-Caveat Lector-
an excerpt from:
Revelations of an International Spy
I. T. T. Lincoln
Robert M. McBride & Company©1916
New York
--[6b]--
After seeing the President of the French Republic, Edward VII hurried to
Reval—by sea to avoid traversing German territory—to meet the autocrat of all
the Russias. Why did Edward go to Reval? And why did he take General Sir John
French with him? What was discussed there, what was decided? He went to Reval
to forge another link in his chain of anti-German policy. In the coming and
contemplated war with Germany in which all Europe will be involved, it was
necessary for England to prevent the Turks, the friends of Germany, from
attacking Suez and Egypt. This is the vital spot of the British Empire. The
Turk must first be beaten, reduced to impotence. England suggested in St.
Petersburg a strong Russian-Balkan policy—indeed she gave Russia carte
blanche on the Balkans—except Constantinople. "Not yet," was the evasive
reply. Russia could take Armenia, do with and through the Balkans Slavs what
she wanted—was one decision reached. Indeed, a possible Balkan Alliance was
here mooted the first time, to be directed against Turkey and Austria. Its
originator was England.
Another question discussed at Reval was this: How to prevent the Germans
invading France in the coming conflict? This was General French's business
there. France was pressing this question and the only way to prevent this was
an invasion of Belgium and, Holland, or one of the two, by England.
After hostilities break out, either a pretext will be found to force the
Scheldt and land an army there (should Leopold II still be King of Belgium)
or Belgium will ask the protection of England and the latter will then land
160,000 men there, to outflank the Germans (should Prince Albert have
succeeded on the throne). The vexed and much debated question of violating
Belgium's neutrality by the Germans hinges upon this my statement. Germany
knowing this nice little scheme, prevented its execution by forestalling it.
This is what Bethmann-Hollweg meant when he said "necessity knows no law."
The English and French were furious, not because Germany invaded Belgium but
because in doing so she prevented them from doing it.
Again I hear some readers say: This cannot be true, because Sir Edward Grey
asked Germany's pledge not to violate Belgium's neutrality. Quite true, but
when Germany asked him on the 1st of August (page 66 of British White Paper)
whether he would engage to remain neutral if Germany agreed not to violate
Belgium's neutrality, was his reply "Yes"? Oh no! He said "he could not say
that."
Prince Lichnovsky then "suggested that the integrity of France and her
colonies might be guaranteed," in addition to Belgium's neutrality. What did
Grey say? "I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to
remain neutral on similar terms and I could only say that we must keep our
hands free." (Despatch to Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador to Berlin,
signed by Grey, mailed on the 1st of August, 1914.) This should effectively
dispose of two of England's contentions: 1. That Grey only went to war
because Germany violated Belgian neutrality. 2. That Grey did not want war.
In fact, it should be clear to all impartial readers, that Grey was forced by
previous agreements to support Russia in her ridiculous Balkan pretensions in
shielding the Servian murderers of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand.
But granted that it is beyond contention, can it be possible that Grey would
have invaded Belgium after he warned off Germany? Yes, that is precisely what
he wanted to do and what he decided upon years before 1914. Diplomacy is a
game, you must never take the statements of diplomats at their face value.
Did not England seize several Greek Islands during this war on the plea that
military necessity compelled her to do so? Indeed, when I criticized the
Germans—as will be related in a later chapter—for having played into Grey's
hands by the invasion of Belgium, assuring them that the people of Great
Britain would have swept Grey out of office had he dared to side with Russia
and France, not knowing of any of his secret agreements, they replied: "Once
war breaks out a clever minister like Grey, who fooled his country eight
years, would have easily fooled them, once passions ruled. We knew that he
meant to invade Belgium and we had to act accordingly."
Another matter discussed at Reval referred to consolidating the Balkan
States. Here it was the first time that the Balkan League was mooted. They
counted without their host. On the 23rd of July the Young Turks revolted. The
Young Turkish Revolution would in any case have come within a year. But the
reports of the Reval meeting reached the Committee of Union and Progress and
fearing for their country's future, the revolt broke out as soon as the most
necessary preparation had been made. Germany and Austria-Hungary immediately
after Reval partially mobilized their forces—they made up their minds that
they would for once not tolerate Edward's insults and plots. They knew very
well that neither Russia nor France nor England was then ready and they
consequently decided to call their bluff. This was very cleverly done. In
order to prevent the Balkans acting in unison in any direction, secret
negotiations were started with Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria with a view of
concerted action. For everything was in the melting pot now. But more of this
aspect anon. Concurrently with the negotiations, extensive military
preparations were carried out on the Servian and Galician frontiers by
Austria and by Germany on the cast and west.
Isvolsky met Aerenthal over the Balkan question—he wanted to gain time.
Hardly did he leave Aerenthal, and when all the preparations were ready,
Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Bulgaria declared her
independence of Turkey. This was indeed a masterstroke of statesmanship.
Russia could not possibly object to Bulgaria (her own creation) going one
step further on the road she started her in 1878. And this was just the
reason for the stormy opposition of Russia and England. Russia had created
Bulgaria, it is true, but she wanted Bulgaria to be and remain her vassal, as
it were. An independent, strong Bulgaria, made so with the help of
Austria—that was a bitter pill to swallow. Russia did not care for
Bosnia-Herzegovina; she readily agreed in previous discussions on the subject
with Austria that the latter should have them. But the cooperation of
Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria shattered for the time being the Triple
Entente's scheme for a Balkan League. While—as to Macedonia—the Young Turks
looked after that. I am constrained to admit that had the Young Turks not
committed a whole series of blunders and if they had listened to the
excellent advice which Count Aerenthal and Berlin tendered to them, the
Balkan League would never have become an accomplished fact. The Triple
Entente bluff indeed had been called, The next few months of acute tension
and war hanging over Europe are well known and remembered by all.
As remarked above, the Young Turkish Revolution brought everything in the
melting pot. All the Powers lost their bearings for the time being. Grey was
spouting fire and brimstone at AustriaHungary for the annexation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and made some rash promises and vowed some childish vows!
Needless to say, he did not keep them. Two years afterwards I was a member of
House of Commons and I could not forego the pleasure of pointing out to Sir
Edward Grey, by way of ironical questions often repeated in various forms,
that he did not keep his word. Several questions of this nature finally upset
his equilibrium and he put up the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs (Mr.
McKinnon Wood) to reply to me, which he did in a brutal fashion.
The year 1909 seemed to start well with a promise of a saner and more
peaceful policy all round. Turkey and Austria composed their differences over
the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Protocol of the 26th of February.
In the same month France and Germany reached an agreement over their Morocco
difficulty, King Edward and Queen Alexandra paid their long-deferred state
visit to Berlin, Russia, faced and threatened with Germany's "hands off,"
acknowledged the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (March 15th). To the
uninitiated observer, it seemed that a new era of international amity and
peace had set in. In truth, the above events—and many others—were dictated by
the fact already mentioned, that all the Powers had lost their bearings. To
make myself clear, the young Turkish Revolution caused Germany to pause and
think. In the German scheme of defense the friendship of Turkey played a very
important role. Nobody at that time could foresee with exactitude how far the
regeneration of Turkey would go and principally how it would affect the
Christian States of the Balkans. Great Britain was anxious about Egypt, and
the possible effect a revival of Pan-Islamism with a regenerated Khalifate
might have on the 60,000,000 Mohammedans in India. Her dear friend Russia was
also causing her much concern-in the Near East, whither she brought her back
from the Far East—and in Persia.
Public opinion in England and a very strong section of the House of Commons
viewed with concern, alarm, and disgust what Russia was doing in Persia. Sir
Edward Grey had to do something. The excesses of Liakhoff and his unbridled
Cossacks could not be overlooked. Sir Arthur Nicholson gently demanded his
recall, which was refused. France and Italy during 1909 were anything but
friendly. Each one of the Great Powers lost its bearings. They were seeking
to find a new direction for their policy. Underground and beneath the surface
the old intrigues went on just the same. Even in 1909 it would not have been
too late to sweep away all the difficulties, artificial and natural, that
existed between England and Germany. And here I must say that Edward
VII—realizing the dangers which his policy had created and the imminence of
war over the annexation crisis-was sincerely anxious this time to bring about
an entente with Germany—the Kaiser being more than willing. It is to the
guilt of Sir Edward Grey, above everybody else, that this was not brought
about. How does this tally with oft-repeated previous statement that it was
Edward VII who was the most active propagator of the anti-German policy?
He was, but having seen that his policy brought Europe four times to the
verge of war, he thought that the opening of the Eastern question might be a
favorable opportunity to compose the differences with Germany. But Grey was
too deeply and too far committed, and it is he who now made this impossible.
He felt the responsibility for this, last year, when he saw England on the
verge of the bottomless abyss of a European war, for he thus wires to Sir
Edward Goschen in Berlin on the 30th of July, 1914:
"My own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could
be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile
policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, or
ourselves, jointly or separately. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to
form the subject of definite proposals."
There are several admissions in this statement.
1. That hitherto a hostile and aggressive policy has been pursued against
Germany and her allies.
2. That Grey could have prevented it by intimating that he will bring about
an arrangement to which Germany can be a party with France and Russia, and
3. That he did not want it hitherto, by calling it, "too, Utopian hitherto."
Grey it was who, in 1909, prevented this, then, "too Utopian" arrangement
being carried out.
After a few weeks of lull, of hypocritical platitudes, the old feuds broke
out anew. France was nervous about a possible entente, or, at any rate a
detente, between Germany and England, while the latter was not less nervous
about the completion of the Franco-German Morocco Agreement. The conspirators
in both countries set to work.
This time, in the spring of 1909, I left Mr. Rowntree, having finished my
investigations for him, and devoted all my time, or nearly all my time to
secret service work. I left for Belgium in the second week of April. Mr.
Rowntree, keenly and sincerely interested, in my welfare, inquired what I was
doing now. For when I left him we parted as good friends and he quite
understood and appreciated that aspiring to parliamentary honors I could—not
remain a salaried man—but must try and make money by entering business. So he
inquired what I was doing in Belgium. Naturally, I could not tell him. I gave
him evasive replies. After several vain efforts he never asked me again. Does
he remember it? Now, of course, he will know what I was doing and why I could
not tell him.
I was sent to Belgium on a twofold mission: To find out exactly what military
measures were being discussed and decided upon, under the influence of the
annexation crisis; and to obtain an exact description of all the iron and
steel factories in and around Liege, Seraing, Ougree, La Louviere,
Hain-St.-Paul, Hain-St.-Pierre, Charleroi, ete., etc. The number of workmen
they do and can employ, capacity of the various mills, forges, lathes,
smithies, etc., raw material on hand, and many other questions. Now an
ordinary spy would have made his residence stealthily in Brussels and tried
to get into touch with some officer at the War Office, and so find answers to
his first question. Very probably he would have been caught and locked up for
a few years. As to obtaining information to the second question-that would
have been even more difficult than the first. Big corporations guard their
secrets very well and very seldom, if at all, are strangers admitted and
enabled to put their noses in all their affairs.
Not so with me! I could and did go ahead openly and boldly. Was I not well
known everywhere? Did not everybody know that I was conducting a scientific
and economic investigation? And although it was finished, was it not possible
that in looking through our material in London we found that on certain
points we needed complementary information? With such thoughts in my mind I
went up on the 14th of April, 1909, to my friend M. Dubois, Directeur General
at the Ministry for Industry and Labour—in other words the highest permanent
official next to the Minister. I requested him to give me an official letter
of introduction which would enable me to visit any and every factory in
Belgium. I was desirous of making a supplementary investigation about wages,
I said. He readily furnished me with the letter. This I knew would fully
enable me to satisfy Question 2.
As to the first question, I went to the War Office? Not at all. That would
have been the obvious but not the best method. Belgium is a country governed
on the principle of very far reaching provincial and local self-government.
Furthermore, there was a modified conscription existing in Belgium, and
national defense was pivoted really on a national guard and national militia.
Now, bearing these two main considerations in mind, I said to myself if any
military measures or reforms were decided upon or were being carried out the
provincial governors, certain communal authorities, would know exactly what
was going on. I decided to visit them, and if after having canvassed them I
found that on one or two points my information was not complete, it would be
necessary to obtain the "missing links" in Brussels. So having obtained the
letter from M. Dubois, I went straightway to the Prime Minister of Belgium.
There was shortly before a ministerial crisis, in consequence of which M.
Schollaert was not only the Prime Minister, but also the Minister of the
Interior and Minister of Agriculture, until he could fill this latter
portfolio. I really went to him in his capacity as Minister of the Interior.
I received from him next day the letter. Armed with these two letters I
traveled all over Belgium, visiting every iron and allied mills and, of
course, calling on provincial governors and certain communal or regional
officials.
I was readily admitted to every mill save two: Cockerill's in Seraing and the
big Ougree, works (both near Liege). Cockerill's is the Krupp of Belgium. I
was shown into the spacious and beautifully furnished private room of its
managing director—if I remember rightly, Mr. Schneider, or something similar.
No, he could not, much to his regret, let me go through the works. If I
wanted to know anything, I could give him or send him a list of questions and
they would be very pleased to furnish me with replies compatible with their
rules on such matters. Of course, that would not do for me. After much
arguing and persuasion he promised he would consider it and let me know in a
day or two. I had with me an expert in order to get the most out of my visit.
So naturally, I requested that my "secretary" might accompany me. I wired to
Minister Dubois what had happened, requesting him to write direct to
Cockerill's requesting that the desired facilities be extended to me.
Cockerill's is in Seraing, a suburb, so to, speak, of Liege. I stayed in
Liege visiting some other works whilst waiting for the reply of Cockerill's.
On the second day the permission to visit Cockerill's arrived and I and my
"secretary" had a very useful day. Mr. Schneider showed me the great courtesy
of appointing as my guide an English speaking official. I think it was the
librarian—an Englishman. I had another similar experience. Next to Seraing in
the village of Ougree is the Societe Anonyme d'Ougree, employing about 6000
men. They would not let me in; no, not even with Mr. Dubois's recommendation.
They only let people in for whom some one they know vouches.
"Do you know Professor Mahaim?" asked.
"Mais, certainement, Monsieur!" replied the director.
Professor Mahaim. was professor at the University of Liege, one of the most
prominent and respected citizens of Liege. I knew him very well. So did he
me. It was promised that if Professor Mahaim. will vouch for me and accompany
me, then I can visit their works.
This was easily arranged. On the appointed morning Professor Mahaim, myself
and my "secretary" met in the waiting-room of Ougree. I should have pointed
out that at the time of making the arrangement my "secretary" happened to be
busy somewhere else—and I quite overlooked to ask for a permit for him as
well. Professor Mahaim was associated with me in my investigations for Mr.
Rowntree, having furnished the reports on housing conditions in Belgium—so I
could not introduce my "secretary." as such—Professor Mahaim having known
personally my real secretary. He now passed as my cousin, who just happened
to arrive from London. Since I was permitted to take notes during my visit, I
suggested to Mahaim that I introduce my cousin to the director as my
secretary. And as my "secretary" he was admitted without delay. I obtained a
most thorough and complete dossier and a handsome reward for it—which
foolishly I deposited at the baccarat tables of Ostend Casino.
My visits to provincial governors and local government officials were equally
successful. So successful, that I had but little to complete on my return to
Brussels. I obtained uncontrovertible ,evidence that during the summer and
fall of 1909 the Triple Entente, or rather England and France, were almost
actively interfering in the military, matters of Belgium. They compelled
Belgium to make preparations against the Germans, whilst they themselves not
only contemplated but decided to invade Belgium—with or without Belgium's
approval—after an initial success against the Germans. But I have previously
dealt with this matter, and I leave it to the suggested Commission—to refute
me—if they can.
>From Belgium I returned to England and put in several weeks of electioneering
work in Darlington. I was just contemplating going away for a well-merited
holiday, when a telegram reached me, requesting me to meet "D" at Ostend. The
Triple Entente was decidedly busy in the Balkans and in Southern Hungary. It
was my duty to find out what they were doing. From Ostend I returned to
London. I had now to invent a reason for my secret inquiries in the Balkans.
No longer in Mr. Rowntree's service, I could not say that I wanted to
investigate social or economic conditions in Servia. I would have been
derided. After some consideration I went up to the Foreign Office and
obtained official letters of introduction to Budapest, Belgrade, Sofia,
Bucharest, and Constantinople. Sir Edward Grey said in those letters
addressed to British consuls or ministers in those respective capitals that I
was going to "study commercial conditions with a view of the development of
British trade."
My first visit was to Budapest. The British Consul General at the time there
was the Hon. Esme Howard. He is now, I think, Minister in Berne, Switzerland.
Here it was—the first and only time during my secret activities—that I
committed an indiscretion—which resulted in a rather unpleasant interview at
the Foreign Office in London after my return from the Balkans. This interview
took place between Lord Dufferin, head of the commercial department at the
Foreign Office, and myself.
My indiscretion consisted in mentioning rather often the name of a very
distinguished and prominent personage of the immediate entourage of King
Edward VII. Mr. Howard, either disbelieving the pretended purpose of my visit
to Budapest or suspecting some connection behind that prominent name, cabled
to the Foreign Office in London. He will be surprised that I know this.
Indeed, I knew it immediately. The Foreign Office approached. the personage
in question—who, I may say, has had all kinds of honors, orders, and other
marks of favor showered upon him by King Edward VII—who, of course,
disclaimed any knowledge of me. Mr. Howard was advised accordingly—so -was I.
Two days later I called upon Mr. Howard by appointment, for he was to take me
to His Excellency, M. Kossuth, then Minister of Commerce. Mr. Howard did not
disclose by any word or sign that he had cabled to London. Nor did I betray
to him that I knew of it. He was my guest at luncheon at the Hotel Hungaria,
where I was staying. We both played the game perfectly. After luncheon we
drove across the Danube to the ministry which is in Buda. He introduced me to
M. Kossuth as having come to study "means and ways to extend British trade in
Hungary." After about ten minutes' conversation with the Minister, His
Excellency M. Szterenyi was ushered in and he took charge of me.
We left the room together, leaving Mr. Howard and M. Kossuth behind. It was
then that Mr. Howard warned M. Kossuth against me, as I knew the very same
afternoon.
M. Kossuth was a member of what was known in Hungary as the "Coalition
Government," who wanted to break up the Triple Alliance. One of their
favorite pastimes was coquetting with France and England. When I got back to
London after penetrating the Balkans, I wrote a "diplomatic" letter to the
high personage in question, receiving a "diplomatic" reply. By these letters
exchanged I completely shielded the personage in question-drawing any
possible trouble from him to myself. But nothing happened except that
-unpleasant interview at the Foreign Office.
Lord Dufferin and Mr. Howard may now intelligently guess who my mysterious
patron "D" is, and the significance of my activities in his behalf. And
another observation. In future the British Government will do well not to
leave a young attache in entire charge of the Belgrade Legation. These young
attaches are too inexperienced and are by no means a match for the
resourceful methods of an experienced Secret Service man.
To my great pleasure I found the British Legation in Belgrade in the sole
charge of a young attache from the Bucharest Legation. We got very friendly.
Every afternoon he and I drove out in the Legation's carriage, drawn by two
superb Hungarian horses. We were the sight of Belgrade-when we drove along
the main street in furious tempo, the driver sitting behind in his
picturesque uniform! He introduced me to Colonel Ch___, a very useful source
of information; to Madame E___, in the pay of the British Government. Colonel
Ch___ worked for me and introduced me to two ministers and one ex-minister.
Madame E____ for money and generous compliments was willing to pump officers,
statesmen, and other smaller fry., But above All, my friend, the attache—he
was invaluable; so much so that I could dispense entirely with my
contemplated journey to Sofia, Bucharest, and Constantinople.
Mr. Harting, the newly appointed Russian Minister to Belgrade, arrived with a
very bad reputation from Teheran. Ask Mr. Shuster, the ex-Treasurer-General
of Persia. The plan of a Serbo-Bulgarian rapprochement had already been
discussed between M. Isvolsky and M. Milovanovitsch. Harting was sent to
Belgrade with the definite mission of forging a Balkan alliance against
Austria-Hungary. This was well known by Sir Edward Grey, and had his support.
Harting—and this is not so well known—was the inspirer, the active head of
the disintegrating propaganda carried on from Belgrade in Austria-Hungary. He
was behind the Serbo-Croatian coalition of the Diet of Agram. Out of these
machinations grew the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand. When the full
history of the last few years will be written that dastardly crime will be
brought home to Russian diplomacy. And Sir Edward Grey must accept blame and
responsibility for the odious methods and practises of Harting. His insane
fear of Germany, his mad jealousy of Germany, delivered him up into the hands
of the Pan-Slavists of Russia and the Chauvinists of France. Any price was
not too big for him to pay for the coalition against Germany.
The Triple Entente started reorganizing the Balkans politically and from a
military point of view, and it was openly declared to me then that in three
years' time they would be ready to strike. And they did strike in 1912. Grey
was caught in the meshes of his own intrigues. The Anglo-Russian agreement of
1907, carried against the outspoken opposition of English public opinion and
against the true interests of England, did not work well. There was no little
friction with Russia in 1909, and she was beginning to turn her eyes toward
Germany, with whose help she hoped to obtain the much-coveted outlet on the
Gulf. Grey was alarmed. "An understanding between Germany and Russia or for
that matter between Germany and any other power must be prevented by us at
all hazards, said to me the young attache at Belgrade.
In order to draw away Russia from Persia and to compensate her elsewhere,
Grey thrust Russia into the Balkans. But the annexation crisis has closely
brought home to Russia that while she is playing England's game, England
cannot be of any help to her when their joint policy is brought to a test.
Russia and the whole Triple Entente had to buckle down before Germany in 1909
over the Bosnian question. Russia began to realize that England was using her
for her own aims. Mr. Harting, whom I saw several times in Belgrade, once
told me, "We are wanted by England to crush Germany." If only this true
vision had reached other circles in Russia, the present war would never have
happened. But Isvolsky in Paris, the Dowager Empress in St. Petersburg, Grey
in London, and others took care that it did not.
I returned from Belgrade to London, instead of proceeding to Sofia and
Constantinople, so obliging was the young attache. When I got to London I had
an invitation to go to the Foreign Office. They wanted to question me more
closely about my indiscretion committed in Budapest and which when understood
would have brought disgrace upon a very prominent person of King Edward's
personal circle. So we strenuously disavowed each other. Let now Lord
Dufferin and Sir Edward Grey ponder over that incident and see what they can
make out of it.
I had to devote the remaining few months of 1909 to electioneering. The
elections were to take place in January, 1910. I was elected a member of the
British Parliament for Darlington, by no means a commonplace achievement, in
light of insular prejudice. I was the first Hungarian (and I am surely the
last) that ever attained this honor. During my parliamentary career I paid
very frequent visits to the continent of Europe. In the autumn, whilst in
Vienna, I was honored with an audience by the late Archduke Francis
Ferdinand. It was agreed that I might publish his views on international
political questions concerning England, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, and the
Balkans. To make my article authentic it was arranged that the whole
interview be written out by me in the form of questions and answers with the
assistance of an ex-minister, a confidant of the Archduke. I met His
Excellency and his secretary next day in the Hotel Imperial in Vienna, and
read the draft of my article to. him.
At a special audience, I then submitted it to His Imperial Highness. Archduke
Francis Ferdinand was of a commanding presence. Once you saw him, with his
big eyes, his serene countenance, his superabundant energy manifested by his
every move, gesture, and mien, you could never forget him. He was a man of
fearless courage, deep-set convictions, high and lofty notions of his duties
and work. With clear vision he saw the weak spots in the structure of the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy and with relentless determination he set himself to
repair them and weld the country into a cohesive whole by timely and just
concessions, resisting with unflinching will the disintegrating
influences.[1] He maintained that he was keenly desirous of preserving and
improving friendly relations with Great Britain. [1] This work was ably
continued by Count Tisza, Hungary's present Prime Minister.
His visits to England must be viewed as efforts in this direction. He talked
on Austria's Balkan policy; be denied any political ambitions there, but
freely admitted that Austria-Hungary had commercial interests there. If
Austria-Hungary had political ambitions, she would never have renounced her
right-as she did-of garrisoning the Sanjak of Novibazar. There was a thinly
veiled admission in the published interview of Saloniki being considered as
important for Austro-Hungarian commercial expansion. I published the article
in the Daily Chronicle of London (September or October, 1910). It created a
profound sensation all over Europe, but particularly in southeastern Europe.
It now remains for me but briefly to summarize the more important diplomatic
moves of the years 1911-14, until the outbreak of the war. In the moves that
were executed behind the scenes since 1911, I had no direct part. I quitted
Diplomatic Espionage in 1911, but, of course, I kept up my interest in
international politics and rivalry.
I had considerable business interests in Galicia and Rumania and traveled a
great deal. Occasionally I would stop at Brussels or Paris, or in some Balkan
capital, look up old acquaintances, friends and "channels," discussing with
them the diplomatic questions of the moment, so it was really not difficult
for me to know what was being enacted behind the scenes.
The outstanding event of international importance in 1910 was the meeting of
the Tzax and Kaiser at Potsdam. At the time, as is always the custom, the
dignitaries and the minor officials of the two countries interested denied
that any importance was attached to the meeting. The fact is—and I have it
from the best possible source—that it was of the most far-reaching
importance. Russian statesmen came to realize that the Anglo-Russian Treaty
was a very onesided arrangement and particularly instead of helping Russia to
an outlet on the Persian Gulf it effectively debarred her from reaching it.
Russian statesmen clearly saw that Russia was being used for the purposes of
British policy and British schemes without any compensating advantages. They
could not reach the Gulf and even in the Balkans, whither they were pushed by
the British scheming, they did not get the desired and justly expected
support from England. Was not Russia deeply humiliated in 1908 and 1909 over
the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina? So Russia decided to turn to Germany.
If but Russian statesmen had persisted in their course, the present war would
certainly have been avoided. The Potsdam meeting resulted in the famous but
mysterious "Potsdam Agreement." The cardinal stone of the agreement is to be
found in the following secret clause now given to the world for the first
time: "Germany and Russia each undertakes to remain aloof from any
combination of Powers that has any aggressive tendency against the other in
finding an opening on the Persian Gulf."
This one clause alone virtually meant the breaking up of the Triple Entente.
Germany was glad to enter into this agreement -with Russia, for several
reasons: Germany desired to live in peace with all her neighbors; she
believed a close political cooperation between Germany and Russia might, nay,
would, bring about the Kaiser's long sought reconciliation between France and
Germany; more than this, it would provide an effective means to negative
Great Britain's arrogant pretensions to world domination.
I remarked in an earlier chapter that whenever two or more of the great
Powers enter into an arrangement about a third weaker and smaller country,
one of the first results will be disorders in that small country. So it was
this time. There was a big upheaval in Persia, indeed, in 1911, British
control of the Gulf seemed seriously threatened, and British-Indian troops
were sent to Southern Persia. Great Britain and France were decidedly nervous
over the Potsdam Agreement, the former seeing in it an impossibility of
isolating Germany, the latter a postponement of the "war of revenge" for the
"lost" provinces. Both got busy to upset it and so prevent the understanding
between Russia and Germany from developing. To this end various moves were
undertaken.
The reader will remember the Franco-German Agreement of 1909 about Morocco.
Sir Edward Grey now seized this instrument, designed to bring two neighborly
nations together, and actually made it into an instrument of war. For let it
be known that it was chiefly Grey and Sir Francis Bertie's intrigues in Paris
which made the agreement a dead letter. The secret archives of the British
Embassy will prove this. The intention of Grey was to drive matters to a head
between France and Germany and thus bring about war between the two, France
assisted by Russia. British troops were ready to be embarked and landed in
Belgium (1911). It was with the knowledge of this intended violation of
Belgian neutrality by England that Holland in this year launched a project to
fortify Flushing. The tremendous outcry against it in the British and French
press will now be understood. Sir Edward Grey put up Lloyd George to make a
threatening war speech against Germany (the Mansion House speech, London,
21st of July, 1911).
M. Caillaux, one of the most far-seeing of French statesmen, desired and
worked for a Franco-German entente, but Great Britain foiled it and ousted
Caillaux from office. Now, as then, it was England who caused war and enmity.
In this very year of 1911, von Tirpitz agreed to fix the proportion of the
British and German navies at 16 to 10. What clearer proof than this could
Germany give of the absolute sincerity of her repeated declaration that her
navy was for defensive purposes only? This newer outbreak of the Morocco
crisis-the work of England—did not result in war—to the great disappointment
of Sir Edward Grey. That this last statement is no mere surmise may be
gathered from a comparison of the language used in Downing Street, Quai
d'Orsay, and Wilhelmstrasse.
France and Germany were desirous to discuss the incident tete-a-tete in a
conciliatory way; England thunders, threatens. Sir Edward Grey explicitly
intimates Great Britain's "desire to take part in the discussions of a matter
which very directly concerns important British interests of various kinds."
And he gives Germany to understand that "apart from the support of France
from which there can be and will be no swerving, England has interests of her
own and will not recognize any arrangement to which she was no party."
Now, gentle reader, stop here for a moment. I need not point out the menacing
tone of the language employed, and I am quoting the exact words; I should
like to dwell on another aspect. First, the time chosen for this threatening
attitude. It was the time when two neighborly nations—France and Germany-were
willing to sit down around a table in a conciliatory mood to compose their
differences. You can see that hand! Grey did not want France and Germany to
become friends; he had designated France and the manhood of France for other
purposes! But I want quite particularly to call attention to the Closing
sentence of Grey's threat: "He will not recognize any arrangement to which
she was no party." But when Germany said the same thing in 1905 about the
Morocco agreement of the previous year, the Anglo-French Treaty of April,
1904, she was called the marplot of Europe. Whom did England ask or notify
when she divided Persia between Russia and herself in the Anglo-Russian
Treaty of August 31, 1907? England, it seems, arrogates to herself the right
to dominate the whole world without let or hindrance.
The threatening and domineering attitude of England during this Morocco
crisis would have plunged Europe and the world into war—as Lloyd George
threatened Germany—but for an unforeseen event. Italy long cast envious eyes
across the Mediterranean. She was elbowed out of Tunis by France and hence
she decided on Tripoli. She missed her time in 1908, and so desiring to
profit from the international situation she decided to filch away Tripoli
from Turkey. She declared war on Turkey on September 29th. This event—the
Turkish question has always been the bugbear of European
diplomatists—postponed for the time being the great European war.
France and Germany met, discussed their differences, and entered into the
(second) FrancoGerman Agreement (November 4th, 1911). England and Russia had
their attention directed towards the Near East, both considering themselves
(at that time) the rightful heirs of the Turkish Empire. Indeed, when in
November, 1911, Italy, in the course of war, made preparations to attack the
Dardanelles, or at least to blockade them, Russia interfered and declared
quite plainly that she would not permit it. France would have supported
Russia, as French and Italian interests and policy in the Mediterranean are
antagonistic, which was clearly revealed by several incidents during the
TurcoItalian War and by the traditional backing of Greece by France. Of such
"harmonious" elements is the Quadruple Entente of the present war made!
I have repeatedly pointed out during my narrative the reasons and objects of
the Anglo-Russian Treaty. I particularly emphasized England's aim to draw
Russia away from the Far East and push her into the Balkans. It will be
recollected that I pointed out-among other things-that England desired a free
hand in Central Asia, hence Russia had to be occupied elsewhere—in the
Balkans-for this would inevitably bring to clash Russo-Austrian interests.
This constituted one of the corner-stones of British intrigue, policy, and
diplomacy. An energetic Russian advance in Balkan politics would also prevent
the consummation of the growing Russo-German understanding. Two moves, or
rather three moves, in 1911 testify to this.
The first was Germany "recognizing North Persia as a Russian sphere of
influence and providing German capital to assist in the building of a Russian
railway from Teheran to Khanikin, on the Turco-Persian frontier."
England had to do something first, to counteract this growing intimacy
between Russia and Germany in the Gulf; second, indeed, to separate the two
Powers. To achieve this, England started a very important move on the
Balkans, i.e., to form a, Balkan League. The popular idea is that it was
Russia who initiated or conceived the Balkan League. Others say it was
Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister. Both are wrong. It was a Mr. Bourchier,
the Balkan correspondent of the London Times, who conceived and initiated the
formation of the Balkan League. It was in December of 1911 that Mr. Bourchier
saw M. Milovanovitsch, Foreign Minister of Servia, and broached to him a
comprehensive scheme of a Balkan League. I lay emphasis on the adjective
comprehensive. For it is not unknown to me that Mons. Milovanovitsch previous
to this saw Mons. Gueschoff, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, at a secret
interview when a possible Bulgar-Servian agreement was discussed. I also know
that Milovanovitsch touched upon the idea—for such it was then—when he saw
Sazonoff during his visit to Petrograd. An all-embodying scheme of a Balkan
League, however, was first propagated by the Times correspondent. Indeed, it
was Mr. Bourchier who served as a go-between between Milovanovitsch and
Gueschoff, Gueschoff and Venizelos.
It was also Mr. Bourchier who sounded the Greek Patriarch at
Constantinople, Joachim III, and the Bulgarian Exarch as to their attitude
toward a Balkan League. All this was done with the greatest possible
secrecy—as they thought! Perhaps however Mr. Bourchier will remember now, as
he thinks it over, one of the guides who accompanied him and M. Venizelos.
One of the muleteers, I mean, who. accompanied them on that lovely May
morning in 1912 when they took an early ride on mulebacks over the slopes of
Pelion. Was it not on the summit that Venizelos gave his consent to the
scheme? Does he remember what Venizelos told him? Does he know who the
mule-teer in question was? I daresay not but I rather fancy I do!
Now this Balkan League was directed against Turkey and Austria-Hungary; in
other words, against Germany; and it was the work of England. Russia stood
godfather to it once it was finished, having aided its accomplishment, but it
was originated by Bourchier. How necessary it was—from the English point of
view—to draw away Russia from the Far East was once more vividly brought home
to English statesmen in January, 1912, when Russia invaded outer Mongolia.
This was preceded by a secret Russo-Japanese Treaty, notwithstanding the
Anglo-Japanese Treaty renewed in July, 1911. This sinister activity of Russia
in the Far East, her pact with Germany in the Gulf, the signing of the second
Franco-German Agreement, all brought forcefully out the bankruptcy of Grey's
policy and diplomacy.
He veered round and sent Haldane to Berlin. This was in February, 1912. Dates
are important, as will be clear presently. The Haldane negotiations were
continued in London, between Grey and Count Metternich, German Ambassador.
Germany was willing and did several times modify her attitude, her proposals,
but alas I Grey Is mind was poisoned against Germany, and as soon as the
danger had passed he deliberately frustrated the Anglo-German negotiations.
Grey refused to meet Germany half way, "fearing he might offend France and
Russia." In these words of Grey (and these are the actual words he used), the
criminal designs of Grey's policy are glaringly revealed. But, I can hear
some reader interjecting, but why should he send Haldane to Berlin to
negotiate if he did not want to conclude an agreement with Germany?
The Russian menace was the sole cause of Grey's Anglo-German negotiations. He
continued these negotiations as long as he was uncertain of Russia. Indeed,
he would have gone to any lengths with Germany against Russia. But when his
schemes in the Balkans matured, he knew that he had Russia in the hollow of
his hand.
I said above that dates are important. Certainly they are. Haldane went to
Berlin in February and the negotiations were continued in London until May.
In March, 1912, the Bulgar-Servian Treaty was signed. In April, the treaty
between Greece and Bulgaria and in May the Serb-Greek Treaty was signed. The
Balkan League was a fait accompli. The work for Russia was cut out. The
cleverly engineered antagonism between Russia and Austria-Hungary was driven
to a climax. The Triple Entente were ready for war and war came. On October
8, 1912, the first Balkan War was declared-it was a war more against
Austria-Hungary than Turkey. The Serb-Bulgar Treaty contained a, clause
against Austria.
And what did Germany and Austria-Hungary do? These so-called military
nations, who are continually on the look-out for bloodshed and conquest? They
worked for peace, as Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith publicly and repeatedly
declared in the House of Commons. Will any intelligent student of history
deny that had Austria-Hungary stationed only five army corps on the Danube,
Servia would have been defeated by the Turks in Macedonia and the whole
Balkan War would have ended disastrously for the Balkan League? Or if
Austria-Hungary had attacked Italy in 1911 when Italy was busy with the
Turks? But Austria-Hungary does not attack her ally when that ally is busy
with other enemies. Such conduct was reserved for Italy!
Yes, Austria-Hungary did something in the first Balkan War; she permitted
Servia and Montenegro to treat the Saiajak of Novibazar as Turkish territory
and join forces there, which was of incalculable strategical advantage. And
who brought the first Balkan War abruptly to an end at a time when the
crowning victory of capturing Constantinople was within the grasp of the
Bulgarian? Who? England and Russia! They prohibited Bulgaria following up her
victories! They actually called her to stop at Tchadaldja!
Russia, "the Mother of All Slavdom," certainly. Russia is quite in favor of
the Southern Slavs fighting battles. That is her whole interest in them.
Russian intrigues and Russian breach of faith caused the Second Balkan War.
Sazonoff by denying the existence of the secret treaty of 1902 between Russia
and Bulgaria, the former guaranteeing the integrity of Bulgarian territory,
enabled Roumania, to stab Bulgaria in the back and occupy the territory
Turtukaia-Baltchik.
The Treaty of Bucharest, which ended the Second Balkan War—the work of the
Triple Entente—left sores everywhere. I was at the time in Bucharest and I
predicted then and there a European war within two years. It actually came
exactly a year afterward. The Russian Minister, Hartwig, relentlessly pursued
his anti-Austrian intrigues in Belgrade. The rest is known, how England—from
the very first—backed up Russia at all costs, and how this and this alone
precipitated the present war. If the Parliamentary Commission suggested by me
will be appointed and will do its work honestly and fearlessly, then the
world need not wait till future generations to learn the true history of the
present war. I have told it in this present volume and I challenge the
British Government to refute me. I cannot conclude this chapter more
fittingly than by quoting from an inspired editorial of the London Times on
July 31, 1911, which, by the way, effectively disposes of the Belgian pretext.
"A German advance through Belgium into the north of France might enable
Germany to acquire possession of Antwerp, Flushing, and even Dunkirk and
Calais, which might then become German naval bases against England.
"France does not threaten our security. A German victory over France would
threaten it irremediably. Even should the German navy remain inactive, the
occupation of Belgium and Northern France by German troops would strike a
crushing blow at British security. We should then be obliged alone, and
without allies, to bear the burden of keeping up a fleet superior to that of
Germany and of an army proportionately strong. This burden would be ruining
us. The instinct of self-preservation, therefore, compels us to be ready to
strike with all our force for our own safety, and for that of our friends."
Here you have British policy in a nutshell!
In the next chapter I shall describe an unsuccessful attempt to do naval and
military espionage for Germany in England since the outbreak of the war.
pps. 165-234
--[cont]--
Aloha, He'Ping,
Om, Shalom, Salaam.
Em Hotep, Peace Be,
Omnia Bona Bonis,
All My Relations.
Adieu, Adios, Aloha.
Amen.
Roads End
Kris
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