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<A HREF="http://jya.com/msnsa-not.htm">MSNSA Not News</A>
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6 September 1999

See related: http://jya.com/msnsa.htm
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/1999/sept99/rsapr.htm



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From: "Brian Gladman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "UK Crypto List" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NSA key in Windows
Date: Mon, 6 Sep 1999 14:23:33 +0100

I am always surprised about just how long it takes to recognise the
political implications of simple technological decisions. The Microsoft CAPI
issue is well over ***three years old*** and to illustrate this here is a
URL for a paper that I wrote in early 1996 to try and get action from the UK
government and from the EU when this issue first arose:

    http://www.seven77.demon.co.uk/capi.pdf [HTML below]

In my view the real issue here is not an NSA backdoor (I doubt that one
exists in the form postulated) but rather the principle that Microsoft
should allow the US government to impose its cryptographic export controls
on other sovereign countries by controlling access to the relevant
interfaces for integrating cryptographic Service Providers (CSPs) into
Windows.

When this was topical back in 1996 I objected vigorously to this approach
(with ***support*** from GCHQ/CESG!)   It took a lot of effort but the UK,
at least, did establish a Microsoft UK based capability for signing
cryptographic modules separate from that in the US.

I might also add that I had access in the UK to the Microsoft CSPDK
(Cryptographic Service Provider Developer Kit) in 1997 and the keys now
being discussed were openly a part of the CSPDK at the time.   If this was
an NSA backdoor then they did not make a very good job of hiding it!

Hence, while I believe that Microsoft should be criticised for allowing
itself to be used by the US government to impose extra-territorial controls
on crypto, I am very doubtful that they co-operated in the provision of any
backdoor of the form now proposed.

          Brian




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6 September 1999. Thanks to Brian Gladman
Source: http://www.seven77.demon.co.uk/capi.pdf (69K, 7 pp.)



------------------------------------------------------------------------

The International Cryptography Experiment
The Third Workshop

Dr. B. R. Gladman, 7th Draft, 22nd February 1996
US Government Controls on the Microsoft Cryptographic Application
Programming Interface


A Paper for the ICE Workshop by Dr Brian Gladman
1. Introduction


Recently Microsoft have published a Cryptographic Application
Programming Interface (CAPI) for 32 bit applications running on Windows
NT (and, possibly, Windows 95). This interface will be provided as a
part of the 32 bit applications interface and will allow separate
Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) modules to be plugged into these
operating systems.

Microsoft has announced its intention to digitally sign supplier
provided CSP modules for two reasons:

•To allow the integrity of supplied CSP modules to be checked by the
operating system;
•To ensure that CSP modules comply with United States export controls on
cryptography and cryptographic interfaces.


The first of these requirements is straightforward and sensible and will
not be discussed further here. The second reason for signature is,
however, contentious for reasons which will be discussed below.

This paper is concerned, in particular, with the impact of the Microsoft
proposals on CSP suppliers and users outside the United States and
Canada.
2. Background


It is well known that many nations control the provision, use, import
and export of cryptographic and related products. The extent of these
controls vary from one nation to another but a common practice is that
of controlling the export of such products without constraining directly
any domestic provision or use. This is the situation in the United
States, the United Kingdom and a number of European countries.

It is less well understood that these export control laws not only
constrain cryptographic and related products but also any products which
are specifically designed to interface to, or integrate with,
cryptographic products. In effect, therefore, the very principle of
openly available Cryptographic Application Programming Interfaces (CAPI)
is in direct conflict with the existing export control provisions in
many countries. Thus, to integrate a CAPI into their operating systems
 without making them subject to export control Microsoft has had to
establish some rigorous CAPI control procedures.

It is important to recognise that this situation is not of Microsoft’s
making. In publishing and promoting a CAPI for use with their products
Microsoft has gone as far as it can under US law to establish an
improved basis for the provision of cryptographic information security
when using their products. The procedures discussed below are the
provisions which the United States administration has imposed in order
that Microsoft can offer their operating systems in world markets
without being subject to US export controls.

For these reasons nothing in this paper should be seen as in any way
critical of Microsoft’s efforts to advance the state of the art in this
vitally important area.
3. Planned Controls on CSP Providers


In announcing its CAPI Microsoft has indicated its intentions in respect
of the relationship between Microsoft and the prospective suppliers of
independent CSP modules. The actions required are different in each of
the three situations set out in the following sub-paragraphs.

3.1 CSPs Produced in the United States and Canada for Domestic Use

•The CSP Software Development Kit (SDK) is freely available without
export control.
•Microsoft will sign a CSP module without US (or other) government
involvement.


3.2 CSPs Produced in the United States and Canada for Export

•The SDK is freely available without export control.
•Microsoft will sign a CSP module given evidence of United States
government export approval.


3.3 CSPs Produced Outside the United States and Canada

•The SDK is subject to US government export control.
•The Microsoft signature on a CSP is deemed to be a ‘defense service’
provided by Microsoft to an overseas supplier and as such it is subject
to the provisions of United States export control laws.


The basis on which the United States administration will give permission
for Microsoft to sign a CSP from a supplier outside the United States or
Canada is unclear at present. In response to an earlier version of this
paper Microsoft have stated:
It is our understanding that [all] CSPs intended for sale in US or
Canada and limited to sale in that region will be eligible for
signature. No supplier should expect however that the CSP sold in the US
or Canada will be eligible for sale outside the US or Canada. That
limitation puts all suppliers on a strictly equal footing with regard to
sales in US or Canadian domestic markets.

>From this statement it seems very likely that there will be no United
States government constraints on either domestic or foreign CSP
suppliers who supply only within the US and the Canadian domestic
markets. This statement is also strongly suggestive of an intent by the
United States government to use its powers over Microsoft signature to
control the availability of good cryptography outside the United States
and Canada.

Thus, in clarifying the intent of the United States administration in
respect of US and Canadian domestic markets, this statement leaves the
position of CSP suppliers outside the United States (and Canada) unclear
in several important respects. An immediate question is:

•Will domestic and foreign CSP suppliers be treated equally by the US
administration when requests for the approval of Microsoft CSP signature
are being considered?


In practice it would be naïve to expect the United States government (or
any other government) not to act to the advantage of its domestic
companies (it is entirely reasonable that they should do so).

The controls which Microsoft propose for their CAPI will have a number
of consequences for CSP suppliers outside the United States and Canada
which will put them at a commercial disadvantage in respect of their
North American cousins. In particular they will suffer from the
following disadvantages:

•The CSP Software Development Kit is subject to US export control and
this will create a significant delay in its availability to non US and
Canadian suppliers.
•Companies outside the US and Canada have to secure the approval of both
Microsoft and the United States government before they will be allowed
to develop CSP modules capable of working with Microsoft operating
systems which implement the CAPI.
•In order to minimise the risk of nugatory investment they will have to
develop detailed plans for approval by Microsoft and the United States
government before embarking on CSP module development.
•Even when this has been done there remains a risk that Microsoft will
be unable to sign the resulting CSP because this is seen by the United
States administration as detrimental to (unspecified and unannounced) US
interests.


These factors will put suppliers outside the US and Canada at a
disadvantage in world markets because their CSP development plans will
be subject to more delay than is likely for US and Canadian suppliers.
Extra delays arise because the Microsoft Software Development Kit for
CSP modules is export controlled and this gives a US or Canadian
supplier a head start in the development process. Worse still, CSP
suppliers outside the United States and Canada need to get their plans
approved by the United States government before CSP development can even
be started.

Thus, even though Microsoft have made it clear that they will do
everything possible to reduce or eliminate the impact of these
imbalances, it seems inevitable that the existing proposals will act to
the disadvantage of overseas suppliers in these respects.

A second obvious question is:

•Will the United States administration prevent Microsoft signing strong
CSP modules developed in other countries? For example, will Microsoft be
prevented from signing CSPs for domestic use even when there is no legal
basis for constraints on such products either in the US or in the
country concerned?


The likely US position on this point is illustrated by a comment in the
Microsoft response to a request for overseas release of the CSP
Development Kit where it is suggested that signatures on CSPs will be
possible for
General purpose data encryption which would be deemed exportable from
the U.S. However, at present the U.S. allows only 40 -bit private or
512-bit public keys in exportable software, and foreign developers will
not generally limit themselves to this. CryptoAPI is not a viable
mechanism to enable strong security for general purpose data encryption.
However, it may be possible to work with foreign vendors seeking to
develop encryption systems for vertical markets in certain countries
(e.g. a medical records system for health care providers in the European
Union).

Microsoft have also indicated:
For suppliers who want to maintain the same product across all markets,
North American and everywhere else, the most attractive strategy remains
to develop CSPs outside the US or Canada and outside CryptoAPI.

This is again a clear recognition on Microsoft’s part that it will NOT
be possible to use their CAPI to support the general availability of
good cryptography outside the United States and Canada.

>From these observations it is clear that Microsoft expect the United
States administration to use its powers over Microsoft CSP signature to
constrain the development and use of cryptographic capabilities outside
the United States. Thus:
In terms of practical effect the mechanisms for the control of CSP
signature will be used by the United States administration to extend the
scope of US export controls to cover CSP modules produced for domestic
use in other countries even when there is no legal basis for such
domestic control either in the United States or in the country
concerned.
4. The Likely Market Impact of the Microsoft CAPI


The extensive and widespread use of Microsoft 32 bit operating systems
(Windows NT and Windows 95), when combined with a convenient ‘plug and
play’ interface for cryptography, is certain to have a big market impact
within the United States (and Canada).

The whole point about CAPIs is that they allow cryptography to be more
easily integrated with standard operating systems and applications and
this will mean that in the unconstrained US (and Canadian) domestic
markets there will be vigorous competition between CSP suppliers with
the result that very high quality CSP modules will be generally
available on the open market.

In contrast, in the rest of the world, the US administration will
constrain generally available cryptography capable of operating with
Microsoft products to the current 40 bit key limit which can be
circumvented by amateurs in a few days and by professionals in hours or
even minutes. Thus, whilst everyone in the United States (and Canada)
will have open access to good cryptography with Microsoft products, the
rest of the world will have nothing of any real value except in
specialised application approved by the United States administration.

Given the strength of Microsoft products within world information
systems markets we can thus expect that the US government controls on
CSP signature will lead to the following situation:

•Good cryptographic protection will be widely and openly available
within the US and Canadian domestic markets.
•Only poor cryptographic products,, or products which can be
circumvented by the United States government, will be available
elsewhere.


This in turn will lead to a national information infrastructure in the
United States which is well protected whilst the information
infrastructures of other countries (except Canada) will remain highly
vulnerable because good cryptography will not be generally available as
in the United States.
Whether by accident or design the US policy on CAPI signature will lead
to a situation in which the US national information infrastructure is
well protected whilst that of the rest of the world is wide open to easy
exploitation.

The rapid growth of electronic information exchange as the industry
norm, combined with the trend for all developed economies to become
increasingly information based, will mean that the result of this US
export control policy will be to put the economies of developed
countries increasingly at the mercy of those in the world with hostile
or criminal intent. It is hard to believe that this is truly in the
interests of the United States and it certainly isn’t in the interests
of the countries involved. No doubt this is not the intended result of
the policy but this does not make it any more acceptable.

The original intent of the export control laws, applied in unison by
many western countries, was to prevent cryptography – a critical defence
technology – getting into the wrong hands. But things have now changed.
Firstly the technology is now as important, if not more so, in the
commercial world. Secondly, as a result of the dominance of the US
companies within global information systems markets, US export controls,
in preventing this technology getting into the wrong hands, also prevent
its beneficial exploitation within many of the countries which these
laws were designed to protect.

Because of changes in world markets, defence related export controls are
now having a completely different impact from that for which they were
designed. In a modern world they have become blunt and indiscriminate
weapons which damage friends much more than they ever do enemies. An
unconstrained market in the United States (and Canada) will mean that
the hostile and criminal elements in society will easily obtain good
cryptography for use anywhere in the world. In contrast, legitimate
users in industry and commerce outside the United States (and Canada)
will not be able to obtain good products because of the controls
envisaged. We will thus be in the bizarre situation where export
controls will allow criminals and those with hostile intent easy access
to good protection whilst denying it to legitimate users!

Thus the saying ‘if cryptography is outlawed, only outlaws will have
cryptography’ will soon become true outside the United States and Canada
because of, rather than in spite of, export controls! This will serve
only to alienate those living in countries which share US values and
cannot see any reason why they should be denied the levels of protection
generally and openly available within the United States. Again, this is
a situation which cannot truly be in the interests of the United States.


These pressures have been building up for some time but the introduction
of a Microsoft CAPI is certain to have a powerful effect on global
markets and will accentuate and accelerate these developments. For this
reason it is now vital to develop CAPI control proposals which will lead
to a more balanced global market for cryptographic products.
5. Acceptable Control Provisions for International CAPIs


If the proposals set out by Microsoft are unacceptable, what form of
control could be contemplated for an International CAPI? I would suggest
the following requirements need to be met:
1. Control of the use of the CAPI within products should be subject only
to the laws of the country in which this use takes place.

2. Government control of the CAPI in the country where this use takes
place should only be exercised where this has a basis in law.

3. The use of the CAPI within operating systems and applications which
provide support via such a CAPI for separately supplied cryptographic
modules should not themselves be subject to any domestic or export
controls which apply to cryptographic and related products.

4. The provision, signature and use of cryptographic modules supporting
the CAPI should be subject only to the laws of the country in which
module suppliers and module users reside.

5. Where operating systems (or applications) suppliers provide
information, tools or technical support to aid CSP development and
integration, these are to be provided on the same basis for domestic use
1 and for use in countries which have equivalent (or more restrictive)
controls on the export and re-export of such products and equivalent (or
less restrictive) controls on their domestic use.

____________________
1 That is by a CSP supplier in the same country as the operating system
or applications supplier.


6. A CSP supplier in one country should be able to export his CSP to a
recipient in another country where the latter has equivalent (or more
restrictive) controls on the export and re-export of such products and
equivalent (or less restrictive) controls on their domestic use.

Some of these provisions, for example, the last two, would extend the
existing relationship between the United States and Canada to apply also
to other countries such as, for example, the United Kingdom.
6. An Alternative to the Microsoft Proposal


A way in which the Microsoft proposals could be changed to meet the
above principles would be for:
Microsoft subsidiaries to have the authority to digitally sign CSP
modules, subject to control only by the government of the country in
which the subsidiary resides and only then when the law of this country
requires this.

Such ‘delegated signatures’ could be restricted to those countries with
equivalent export controls to those of the United States. A proposal
along these lines should be able to meet principles 1 to 4 above and,
even without principles 5 and 6, this would be a considerable
improvement over the current Microsoft (and US government) proposals.
Whilst this alternative has been set in a Microsoft context it could
apply more generally to any companies whose products require digital
signatures.

If, in addition, principles 5 and 6 could also be established, we would
then have a much improved basis for providing adequately secure products
within the open international markets operated by and between the
democratic countries of the world.
7. Conclusions For ICE


Since ICE started there has been much technical progress in the
development of CAPI principles and there can no longer be any doubt (if
there ever was) about the technical validity of the concepts involved.

At the same time, however, it is now clear that CAPI control provisions
introduced by the United States administration could have a highly
divisive impact on the global information systems market. For this
reason we now need to make progress on the political aspects of CAPIs,
without which there is no prospect that we will be able to provide the
good cryptography which global electronic commerce and the global
information infrastructure of the next century will require.

Resolving this issue must now become a central and overt objective of
ICE.
8. Acknowledgements


My sincere thanks go to many colleagues who have commented on earlier
drafts of this paper. I am most grateful for their advice and for their
support with its overall aims. My thanks also go to my Microsoft
colleagues for their perseverance in answering my many questions during
the preparation of this paper.



------------------------------------------------------------------------

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