-Caveat Lector-

>From http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/18/international/middleeast/18CHEM.html?ex=
1030248000&en=b0ae2fbb743e693d&ei=5006&partner=ALTAVISTA1

August 18, 2002

Officers Say U.S. Aided Iraq in War Despite Use of Gas

By PATRICK E. TYLER



ASHINGTON, Aug. 17 — A covert American program during the Reagan administration
provided Iraq with critical battle planning assistance at a time when American 
intelligence
agencies knew that Iraqi commanders would employ chemical weapons in waging the
decisive battles of the Iran-Iraq war, according to senior military officers with 
direct
knowledge of the program.

Those officers, most of whom agreed to speak on the condition that they not be 
identified,
spoke in response to a reporter's questions about the nature of gas warfare on both 
sides
of the conflict between Iran and Iraq from 1981 to 1988. Iraq's use of gas in that 
conflict is
repeatedly cited by President Bush and, this week, by his national security adviser,
Condoleezza Rice, as justification for "regime change" in Iraq.

The covert program was carried out at a time when President Reagan's top aides, 
including
Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci and Gen. 
Colin L.
Powell, then the national security adviser, were publicly condemning Iraq for its use 
of
poison gas, especially after Iraq attacked Kurds in Halabja in March 1988.

During the Iran-Iraq war, the United States decided it was imperative that Iran be 
thwarted,
so it could not overrun the important oil-producing states in the Persian Gulf. It has 
long
been known that the United States provided intelligence assistance to Iraq in the form 
of
satellite photography to help the Iraqis understand how Iranian forces were deployed
against them. But the full nature of the program, as described by former Defense
Intelligence Agency officers, was not previously disclosed.

Secretary of State Powell, through a spokesman, said the officers' description of the
program was "dead wrong," but declined to discuss it. His deputy, Richard L. Armitage, 
a
senior defense official at the time, used an expletive relayed through a spokesman to
indicate his denial that the United States acquiesced in the use of chemical weapons.

The Defense Intelligence Agency declined to comment, as did Lt. Gen. Leonard Perroots,
retired, who supervised the program as the head of the agency. Mr. Carlucci said, "My
understanding is that what was provided" to Iraq "was general order of battle 
information,
not operational intelligence."

"I certainly have no knowledge of U.S. participation in preparing battle and strike
packages," he said, "and doubt strongly that that occurred."

Later, he added, "I did agree that Iraq should not lose the war, but I certainly had no
foreknowledge of their use of chemical weapons."

Though senior officials of the Reagan administration publicly condemned Iraq's 
employment
of mustard gas, sarin, VX and other poisonous agents, the American military officers 
said
President Reagan, Vice President George Bush and senior national security aides never
withdrew their support for the highly classified program in which more than 60 
officers of
the Defense Intelligence Agency were secretly providing detailed information on Iranian
deployments, tactical planning for battles, plans for airstrikes and bomb-damage
assessments for Iraq.

Iraq shared its battle plans with the Americans, without admitting the use of chemical
weapons, the military officers said. But Iraq's use of chemical weapons, already 
established
at that point, became more evident in the war's final phase.

Saudi Arabia played a crucial role in pressing the Reagan administration to offer aid 
to Iraq
out of concern that Iranian commanders were sending waves of young volunteers to
overrun Iraqi forces. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the United 
States,
then and now, met with President Saddam Hussein of Iraq and then told officials of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency that Iraq's military
command was ready to accept American aid.

In early 1988, after the Iraqi Army, with American planning assistance, retook the Fao
Peninsula in an attack that reopened Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf, a defense
intelligence officer, Lt. Col. Rick Francona, now retired, was sent to tour the 
battlefield with
Iraqi officers, the American military officers said.

He reported that Iraq had used chemical weapons to cinch its victory, one former D.I.A.
official said. Colonel Francona saw zones marked off for chemical contamination, and
containers for the drug atropine scattered around, indicating that Iraqi soldiers had 
taken
injections to protect themselves from the effects of gas that might blow back over 
their
positions. (Colonel Francona could not be reached for comment.)

C.I.A. officials supported the program to assist Iraq, though they were not involved.
Separately, the C.I.A. provided Iraq with satellite photography of the war front.

Col. Walter P. Lang, retired, the senior defense intelligence officer at the time, 
said he
would not discuss classified information, but added that both D.I.A. and C.I.A. 
officials
"were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose" to Iran.

"The use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic
concern," he said. What Mr. Reagan's aides were concerned about, he said, was that Iran
not break through to the Fao Peninsula and spread the Islamic revolution to Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia.

Colonel Lang asserted that the Defense Intelligence Agency "would have never accepted 
the
use of chemical weapons against civilians, but the use against military objectives was 
seen
as inevitable in the Iraqi struggle for survival." Senior Reagan administration 
officials did
nothing to interfere with the continuation of the program, a former participant in the
program said.

Iraq did turn its chemical weapons against the Kurdish population of northern Iraq, 
but the
intelligence officers say they were not involved in planning any of the military 
operations in
which those assaults occurred. They said the reason was that there were no major 
Iranian
troop concentrations in the north and the major battles where Iraq's military command
wanted assistance were on the southern war front.

The Pentagon's battle damage assessments confirmed that Iraqi military commanders had
integrated chemical weapons throughout their arsenal and were adding them to strike 
plans
that American advisers either prepared or suggested. Iran claimed that it suffered
thousands of deaths from chemical weapons.

The American intelligence officers never encouraged or condoned Iraq's use of chemical
weapons, but neither did they oppose it because they considered Iraq to be struggling 
for
its survival, people involved at the time said in interviews.

Another former senior D.I.A. official who was an expert on the Iraqi military said the
Reagan administration's treatment of the issue — publicly condemning Iraq's use of gas
while privately acquiescing in its employment on the battlefield — was an example of 
the
"Realpolitik" of American interests in the war.

The effort on behalf of Iraq "was heavily compartmented," a former D.I.A. official 
said,
using the military jargon for restricting secrets to those who need to know them.

"Having gone through the 440 days of the hostage crisis in Iran," he said, "the period 
when
we were the Great Satan, if Iraq had gone down it would have had a catastrophic effect 
on
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and the whole region might have gone down. That was the
backdrop of the policy."

One officer said, "They had gotten better and better" and after a while chemical 
weapons
"were integrated into their fire plan for any large operation, and it became more and 
more
obvious."

A number of D.I.A. officers who took part in aiding Iraq more than a decade ago when 
its
military was actively using chemical weapons, now say they believe that the United 
States
should overthrow Mr. Hussein at some point. But at the time, they say, they all 
believed that
their covert assistance to Mr. Hussein's military in the mid-1980's was a crucial 
factor in
Iraq's victory in the war and the containment of a far more dangerous threat from Iran.

The Pentagon "wasn't so horrified by Iraq's use of gas," said one veteran of the 
program.
"It was just another way of killing people — whether with a bullet or phosgene, it 
didn't
make any difference," he said.

Former Secretary of State Shultz and Vice President Bush tried to stanch the flow of
chemical precursors to Iraq and spoke out against Iraq's use of chemical arms, but Mr.
Shultz, in his memoir, also alluded to the struggle in the administration.

"I was stunned to read an intelligence analysis being circulated within the 
administration
that `we have demolished a budding relationship (with Iraq) by taking a tough position 
in
opposition to chemical weapons,' " he wrote.

Mr. Shultz also wrote that he quarreled with William J. Casey, then the director of 
central
intelligence, over whether the United States should press for a new chemical weapons 
ban
at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Mr. Shultz declined further comment.


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