The Thousand Conspiracy - Secret Germany Behind the Mask Paul Winkler Charles Scribner’s Sons©1943 New York 381 pps. – First Edition – Out-of-print --[5b]-- The Totalitarian Plan Between the two world wars, Germany was thus the first country to destroy, on a large scale, the effect of the stabilization of her currency, and to break away from international free trade based on gold. It was she, therefore, who supplied the "evil inspiration," and within a few months several countries followed suit. The avalanche was let loose. Finally many countries adopted a kind of "control of exchange" which became, during the period before the war, the primary obstacle to international commerce.* [* The state of war added other obstacles such as transportation difficulties and prohibitions on exporting. In addition, during the war the few countries which were still allowing free export of currency finally adopted, almost without exception, a system of more or less strict control of exchange.] The control of exchange introduced by Germany was extremely strict. A veritable financial "wall of China" was built around the country. Without this seclusion, whose rules were established and perfected under a regime still bearing the title "Republic," Hitler's totalitarian scheme could not have functioned. The new measures were part of the Prusso-Teutonics' plan, and they had definitely decided that, from that time on, the country was headed in a totalitarian direction. At that moment it was probably not yet clear in the minds of the real masters of Germany who should be entrusted with the task of putting this totalitarian orientation into practice. Although Hitler was already a serious candidate for the enviable post of "sublime henchman," and was the protege of several persons of influence, the forces running Germany from behind the scenes still, in principle, had free choice. One may well imagine that they might have put someone else in charge of the execution of an absolutely identical plan, provided that they could have found one as well qualified as Hitler to dispatch the business. It was Hitler's good fortune that at the time no other man existed in Germany who had his peculiar qualifications to put into execution the Machiavellian plan of the Prusso-Teutonics. Von Papen, who was the only other serious candidate, was simply an amateur in comparison. He did not have the qualities required of a "good professional." The "Robber Baron" Concept After the advent of Nazism only the method of a "financial wall of China" could permit German economy to be placed practically on a war basis and to work for total national rearmament. (Secret rearmament in accordance with a definite plan had never ceased since the Armistice.) It was this financial arrangement which paved the way for Hider's demagogic argument * that other nations were refusing Germany the raw materials she needed, and therefore she must conquer to get them. It was this argument that made it possible for Hitler to get his people to accept the harsh policy, "cannon instead of butter," and the sufferings of war. By virtue of the same argument he got people in certain foreign circles almost to excuse his policies because they bewailed the fate of "starving Germany."[ * If the Prusso-Teutonics had chosen another "henchman" he would have used the same argument.] We have already touched on this question, but one cannot insist too strongly on the fallacy of this line of reasoning. As long as she remained on the basis of a free financial system Germany could always have procured all the raw materials she needed. They were at her disposal in free markets throughout the world, and could be bought in a few seconds at any time by means of a simple cabled order. Countries much smaller—Belgium, for example, which was as industrialized as Germany—were also in the same position and never complained of a "dearth of raw materials" or of "lack of vital space." This dearth, this lack of vital space, was deliberately produced by a series of measures, the first of which was the introduction of control of exchange on July 13, 1931. Those who defend the German point of view try to prove that the financial panic provoked by the introduction of control of exchange was not brought about deliberately by the group ruling the affairs of Germany, and that consequently control of exchange was inevitable. The reverse is easy to prove, but even if we admit for a moment the correctness of this thesis, we must say that the solution by control of exchange as a permanent measure was the worst that could have been chosen. One may compare Germany in panic to a bank on which there is a run. Obviously, the doors must be closed for a time, but permanent closing, or opening subject to all sorts of restrictive and annoying rules imposed on patrons, would be the best way one could imagine to avoid entirely restoring normal life to the bank. One need not wonder why a bank choosing such methods goes to its ruin. The only solution by which one might hope to save a bank in straits would be to put persons in charge who inspire confidence, and start to function again by opening the cashiers' windows wide. Germany's seclusion from the normal economic world exchange was also in perfect harmony with what one would expect from "robber barons." Henceforth it was a matter of gaining possession of raw materials by force and consequent ly of the territories which produced them, even if it was possible to buy and pay for these materials with the product of one's labor, provided, of course, that one was inclined to supply such labor. Most people—and most nations—feel that this procedure is simpler, healthier and more satisfactory. The robber barons, and the powers governing Germany, felt (and still feel) exactly the opposite way. People committing acts considered dishonest under the law Dalways try to excuse these acts by saying that they have been obliged to act so because the society in which we live does not allow them to live otherwise. Just the same attitude was adopted by Germany from 1931 on; Hider merely accentuated it by developing the theme of "vital space." But the plans providing for this attitude were established long before 1931 by the powers behind the German scene. Dr. Schacht Chooses Hitler In 1930, at the time of Schacht's resignation, the Prusso-Teutonic powers did not yet seem to have chosen Hider as final executor of their schemes. The agitation which he had created in Germany had a certain utility for these aims; therefore they helped him when occasion offered but had not yet decided to entrust him with the "supreme task." If the combined Prusso-Teutonic powers had not yet made their choice, Schacht had made his. From 1930 on he was staking everything on Hitler. Known to the public as a man of democratic convictions, Schacht had in reality always been in close touch with the Prusso-Teutonics and in particular with the "heavy industry" wing of that group. He was no fool; he knew who wielded the real power in Germany. All his activity as head of the Reichsbank, the stabilization of the mark and his fruitful efforts to attract foreign capital, had been undertaken in perfect agreement with the Prusso-Teutonics. We have seen that at that time the Nazis were not in agreement with him, for they knew that stabilization and influx of foreign capital would bring order and prosperity back to the country. And nothing could have a less favorable effect on the success of their demagogic agitation than order and prosperity. No wonder, then, that they attacked Schacht's stabilization measures. Not yet admitted to the "inner councils," Hitler and his friends did not know that stabilization and the prosperity it was designed to bring about were to be of short duration, according to the intentions of the very ones who had decided on the introduction of these measures. Toward the end of his regime at the head of the Reichsbank Dr. Schacht contributed greatly to preparations for the panic which was to reach its climax in July, 1931, a year and four months after his return to private life. Attracting foreign capital no longer concerned the Prusso-Teutonics. Now they were occupied with achieving successively financial and economic autarchy in Germany and ultimately keeping the foreign capital which had been invested there. This pleased the Nazis better, since panic and privation resulting from autarchy would furnish a fertile field for their agitation. The points of contact therefore between Hitler and Schacht were quite obvious. Meetings between Schacht and Nazi leaders took place and after his departure from the Reichsbank Schacht saw Hitler personally. No Nazi again accused Schacht of being named Hajim Schachd. During March, 1930, the National Socialist deputy Feder was the only one to defend Schacht in the Reichstag while deputies of other parties attacked him for his "unmotivated" resignation which was bound to have a harmful effect upon Germany's financial prestige. Immediately after his retirement from office in 1930 Schacht procured subsidies for Hitler from his friends in heavy industry. About that time Schacht introduced Dr. Walter Funk to Hitler. Funk was to become head of economic affairs in Germany under the Hitler regime. Schacht had known Funk when the latter was a young economic journalist working chiefly for publications financed. by industrialists of the Ruhr. His presence close to Hitler represented a further guarantee to the industrialists that their plans would be faithfully executed by Hitler. Schacht and Funk had long conversations with Hider on matters concerning the economic future of Germany, and explained List's ideas to him. In this way Hitler's economic training was shaped in a direction coinciding in every particular with Prusso-Teutonic conceptions and traditions. He understood the full meaning of List's economic thesis, which recommended rigid economic isolation from the rest of the world in order to have to conquer it by force. All the speeches made by Funk from the time he began to represent Germany in the economic sphere were obviously inspired by this thesis. In the fall of 1930 Schacht set out on a journey which took him through several countries: Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and America. He went "as a private citizen" to visit his friends in banking circles. He was well received everywhere, for the halo of the stabilization still surrounded him. People did not realize that he was actually just as responsible for the recent deterioration of German finances which he had promoted from the wings. Schacht was still looked upon as a man of the Weimar Republic, a sincere democrat. Foreign bankers therefore wondered why during his trip he openly defended the Nazis and predicted a great future for them, using the Leitmotiv: "They are not as dangerous to big business as people say." On his return to Germany the National Socialist deputy von Reventlow made a speech in the Reichstag thanking the former President of the Reichsbank for having so well explained the Nazi point of view in the United States. In spite of the position taken openly by Schacht in favor of National Socialism, people were astonished when on March 17, 1933, he returned as head of the Reichsbank. Hitler had taken office only six weeks previously, on January 30. The Fuehrer had decided to allow free rein in financial matters to the man who had considerably aided his accession to power by winning confidence toward him of a section of the Prusso-Teutonic group as well as of German and foreign banking circles. Bruening's Blunder Bruening was much less "in the know" than either Schacht or Hitler. In spite of services he had consciously or unconsciously rendered the Prusso-Teutonics, Bruening was sacrificed by them in 1932. Indeed the Chancellor, though he had been obedient in the beginning to pressures to which he had been exposed, was naive enough toward the end of his term in office not to recognize the precise extent of influence exerted by the Prusso-Teutonics over the affairs of Germany. The misery of the peasant class had been aggravated as a consequence of the very measures which were enriching the Junkers. Bruening committed the tactical error of heeding his humanitarian feelings, a dangerous luxury for a German statesman. He had been moved by the peasants' misery, and to bring about a remedy had envisaged a plan of settling small farmers on land taken from poorly exploited large estates. This land would have to be condemned at prices to be determined. This Siedlungsplan, although quite modest in extent, alarmed the Junkers exceedingly. They began to conduct a campaign against Bruening, speaking of his "agrarian Bolshevism." Bruening aggravated his mistake in the eyes of the Prusso-Teutonics by retorting with a dangerous argument. To justify his plan he hinted that he would let the Osthilfe abuses be brought up again and he threatened to prosecute the people responsible for them. He ingenuously imagined that it would suffice to pronounce this threat in order to win the argument. Actually the argument was dynamite and caused an explosion. The stable Bruening regime which had lasted more than two years disappeared in a trice. Representatives of the Landbund and the Herrenklub had worked on Colonel von Hindenburg and he interceded with his father, only a few weeks after the Marshal-President's re-election in which Bruening had helped considerably. The Marshal felt a certain gratitude toward his Chancellor and was embarrassed to have to sacrifice him. But what could he do when Bruening had committed the blunder of definitely displeasing those Landbund gentlemen? And then had not Oscar remarked that if too much were said about the Osthilfe business, people would end up by wondering similarly about the circumstances under which the deed of gift to Neudeck had been made? Hindenburg called Bruening into his office and the interview ended with the latter's resignation. The Chancellor had been able to govern only with the aid of the famous "decrees of dissolution" of the Reichstag, signed in advance by the President. Since the Marshal no longer accorded him his confidence and refused to sign the necessary decrees from that time on, Bruening had to leave. Three men chiefly had contributed to Bruening's fall, three ambitious men who depended upon different sources of strength: von Papen, General Schleicher, and Hitler. They had thus succeeded in eliminating one rival who had been in their way. The problem now was for each to eliminate the other two. The Man of the Junkers Franz von Papen was the man of the Junkers, or at least, recognized their strength, intended to serve them faithfully, and derive thereby well deserved advantages. He was not a Junker himself, in the strict sense of the word, for he did not come from the eastern provinces. He was descended from a noble Westphalian family. His ancestors had participated in the terrible practices of the Fehme of Westphalia but were not part of the circle around the Teutonic Knights. Von Papen, a member of the Herrenklub, had nevertheless been accepted by the Junkers as one of them, and he conducted himself as a faithful executor of the Landbund's designs. Attache' of the German Embassy at Washington until 1916, von Papen had been responsible for numerous acts of sabotage carried out to obstruct American manufacture of armaments. He later joined detachments of the German army in Turkey and after the war became active in politics. A devout Catholic, he was at first a member of the Centrum party, the Catholic party par excellence. The n, having realized that the real power was in the hands of the Junker class, he swerved further and further away from the Centrum, whose platform opposed the Junkers', and applied himself exclusively to the promotion of Prussian policies. By reason of his Westphalian origin von Papen had close connections with the big industrialists of the Ruhr. He exerted himself therefore to strengthen the bonds long existing between Junkers and heavy industry. Not ignoring the influence which the Nazi movement appeared to be gaining in the wake of the Junker movement, he procured subsidies several times for Hider from the industrialists. In these efforts he was later matched by Schacht. Each time, of course, he acted with the full approval of his masters, the Junkers. Finally recognizing the prestige surrounding Marshal von Hindenburg and taking account of the fact that as long as he was President of the Republic he would wield great authority, von Papen attached himself particularly to his person and acquired considerable influence over him. Von Papen's intrigues contributed greatly to Bruening's fall. Member of the Centrum party like Bruening, he should normally have formed a common front with him. Actually he set a trap for him. After getting him to talk privately about his plans for dividing land into lots, he hurried to report these conversations to the Herrenklub and to Hindenburg. He gave them to understand that Bruening was promoting a policy contrary to Junker interests and that it was necessary to get rid of him. The Man of the Reichswehr General Kurt von Schleicher was above all else a soldier and in his political attitude depended chiefly on the Reichswehr. He was also considered the more or less official delegate of the army in the political world. This was the role he intended faithfully to perform. He hid in the shadow of the different governments which succeeded each other-the ever alert watch-dog over the interests of that powerful organization, the Reichswehr. His mistake was to believe that the Reichswehr was a power in itself which could get along without every other power, including the Junker class. In spite of his Prussian origin Schleicher didn't like the idea that the Reichswehr had to receive orders from the Landbund, but at the outset he did not show his displeasure. To strengthen his position he sought allies outside the Reichswehr. He believed he had found them in the persons of Gregor Strasser and Captain Roehm, two men who represented, within the Nazi party, tendencies opposed to the Junkers. Schleicher figured that Rochm, who was at the head of the 600,000 men comprising the SA, and Gregor Strasser, who came immediately after Hitler in the Nazi hierarchy, would be the real future masters of the Nazi movement. Gregor Strasser was the sincere fanatic of the movement, a direct antithesis of the Machiavellian Hider. Strasser still believed in the program represented by the name "National Socialist" and took a very censorious attitude toward the Prusso-Teutonics' hold on Germany's affairs. Gregor Strasser was, moreover, strongly influenced by his brother Otto on this subject. The latter, though clearly the more intelligent and discerning of the two brothers, did not have the prestige of Gregor because he was younger. Cognizant of Hitler's lack of sincerity and of his servile submission to the Prusso-Teutonic powers, Otto Strasser left the Nazi party in July, 1930. Gregor stayed because he imagined that with the great influence he wielded over the militant members of the party he would succeed in making his ideas triumph. Through Gregor Strasser, Schleicher hoped to secure the help of the Nazis and their parliamentary representatives who were very strong in the Reichstag. Roehm did not have the sincerity of Strasser. He was a simple adventurer, but, South German like Strasser, he disliked the strong influence of Prussian lords on German affairs. His cohorts of the SA struck terror everywhere. They were composed of hoodlums of every sort, including some elements from the Consul and Rossbach organizations. These had not been able to find other employment after dissolution of those organizations, and finding themselves abandoned by their former bosses, ended up by joining the first free gang willing to feed them. In spite of the presence of these elements on its roll, the SA, under Roehm's leadership, did not incline toward the Junkers. Roehm. figured that the Nazi party would soon be the sole force of importance in Germany. Since he was at its core with his 600,000 SA men he would wield the real power. Schleicher expected to use to advantage his identity of feeling with Strasser and Roehm on the subject of the Junkers. Certainly the Reichswehr was, to his mind, the really supreme power in Germany. But if he were to oppose the Junkers, the Nazis, especially if they were of the complexion of Gregor Strasser and Roehm, would be welcome allies. Consequently as a service to his newly acquired friends he violently opposed General Groener, War Minister in Bruening's cabinet, when Groener decided to dissolve the semimilitary organizations of the Nazis, including Roehm's SA. Groener usually acted as a man of politics rather than as a general. As for Schleicher, he knew that he could count on the full support of the Reichswehr even if there were conflict between himself and Groener. Moreover, the latter, who was not of noble birth, had always been considered by the other generals as an upstart plebeian. Schleicher now showed the generals clearly that the Nazis could be of great use to them and that the SA would end up by augmenting the Reichswehr troops. Their dissolution must be avoided at all costs. Schleicher and the Reichswehr were therefore in agreement with von Papen and the Junkers in the matter of getting rid of Bruening and Groener. This facilitated the abrupt dismissal of the Chancellor by Hindenburg, for the Marshal heeded the counsel of the Reichswehr. Von Papen and Hitler rubbed their hands. Thanks to the aid they had received from Schleicher, they had got rid of one of their rivals for power, Hitler Chooses His Masters Of the three people left in the poker game after Bruening was "cleaned out," Hitler was by far the best tactician and at the same time the most hypocritical and Machiavellian. Ever since the beginning of his career he had had but one goal: personal power. To achieve it he was always ready to make any concession or any compromise. He also knew exactly for whom to reserve these concessions and compromises, for he judged accurately the importance of powers opposing each other and figured that he should always ally himself with the strongest. Hitler knew that the democratic parties in Germany were completely paralyzed, at first as a consequence of acts of the Felime, and later because of the rise of his own party which had been effected with all the cunning of demagogism. and terror. There remained the Prusso-Teutonic group which controlled Germany's affairs to a greater and greater extent. Hitler realized that he must reckon with several divergent forces within this group. The Junker organizations, with their "professional" offshoot, the Landbund, and their "social" outgrowth, the Herrenklub appeared to be the most powerful. The bulk of the Junker class were interested only in maintaining their feudal privileges, but the secret Junker organizations, descended from the Society of Lizards, seemed to have kept alive the most fantastic, most ambitious Prussian expansion schemes. The big industrialists of Westphalia ran second. They had by this time definitely chosen their path of industrial expansion: the rearmament of Germany. Hugenberg, who controlled a powerful press and the "Deutschnazional" party in the Reichstag, was their agent. The industrialists felt inferior to the Junkers in the matter of secret organization. Their infiltration into the machinery of the State was not as complete as that of the Prussian lords. Nevertheless, they were superior in financial means. The third component of the Prusso-Teutonic group was the Reichswehr. Sprung from the same roots as the Junkers, joined to them by a thousand ties, and generously serving their interests, the Reichswehr still had an existence of its own, determined by its own professional ambition. Groener was an example of a general who had almost completely escaped the grasp of the external powers which controlled the Reichswehr. Schleicher, mouthpiece of the Reichswehr until 1933, at first had a meek attitude toward the Junkers, but later tried to save the army from their influence. These tendencies show that the army officers, proud of their professional knowledge, had at times an exaggerated opinion of the influence which their armed forces gave them in the internal political scheme, and did not always took favorably upon the role which the other elements of the PrussoTeutonic group made them play. In spite of this fancied independence, the Reichswehr on the whole was still an organic component of, and faithfully submissive to, the PrussoTeutonic group. The officials sprung from the old Prussian school, descendants direct or spiritual of "officials of the Order," did not form so coherent an entity as the Reichswehr, for example. They could be found scattered here and there throughout the machinery of administration. They could not be distinguished, on the surface, from officials of another type of a more modern and more democratic background. By now they could also be met-and this had been true for some time -well beyond Prussian frontiers, in other parts of Germany. Prussian centralization had functioned well in Germany since Bismarck's times: Prussian officials were sent all around the country and local officials were brought closer and closer to the Prusso-Teutonic type of thinking through the influence of the numerous patriotic and professional organizations under Prussian control. Not necessarily allied and related to the Junkers and officers, but sometimes merely coming from schools steeped in the old Prussian spirit, they were faithful servants, in most cases reaping the personal reward for their devotion. If they committed abuses, or closed their eyes to the abuses of others, this was always because of their devotion to what they thought-sometimes correctly, but often mistakenly—a higher German cause. Highly disciplined them selves, and disciplining others—therefore very intolerant—, highly conscious of what they called a "Prussian sense of duty," they may well be considered chiefly the victims of their traditions. They were victims as well of the dark intentions of the rest of the Prusso-Teutonic group. Characters of every background and description gravitated about the Prusso-Teutonic group, serving its interests and gaining advantages in exchange. Writers, university professors, bankers, etc., in large numbers, had realized that they could count on the success of Prusso-Teutonic plans and became their ardent propagandists. But all these folk were not an organized entity. Hitler, who sought only personal power, was therefore not in the least obliged to reckon with them as factors in the internal political scheme. Furthermore, for the same reasons he could also neglect the functionaries, in spite of their numerical importance. Hitler, who was a good judge during his entire career of the political importance of people and groups he encountered, knew that all these elements would follow him without hesitation, from the moment he succeeded in coming to terms with the three great contemporary branches of the PrussoTeutonic group: Junkers, industrialists, and Reichswehr. The Men Who Mattered In order to achieve such an arrangement, Hitler figured that he needed either to come to an agreement with the men in whom these three blocs placed their confidence, or else eliminate these men. The men who mattered were Schacht, Hugenberg, von Papen, and Schleicher. Schacht had influence over heavy industry and the banking circles which were behind this industry. Hitler knew, after his talks with Schacht in 1930, that he could thenceforth count on him unreservedly. Furthermore he himself had given Schacht and his friends absolute pledges regarding the execution of the financial and economic plan in which they were interested. Schacht had secured Hitler's promise that after he seized power Schacht would be allowed to return to the direction of the Reichsbank and would be able there to finish the job of financially isolating Germany from the rest of the world. Behind the wall of isolation, rearmament could be ceaselessly pushed and heavy industry would be generously supplied with orders. On Schacht's suggestion, Hitler was also willing to accept the service of that other faithful servant of the aims of heavy industry: Dr. Walter Funk. Schacht and Funk were to have, from then on, carte blanche in everything concerning the economic action of Nazism. (Goering later tried to eliminate Schacht, whom he considered a competitor in the economic field. Although GoerinLy himself had succeeded in establishing strong ties with the Prusso-Teutonic group, he could not get rid of Schacht completely because the latter right down to the present has been supported by big industry.) Hugenberg was the political and journalistic henchman of the industrialists. Hitler figured that he would be easy to satisfy. A post in the cabinet when Hitler succeeded to power, advantages granted his newspapers, would be sufficient to keep him quiet so that he could later be relegated to the background. Von Papen had as strong an influence over the Junkers as he had over the industrialists, and over the old Marshal as well. He had often played the role of liaison officer between all three and this had given him additional influence. Schleicher in his turn had the full confidence of the Reichswehr. Von Papen and Schleicher were therefore, in the eyes of Hitler, the two men with whom he must first reckon if he wished to prepare for his advent to power. He used his formula in connection with them first of all: either come to an agreement with them, or eliminate them. To come to an agreement with both at once seemed to him impossible. The possible grounds for understanding were different in each case. Von Papen, with whom Hitler maintained a close personal relationship, seemed entirely devoted to the feudal interests of the Junkers. On the other hand, Schleicher became more and more critical of these feudal tendencies and maintained relations with the anti-Junker wing of Hitler's own party: Strasser and Roehm. Hitler was kept informed of talks between his lieutenants and Schleicher, and Gregor Strasser tried to persuade him to ally himself definitely with Schleicher. He had to make his choice. Weighing the power and influence of each, Hitler arrived at the conclusion that the Junkers were the most important force within the Prusso-Teutonic group. Next came heavy industry. These two forces, furthermore, got along quite well, and von Papen was the man of both. He must therefore treat him with respect. Schleicher was the man of the Reichswehr, and the Reichswehr itself only executed the commands of the two other groups; therefore it was a less important force. Hitler's choice was made: he chose, as usual, the stronger. He could get rid of Schleicher without risk if he were supported by von Papen and the powers behind him. The operation he had in mind was not so simple as it sounded. It was a matter of discarding Schleicher and molding von Papen to his wishes. To succeed in this he knew of an infallible method: to set the two men against each other and make them do the job he had in mind. After the fall of Bruening von Papen was a logical candidate for the office of Chancellor. If Hitler could succeed in getting von Papen overthrown through the good offices of Schleicher, and Schleicher later overthrown through the aid of von Papen, the trick would be turned and Hitler himself could succeed to power. By instigating this double action without bringing himself into the picture, Hitler foresaw the advantage of having both men find themselves in direct opposition to each other without getting himself involved. This was the classical system so frequently applied in Prussian history when competing nations were divided by getting each to believe the Prussians were on their side. Thus Bismarck succeeded in dividing and isolating Denmark from Austria on the one hand, and Austria from France on the other. The same Prussian system was to be used later by Hitler in the international game when he tried to make the nations allied against him believe-one after the other-that he intended to ally himself with that nation against the others. Hitler used this system successfully in 1939 when he managed to separate Russia from England; and in 1940 when he made the France of Petain believe that Nazi Germany could be a more valuable ally for France than England. And it was this same system that Hitler tried to apply in 1941, this time without success, when he attempted to persuade England and Russia alternately to conclude a separate peace with him so that he could later turn against the other. The game was becoming too transparent for him to succeed every time. But it's true also that the time-honored systems of "confidence men," though often exposed, nevertheless continue to claim new victims. A further parallel may be drawn between Hitler's actions in inner German politics and the methods he employs in dealing with foreign nations. To weaken his enemy, internal or external, his preferred method is to use the enemy's "minorities"—whom he wins over to his side-to his own advantage; at the same time his own minorities also serve his purposes. Notwithstanding the traditional fidelity of the Reichswehr toward the Junkers, he knew how to set General Schleicher against the Junkers without putting himself in evidence. He thus succeeded in causing a division among his victims, using the "minority" in the opposing camp, while his own "minorities," Gregor Strasser and Roehm, were, due to their influence on Schleicher, unconscious tools of this transaction. Likewise, Hitler managed to put to good use foreign connections of a man such as Abetz, known earlier for his pacifist activities. Abetz was to bring him several French "leftist collaborationists," jean Luchaire for example, who had formerly worked hard in behalf of the League of Nations. Hider knows how to transform former opponents of his ideas into useful tools. pps. 154-196 ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, All My Relations. Omnia Bona Bonis, Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance—not soap-boxing—please! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'—with its many half-truths, mis- directions and outright frauds—is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. 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