-Caveat Lector-

from:
http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/te/2898/1.html
<A HREF="http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/te/2898/1.html">Only NSA can
listen, so that's OK</A>
-----

Only NSA can listen, so that's OK
Duncan Campbell  01.06.99



Export version of Lotus Notes provides trapdoor for NSA.



Giant US software manufacturer Lotus has been lowering the profile of
information about how they have installed an NSA-only trapdoor into
e-mail and conference systems used by many European governments,
including the German Ministry of Defence, the French Ministry of
Education and Research and the Ministry of Education in Latvia.



Last week in Brussels, Lotus staged a lavish "Global Government Forum"
to try and gain more government customers for its software. They
succeeded in striking a new 500,000 user deal with the Russian Ministry
of Higher and Professional Education for the development of a new
information infrastructure for the Russian education system. Yet another
conference, Lotus Eurosphere '99, will be held in Berlin in October.

Lotus claims that its systems are inherently more secure than those from
its main rival, Microsoft.
However, although details of how the NSA trapdoor works can still be
found in some corners of the web (see  IBM Redbook, Page 80 ), the key
technical papers and press releases which reveal how Lotus worked with
NSA to build a special trapdoor into the International Edition of Lotus
Notes have disappeared from the web.

Visitors to the security pages on Lotus's  website are now told that the
export version of Lotus Notes uses "a system approved by the US
government called "Workgroup Differential" and "encrypt(s) information
using 64 bit keys".

The name "Workgroup Differential" is meaningless. The correct title is
"Differential Workfactor Cryptography". The "differential workfactor"
means that the US National Security Agency can break the code on Lotus
Notes private messages 16 million times faster than anyone else.

How "Differential Workfactor Cryptography" works was revealed by Lotus
itself three years ago. Although the documents concerned have now
disappeared from the web, Telepolis has obtained copies.

In a keynote speech to the RSA Data Security Conference on 17 January
1996, Ray Ozzie, President of Lotus designers Iris Associates revealed
how Lotus had come to terms with American government export controls,
which prohibited the export of cryptographic systems with a key length
over 40 bits.

He told them that no-one regarded this as secure:



"Our customers have lost confidence in 40-bit crypto. They told us that,
if we were going to continue to market 40-bit Lotus Notes overseas, we
should stop marketing it as a secure system -- that we should start to
call it "data scrambling" or "data masking" instead of encryption".





Lotus's answer was a system that let NSA easily read foreign users'
e-mail, while improving security against other eavesdroppers. In a paper
distributed to the RSA conference, Security Project Leader Charles
Kaufman explained in detail how the system worked.

When sending e-mail messages, Lotus uses a 64 bit key. But in export
editions, 24 bits of the key are broadcast with the message, reducing
the effective key length to 40 bits. The 24 bits are encrypted using a
public key created by the NSA. This is called the Workfactor Reduction
Field. Only NSA can decrypt the information in the Workfactor Reduction
Field. Once the key length is reduced to 40 bits, fast modern computers
can break the code in seconds or minutes.

Only Americans could think that this was an advantage for the Lotus
system. In 1996, Kaufman also revealed that Notes had to be weakened
even further to prevent users from simply removing the NSA backdoor from
being sent along with their messages. To prevent foreign users tampering
with the workfactor reduction field, the International Edition of Lotus
Notes will refuse to decipher any message which does not contain the
correct field. To check this means that the entire key to the message
has to be transmitted in the message. The recipient's software then
checks that the workfactor reduction field is present and correct. The
fact that the full key is sent along with the message creates the
possibility of a second backdoor, reducing further.

Since these papers were presented openly, European governments have
become aware of the enormous scale of communications monitoring by the
NSA, and by the  Echelon network in particular. The loophole in Lotus
Notes made front page news in Sweden in November 1997. Although the
company did not deny the allegation, they claimed that the American
government would not "misuse" them.



Since the row in Sweden, both Lotus and RSA have removed the 1996 papers
from their web sites. Another Lotus employee claimed "we haven't
weakened the security of international encryption, but actually made it
equal to the US security (to everyone but the NSA). We are proud of this
arrangement" (our emphasis).

Only Americans could think that this was an advantage for the Lotus
system. From the European perspective, the greatest threat may be
economic and political espionage by NSA. With Lotus bent on increasing
its markets in Europe, there must be serious questions about whether
users are being told the whole truth about security.





------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright © 1996-99 All Rights Reserved. Alle Rechte vorbehalten
Verlag Heinz Heise, Hannover
last modified: 08.06.99
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