---- Original Message -----
From: Para [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Tuesday, August 31, 1999 1:40 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: MI6 & the Media
MI6 & the Media
- SUPER SLEUTHS -
The allegation that Sunday Telegraph editor
Dominic Lawson is an MI6 spy has raised the
spectre of links between the media
and intelligence services.
A former agent, who cannot be named,
provides a compelling insight.
========================================
"M16 has an entire highly secret department
dedicated to manipulating media opinion"
========================================
Journalism and spying have a long and intertwined history.
Graham Greene and Somerset Maugham are just two of the
better-known journalists who have crossed the blurred line into
the intelligence world. Both professions have a great deal in
common, benefit each other and compete with each other.
Inevitably there always has been, and always will be, close
contact between the two sides.
Until the recent allegation in the House of Commons by the
Labour M.P. Brian Sedgemore, that Dominic Lawson, editor
of the Sunday Telegraph, is a paid agent of MI6, the extent
of the co-operation between M16 and elements of the British
media has been a keenly guarded secret, kept quiet even
within MI6 itself.
Lawson denies the allegation, but there is nothing particularly
wrong with journalists mixing in the intelligence world and using
spies as sources, as long as the information from such sources is
treated with the same scepticism and impartiality as information
from any other source.
However, clearly there is everything wrong with a journalist or
worse an editor, acting as an agent of a state intelligence service,
particularly one as politically unaccountable as MI6.
Most Western governments recognise the dangers of such
collaboration and have strict rules and guidelines governing the
degree of contact between their intelligence services and their media.
Even the CIA, which wields more power in its country's policies
than most other Western intelligence services, is prohibited from
cultivating contacts in the American media.
But no such strictures apply to MI6. Indeed, MI6 has an entire
department, known as "Information Operations", or "I/Ops" for
short, dedicated to manipulating media opinion. The existence
and operations of I/Ops are kept secret even within MI6 itself,
such is its obvious sensitivity.
Normally, it is only when officers reach a relatively senior level
and are posted overseas that they are briefed into its activities
and key assets.
The scope and objectives of information operations performed
by the intelligence services are varied and often highly imaginative.
The bread-and-butter work is in massaging public opinion into
accepting controversial foreign policy decisions. The plethora of
media stories about Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological
weapons capability was no accident - the ante was upped so that
there would be less of a public outcry when the bombs started to
fall. Sometimes the objective may be to influence events in another
country or organisation in a direction favourable to Britain.
For example, MI6 made a determined (but unsuccessful) effort to
plant discrediting stories in the American press about Boutros
Boutros Ghali, whom they regarded as dangerously Francophile,
in the run up to the 1992 elections for UN secretary-general.
Often, the intelligence Services may use information operations
simply to defend themselves against criticism or public hostility.
They worry about their public image, not only because they need
political support to justify their existence and budgets, but also
because it affects staff morale. They therefore expend considerable
energy behind the scenes to ridicule their critics and publish their
successes.
The results of these tactics can be seen in the ferocious attacks in
certain newspapers on those who publicly criticise the intelligence
services, such as former M15 officer David Shayler. It is no
coincidence that the same newspapers carry an abundance of "scoop"
stories on intelligence-related matters.
So how exactly do intelligence services manipulate the media to their
own ends? Three main tactics are used to get what the intelligence
services want us to believe into the press or on to our TV screens.
The first and most straightforward is simply to give off-the-record
briefings to trusted journalists. We see the results of these briefings
regularly in our media, referred to obliquely as "intelligence sources".
Such sourcing is so omnipresent in the British press that we tend to
accept the veracity of the information without challenge.
However, the intelligence services cannot afford to lose the trust of
their media contacts, or the public at large, so a basic rule is never,
or at least rarely, spread false information using this method. This rule
is only broken if the stakes are particularly high or the chances of the
story being disproven are negligible.
The second tactic used by the intelligence services to persuade the
media to run a story is slightly more subtle - the "double source".
This tactic, more difficult to manage and set up, is used particularly
to spread disinformation and misleading stories. A tantalising titbit is
first fed to a journalist by an intelligence officer in the normal way
but with the caveat that it is a "rumour", or "not reliably sourced".
That way if the information is subsequently exposed to be untrue,
the trust between the intelligence officer and his media contact is
not prejudiced. But the intelligence officer goes home after the
meeting smug in the knowledge that any reputable journalist will
seek corroboration for the story.
It is not uncommon for the media and intelligence services to
share the same sources and so frequently a journalist will seek
corroboration from a source already under the control of the
intelligence services.
Whereas the media use their sources only passively ie, to extract
information, the intelligence services will persuade that same
source, or agent in their terms, to act proactively. They will
persuade the agent to give the journalist a misleading story that
will corroborate the "rumour" planted a few days earlier.
With the story now apparently independently confirmed, even
the most sceptical and impartial journalist will accept the line
first put to him by the intelligence officer and so the story will
end up in the media. This technique, and more complicated
variations on it, are regularly used by MI5 and MI6 to plant
stories.
The BBC's Panorama programme has regularly been a victim
of such operations.
Arguably, there is nothing much wrong with the intelligence
services manipulating the media in this way It is a tactic used,
in one variation or another, by any public relations company
or spin doctor.
But it is the third tactic that clearly crosses into dangerous
moral territory.
The recruitment of Dominic Lawson - if true - is a spectacular
example of this.
Alas, it is probably not the only one.
The intelligence services are always on the lookout to recruit
people with influence in the media. This way a story can be
proactively directed by the intelligence officer, rather than
diluted by the judgement of the journalist.
The agent can then be used to influence the views of his
colleagues or even double-source other journalists.
How do the intelligence services go about recruiting such
assets?
Virtually every journalist working in the field of politics,
defence or international affairs will at some stage in their
careers meet, either socially or professionally, a member
of the intelligence services. They may not necessarily know
they have done so, because the officer will be working
undercover. M16 officers have been known to work in
British embassies overseas as embassy press officer because
the job gives them access to so many journalists.
At the first meeting, perhaps at a social function, the intelligence
officer will make an assessment of the target journalist's access
to useful information, his psychological make-up, his political
leanings, his influence and potential usefulness. Then the
journalist will be traced on the internal computer system
(to check that he or she does not already have a personal file)
and a record of that meeting will be written up.
>From that moment he or she will have a personal file, which
will be added to every time his or her path crosses that of the
intelligence service.
Virtually every journalist working in areas of professional
interest to the intelligence service will have a file.
Most targets will be rapidly dismissed as unrecruitable. They will
be either too principled, regarded as ideologically unsound,
unreliable, or indiscreet. But if they are judged to be recruitable,
then the intelligence officer will arrange a series of meetings, all
the while sticking to the cover under which contact was first made.
Sometimes a second officer will be introduced to get a second
opinion. MI5 and Special Branch records will be called up and
reviewed and the opinions of friends and colleagues will be gleaned.
Once a detailed profile of the target is built up - and this may
take several years - a decision is taken to attempt a conscious
recruitment. This decision is not taken lightly The consequences
of a recruitment attempt being rebuffed are far more serious in
the case of a journalist than any other target, simply because he
has the means to turn the tables and publicise the attempt.
Careful consideration is given to what motivation the journalist
may have to work for the intelligence service.
The final clearance to attempt a recruitment of a junior journalist
would be given in-house by a relatively senior officer.
Only if there were a risk of political embarrassment to the
government would a submission be put to the Foreign Secretary
to seek permission for the attempt.
Certainly there is no way that MI6 would ever contemplate
seeking permission to recruit a serving newspaper editor - it
would certainly never be signed off by any Foreign Secretary.
However, if an editor had been recruited early in his career,
before his rise through the ranks, M16 would not be obliged
to inform the Foreign Secretary of the new situation.
Assuming the target accepts, the usual operational practice is
to give the new "agent" an immediate assignment. That way,
it makes it harder for the agent subsequently to back down,
and it also gives the officer a chance to assess the ability and
commitment of his new charge.
The sort of tasks given to the recruited journalist will depend
upon his job, his position and his seniority.
A junior journalist would probably be used mostly for
double-sourcing, or spreading disinformation. As he became
more trusted, and rose up the journalistic career path, he
would have more influence and prestige so the tasks given to
him would change.
More often, he would be asked to lead a breaking story and
be given more sensitive scoops.
If the intelligence service were lucky enough to have one of
their agents promoted to an editorship, the possibilities would
be endless. An editor clearly holds considerable influence over
his newspaper's readership, and this is a most powerful advantage
to the intelligence service. But editors also have considerable
influence in Fleet Street and indeed in the wider media.
An editor can be persuaded to wine and dine other influential
editors, pushing a particular angle on a story, in a way that MI6
cannot do directly themselves. For example, senior M16 officers
rarely dare invite other newspaper editors to a private lunch -
and it would be unlikely that an editor would accept.
But presented with a lunch invitation from a rival colleague,
most newspaper editors are far too intrigued at the motive to
decline, giving MI6's man the opportunity to develop a
favourable story
Editors also have the opportunity to offer cover to MI6
agents travelling overseas under cover as journalists. Under
the guise of a journalist, an MI6 officer would have access
to individuals and areas of conflict that would be closed to
diplomats or government officials. Although the officer will
generally try to stick to freelance cover, it is useful to have
the backing of a commissioning editor who can be relied
upon to provide a reference should someone become suspicious.
The extent of the collaboration, unwitting or otherwise,
between our media and the intelligence services will probably
never be fully uncovered, but there is clearly danger in the murk.
It would perhaps be more acceptable if our intelligence
services were fully accountable to our democratic systems
so that at least elected politicians, rather than MI6 officers
themselves, were setting the objectives and parameters of
information operations.
But proper accountability of the intelligence services still
seems some way off.
Until that date, we can only hope that the recent negative
publicity around the Lawson allegations will persuade journalists
who are intertwined with the intelligence services quietly
to extricate themselves.
=================== end =================
MUST SEE ALSO:
CIA: THE USE OF JOURNALISTS
pages at Mario's Cyberspace Station
The most comprehensive source
related to the use of journalists by
the intelligence agencies
http://mprofaca.cro.net/ciapress.html
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