first time the most faithful members of the party began to doubt Hitler. Creditors became threatening. But the Nazis, in spite of their losses, were still the most important party in the Reichstag. Von Papen thought he had brought Hitler into line and again offered him a post in the cabinet, even proposing to him the office of Vice-Chancellor. Hitler refused. He was still playing "all or nothing." 8.—The expedient of dissolving the Reichstag could not be repeated ad infinitum. Von Papen therefore put into execution an idea which he considered a stroke of genius. On November 17, 1932, he offered the President his resignation. He knew that he would be asked to form a new cabinet. He would take advantage of the crisis to prove that it was quite impossible to constitute a government which would have a majority in the Reichstag. Under such conditions it could be shown that if any government were to be stable and effective the constitution would have to be changed. Von Papen as Chancellor would receive under the new constitution quasi-dictatorial powers. 9.—A strong government might perhaps have been able to effect such a change in the constitution, equivalent, without the approval of the Reichstag, to a coup d'Etat. In order to establish a government of this nature it would have been essential for von Papen to be able to count on full aid of the Reichswehr. However, at the last moment this aid entirely failed him. Schleicher actually declared that he did not wish to be in the new cabinet. At first von Papen thought it was a trick. He continued to bargain with the General, who remained adamant, his position taken. Under such conditions there remained no choice for von Papen but to announce, on November 30, that he was unable to organize a new cabinet. 10.—By leaving office von Papen thought he was taking a step which would add to his prestige; he expected to return some day. He retained Hindenburg's confidence, as well as that of the Junker-heavy industry group. He did not feel too strongly against Hitler for not supporting him, for the Nazi leader had for a long time given him plainly to understand that he was not disposed to cooperate except on condition that top place be reserved for him. As for Schleicher, who had stabbed him in the back, von Papen wished to wreak vengeance upon him at the first opportunity. 11.—What had inspired Schleicher's attitude? Negotiations with Gregor Strasser, Hitler's second-in-command as head of the Nazi party, had been the cause. For a long time Strasser had been dissatisfied with Hitler's close connections with the Junkers and heavy industry. He knew that these connections had of late been passing through von Papen. As we have seen, Strasser still held to the old "Socialist" conception of his party and would have liked to free it of its servitude to the Prusso-Teutonics, toward whom he had always been critical. With this aim, he inclined in the direction of an alliance with Schleicher who willingly let himself be designated as the "Socialist General." Such was the integrity of Strasser that he kept Hitler informed of his negotiations with Schleicher. Hitler encouraged them, for he saw in them a good way to separate Schleicher from von Papen. Urged forward by Strasser, and indirectly by Hitler, Schleicher had formulated a plan to organize the cabinet himself, succeeding von Papen, whom he dropped from then on, and taking Strasser with him as Vice-Chancellor. Hitler pretended to be willing to accept this combination, but stated his conditions. 12.—While waiting for the matter of Gregor Strasser's entry into his cabinet to be settled, Schleicher organized his government on December 2, hoping Strasser would join him in a few days. One of Hitler's conditions had been that Strasser ascertain, before accepting the post of Vice-Chancellor, that Hindenburg's veto regarding himself was still valid. Schleicher took Strasser to the Marshal, who gave him his word of honor that "the Austrian corporal would never be ReichsChancellor." Strasser considered the matter definitely verified. He informed Hitler of his interview and awaited Hitler's permission to accept the post of Vice-Chancellor. Hitler was to arrive in Berlin on December 8 to discuss the question. Strasser waited in vain at the station. Hitler was not on the train. Later in the day Hitler rushed to Strasser's house and violently reproached him, accusing him of having lied. Hitler said that he had just seen von Papen, who had assured him that Hindenburg's word had not been final. Since then Otto Strasser has recounted his brother's interpretation of this scene. Gregor, very devoted to Hitler, could never see the full extent of his Machlavellism and attributed Hitler's reproaches to the intrigues of Goering and Goebbels. Indeed Goering and Goebbels had for some time been very jealous of the position occupied by Strasser in the party. Strasser, still confident of Hitler's good faith, felt that only under the influence of Goering and Goebbels could Hitler have believed that his most faithful lieutenant had lied to him. Actually it is plain that Hitler, in spite of Strasser's interpretation, had been putting on an act during all these discussions. He had never had any intention of allowing Strasser to accept the office of Vice-Chancellor, for he knew that this would give Strasser practically first place in the party, which would not have suited him at all. Moreover, by entering the cabinet Strasser would considerably fortify Schleicher's position, and this again would not be to Hitler's advantage. Hitler had nevertheless pretended to approve of Strasser's negotiations, only for the purpose of eventually separating Schleicher and von Papen. Once Schleicher's cabinet had been formed and this separation accomplished, he could afford to reverse his position. The scene he had played before Strasser when he spoke of lies and betrayal, and quoted the testimony of von Papen, Goering, and Goebbels, was merely one of those sensational, dramatic stunts which Hitler always uses to good advantage when he wants to extricate himself from a difficult situation. Strasser let himself be deluded (like so many before and after him) into believing in the sincerity of the actor he was watching. 13.—Gregor Strasser was too weary to continue the struggle. Grieved and deeply shocked that Hitler should believe him a liar, he resigned his position in the party and left for a vacation in Italy. Hitler rubbed his hands with satisfaction; everything had gone as he had hoped. The danger of a strong Schleicher cabinet had been avoided and he could now study the best means of ultimately compromising the "Socialist General." 14.—Schleicher resigned himself to the fact that he could not count on direct aid from Gregor Strasser to improve the position of his government. However, he thought that his tie with the Reichswehr was enough to give him the requisite strength. He did not realize that Hitler, considering him a dangerous rival, had decided his fate. Hitler did not attack in the open, although he had at his disposal in the Reichstag the necessary strength to lead such an attack against Schleicher with every chance of success. But for Schleicher a Reichstag defeat would have been "honorable." As its sole consequence he would have been forced to resign temporarily, with nothing to prevent him from returning to power later. 15.—The only positive way to prevent any return of Schleicher would be to compromise him in the eyes of the forces actually in control of affairs: the Prusso-Teutonics. The left wing of his party again became the unconscious tool of Hitler. Nazi delegates of Strasser's group (that is, anti-Junker) introduced a question in the Reichstag on the matter of the Osthilfe abuses. General Ludendorff, whose ties to Hitler were well known, led a violent campaign against Hindenburg concerning the circumstances surrounding the deed of gift to Neudeck. In this way Ludendorff gratified his personal jealousy of Hindenburg. For Hitler, this was but one additional use of blackmail to enable him to succeed to power. Schleicher also fell into the trap. Believing-as Hitler intended he should-that these attacks had been launched with Hitler's consent, he hoped to secure legislative support from the Nazis by promoting the airing of the scandal in the Reichstag and the press. The Socialists, glad of an opportunity to deal the Junkers a blow, joined in the chorus. 16.-Meanwhile Hitler, directly and through the medium of Goering and Goebbels, maintained close contact with von Papen and through him with the Junkers. He pointed out that Schleicher represented a danger to them because he was favoring the exposure of the Osthilfe affair. The fact that the flames of this campaign were constantly fanned by Hitler's own acolytes did not embarrass him at all. He explained that he could discipline the fanatics in his party and guarantee that such incidents would not recur in the future only if he were appointed to the office of Chancellor. 17.—It was all blackmail, but von Papen was thinking only of his revenge on Schleicher. Besides he had finally realized that Hitler would accept nothing short of the Chancellorship. Hitler, needing von Papen's contacts with the Junkers and the industrialists, had given him to understand that he would be quite ready to cooperate with him on condition that von Papen content himself with a secondary role. The Westphalian was probably already resigned to this. He did not feel himself quite equal to a contest with Hitler and preferred to have him as a friend rather than an enemy. A decisive interview took place between the two men in Cologne, at the home of Baron Schroeder, financier of the heavy industry. Hitler gave assurances to his interlocutors that if he were granted the reins of power he would put an end to the socialistic sallies of his party's left wing. 18.—Von Papen had no difficulty in persuading his friends, the Junkers and industrialists, that they should henceforth place their bets on Hitler. Only the latter was ready to guarantee that the Osthilfe scandal would no longer be discussed. Besides, Hitler could carry out as well as he—or perhaps even better, he must admit—the scheme already outlined by von Papen on which the entire Prussian clique had agreed: constitutional reform with complete concentration of power in the hands of the Chancellor, continuation of the wor k of rearmament behind the screen of Germany's financial isolation, inaugurated in 1931; and finally, reconstruction by stages of the Germanic Holy Roman Empire. All this had hitherto constituted the Prusso-Teutonic scheme as expounded by von Papen. Hitler would take charge of it thenceforth for the benefit of the same silent partners. 19.—On January 12, Schleicher was "guest of honor" at the Landbund banquet. A Landbund bulletin was passed around containing a violent attack on the Chancellor. Schleicher demanded an explanation. It was not given. He was made to feel that the article expressed the feelings of the Landbund members and that was all. Schleicher rose and left the hall accompanied by the generals present. He still did not understand that his fate was already sealed. Junkers and the Landbund had let themselves be persuaded by von Papen, and in the end by Hitler, that Schleicher was dangerous to their interests. He did not realize that nothing could save him now, that only the method of his departure was left to be arranged. Jan Bargenhusen writing in the magazine Die Weltbuehne* on January 24, 1933, said: "The amount of personal authority with which Schleicher assumed office is already terribly diminished. The Landbund in particular has treated him badly . . ." Bargenhusen concluded his article with the words: "The German Reich is a Republic. All power comes from the Landbund." [ * Published by C. von Ossietzky, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, who was later to die in a concentration camp.] 20.—The last act of the tragicomedy took place at the presidential palace. Hindenburg still was hesitating about dropping Schleicher, who seemed to have the generals' support. But his son, Oscar, made it clear that Schleicher was promoting revelations about the Neudeck affair and if that continued, a scandal very embarrassing to father and son might well break out. True, the army still favored Schleicher, but on the other hand the Junkers were absolutely against him and this counted much more. Faced with these considerations the aged Marshal no longer hesitated. On January 28, 1933, Schleicher asked Hindenburg for the famous decree, signed in advance, which provided for dissolution of the Reichstag. This decree had been granted his predecessors who had ruled with the aid of the threat it contained. Schleicher had no doubt that it was a simple formality and that the decree would be granted him without difficulty. But Hindenburg refused, and Schleicher understood that the President had withdrawn his confidence. He was deeply hurt and resigned. 21.-Nothing remained to be done but to appoint his successor. Von Papen was prepared to let Hitler have the post. The Junkers agreed. Heavy industry agreed. Why shouldn't they, since there was no other candidate available to accomplish what had been planned? 22.—Only Hindenburg was still unable to reach a decision. He had given his word of honor that the "Austrian corporal" would not be Chancellor. The Junkers therefore arranged a final stunt to speed things up. On January 30, 1933, one of their leaders, Count von Alvensleben, rushed to the Presidential palace with the "scoop" that Schleicher had put himself in command of the Potsdam Garrison and was marching on Berlin to arrest Oscar von Hindenburg, Papen, and Hitler. The "news" was pure fabrication but it had its effect. Under the stress of emotion Hindenburg finally consented to have Hitler form a government with von Papen as Vice-Chancellor. The Nazi regime was born. On January 30, 1933, began the Gleichschaltung. The various parties were liquidated in succession and a single party, the Nazi party, was left. Henceforth it was to be the only front for the interests which had promoted its rise to power. People had the impression that from then on Hitler was sole master of Germany. Everyone wondered at the ease with which he had gained possession of the helm, meeting with no resistance either from left or right. They forgot that the leftist parties, weakened by underground efforts of the secret societies, were no longer prepared to resist. As for the forces behind the rightist parties, these had all agreed to consider the Nazi party as their front for the future. No other parties would be necessary. The old garments had served their purpose. They could be thrown away. pps. 197-209 ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, All My Relations. Omnia Bona Bonis, Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance—not soap-boxing—please! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'—with its many half-truths, mis- directions and outright frauds—is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. 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